The Queen v. the Justices of Kent
[1873] 8 Q.B. 305(Judgment by: Blackburn J (including background))
Between: The Queen
And: the Justices of Kent
Judges:
Blackburn J
Quain J
Archibald J
Subject References:
Appeal, Signature to Notice of
12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 1
'Signed by the Person giving the same or by his Attorney'
Judgment date: 1 May 1873
Judgment by:
Blackburn J (including background)
By 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 1, a notice of appeal to a Court of Quarter Sessions "shall be in writing, signed by the person or persons giving the same, or by his, her, or their attorney on his, her, or their behalf":-
Held, that a notice of appeal signed in the appellant's name by the clerk to his attorney with the appellant's authority was sufficient.
RULE calling upon the justices of Kent to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, commanding them to cause to be entered continuances, & c., upon the appeal of the Rev. Joseph Weld, against a certain rate or assessment made by the Commissioners of the Rother Levels, and to hear and determine the merits of the same.
On the 29th of May, 1872, the Commissioners of the Rother Levels duly made a scott or rate of certain sums per acre on all lands lying within their jurisdiction, which scott or rate was payable on the 18th of October, 1872, and the lands of Weld, amongst others, were so rated. On the 30th of November, Weld appealed against the rate to the quarter sessions. On the 31st of December the appeal was heard, and it was proved that the notice of appeal was signed in Weld's name by the clerk to his attorney, by Weld's authority. It was then objected, on behalf of the commissioners, that the notice of appeal was insufficient, as the signature of the appellant was not in his handwriting.
The quarter sessions held that the notice of appeal was bad, and dismissed the appeal.
Stanhope shewed cause. Section 1 of 12 & 13 Vict., c. 45, requires that the notice of appeal shall be "signed by the person giving the same or by his attorney." The notice is not signed by the appellant nor by his attorney; the statute therefore is not complied with, and the appeal was rightly dismissed. The object of the Act in requiring that the notice shall be signed by the appellant or by his attorney is, that there should be some guarantee that the appeal is bonâ fide; and the language of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, shews that the signature must be that of the appellant or his attorney, and of no one else. In Hyde v. Johnson [F1] an acknowledgment to take a debt out of the statute of limitations signed by an agent, was held to be insufficient; in Toms v. Cuming [F2] the signature by an agent to an objection under the Registration Acts to a person on the list of voters was held insufficient; and in Miles v. Bough [F3] a local Act required that in all cases in which it was necessary that certain trustees should give any notice under the Act, "such notice shall be in writing, and be signed by any three or more of the trustees, or by the clerk or clerks to the trustees," and it was held that a notice signed with the names of the clerks to the trustees, but signed, in fact, not by such clerks, but by a clerk employed by them, was insufficient. In the present case the Act has pointed out the appellant or his attorney as the person to sign the notice of appeal; there can, therefore, be no delegation of that authority.
Barrow and Biron in support of the rule. The signature of the clerk to the notice of appeal having been affixed by the authority of the appellant, the maxim, qui facit per alium facit per se, applies, and the notice of appeal is valid. In Toms v. Cuming [F2] the statute 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 100, required that the notice of objection should be personally signed by the objector; and in Hyde v. Johnson, [F1] the statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, required the acknowledgment to be signed by the party chargeable thereby. These two cases turned upon the particular words of the statutes. Reg. v. Middlesex, [F4] is in point. In that case the notice of appeal against an order of removal was signed by the appellant's attorney. The 9 Geo. 1, c. 7, s. 8, required that "reasonable notice be given by the churchwardens or overseers of the poor of such parish or place, who shall make such appeal." Patteson, J., says, "There is no case distinctly in point as to whether a notice of appeal signed by the attorney of the parish officers of the appellant parish is sufficient. The general principle is, qui facit per alium facit per se. That sanctions the rule that a man may ordinarily give a notice by means of his agent or attorney." Applying that general principle to this case, the notice of appeal is valid. [They were then stopped.]
Blackburn, J. - No doubt at common law, where a person authorizes another to sign for him, the signature of the person so signing is the signature of the person authorizing it; nevertheless there may be cases in which a statute may require personal signature. It was so held in Hyde v. Johnson, [F5] on the ground that Lord Tenterden's Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 14) must be read in pari materiâ with the Statute of Frauds, and that, upon the construction of those statutes the legislature must be taken to have intended a personal signature. So also in Toms v. Cuming [F6] it was held that a notice of objection under the Registration Acts must be personally signed by the objector, that being the intention of the legislature. But in Reg. v. Middlesex, [F7] Patteson, J., held that a notice of appeal might be signed by an attorney, there being nothing in the statute 9 Geo. 1, c. 7, s. 8, which required the churchwardens and overseers to sign personally. In 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 1, the language is, shall be "signed by the person giving the same or by his attorney." Here the clerk, having full authority from the appellant, signed for him, and this is a sufficient signing at common law. I see nothing in this statute that makes a personal signature necessary, and the rule must therefore be made absolute.