Maunsell v Olins

[1975] AC 373

(Judgment by: Viscount Dilhorne) Court:
HOUSE OF LORDS

Judges: Lord Reid

Viscount Dilhorne
Lord Wilberforce
Lord Diplock
Lord Simon of Glaisdale

Judgment date: 27 November 1974


Judgment by:
Viscount Dilhorne

My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Wilberforce, and I agree with him that this appeal should be dismissed.

The event which led to the enactment of s 41 of the Housing Repairs and Rents Act 1954, now replaced by s 18(5) of the Rent Act 1968, clearly was the decision in Cow v Casey . That was the 'mischief' which s 41 was designed to cure, and while Parliament may, of course, have intended to do more than just cure the mischief, that should not be readily assumed and I see nothing in s 41 that leads me to that conclusion. The Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 contains a separate code for dealing with agricultural holdings. It gives power to the Minister to make regulations dealing with the situation where a tenant of such a holding has sublet a dwelling-house on a protected tenancy, and the superior tenancy has been lawfully determined. No such regulations have been made and it would, indeed, be surprising to me if Parliament, in an Act dealing with housing and rents, had intended s 41 to apply to agricultural holdings, that no reference should be made to such a holding. Unless the word 'premises' in s 41 of the 1954 Act and in s 18(5) of the 1968 Act is to be interpreted as applying to the subject-matter of the superior letting, whatever that subject-matter may be, the argument that those sections apply where the superior letting is an agricultural holding must fail.

'Premises' is an ordinary word of the English language which takes colour and content from the context in which it is used. A reference to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary shows this to be the case. It has, in my opinion, no recognised and established primary meaning. Frequently it is used in relation to structures of one kind or another. No one would, I think, in the ordinary use of the English language refer to farm land as 'premises' though farm buildings may often be referred to as 'farm premises'. I do not think that it is right, when Parliament uses that word in a statute to conclude that it is intended to have the meaning that conveyances attach to it unless a contrary intention appears. It is for these reasons that, in my opinion, whatever may be the scope of ss 41 and 18(5), it does not extend to include a superior letting of an agricultural holding. Such a holding is not 'premises' in the sense in which that word is used in the sections.

My noble and learned friend, Lord Wilberforce, goes on to consider what the word 'premises' in these sections should be taken to mean. In my opinion, it means 'dwelling-houses'. They are what the 1954 Act and the 1968 Act were concerned with and, in my view, the dwelling-houses which are covered by the word 'premises' are those which for the purposes of these Acts are treated as such. But if that is not right, then I think that the word should be given the slightly wider meaning of 'buildings'. It is often used in that sense. Whether it covers, as I think, dwelling-houses in the sense in which those words are used in those Acts or means buildings, it is another thing to say that it covers acres of arable and pasture land and to say that just by the use of that one word, it is to be concluded that Parliament meant the section to encroach on the sphere of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948.

Our task is to interpret the sections 'according to the intent of them that made it' [F1] . It is not for us to decide whether a sub-tenant with a protected tenancy on a farm, the subject of the superior letting, should be placed in the same position as a sub-tenant of a dwelling-house on a protected tenancy when that sub-tenancy has been carved out of the tenancy of a dwelling-house or other building which is not protected. That involves questions of policy and all we have to do is to decide whether the sections apply in this case. The use of the word 'premises' is not, in my opinion sufficient to justify the conclusion that Parliament intended to restrict the common law rights of the owner of the freehold of a farm.

Why, then, it may be asked, was the word 'premises' used in s 41? One can only speculate as to that and the wording closely follows that of the headnote in Cow v Casey . The intention of Parliament could by the use of different and possibly more words have been put beyond doubt. Perhaps this is an instance where the desire for brevity in an enactment has led to litigation which might have been avoided. However this may be, in the process of consolidation, it would not, in my view, have been right to change the word from 'premises' to something else and I accordingly attach no significance to the fact that that word is repeated in s 18(5) of the 1968 Act.

The fact that a different word or words might have been used does not lead me to the conclusion that premises in the sections covers an agricultural holding and, for the reasons I have stated, I think it does not.