McNicol and Anor v Pinch

[1906] 2 K.B. 352

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(Judgment by: Ridley J)

Between: McNicol and Anor
And: Pinch

Court:

Judges: Bray J
Darling J

Ridley J

Subject References:
REVENUE
Excise Licence
Manufacture of Saccharin
Prescribed Book

Legislative References:
Finance Act, 1901 (1 Edw. 7, c. 7) - s. 9
Revenue Act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7, c. 46) - s. 2
Regulations (No. 633 of Statutory Rules and Orders, 1904) -

Judgment date: 22 June 1906

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Judgment by:
Ridley J

I am very sorry to find myself in conflict with the opinion of my learned brothers upon this point; but it is some satisfaction to reflect that that which occurred in the present case is not likely to happen frequently; for I understand that the importation of saccharin of 330 strength is not usual, and may not recur; and it is also some satisfaction to think that it is upon a very special subject that we are found to be in difference, namely, upon the meaning of the word "manufacture."

I cannot help thinking that the appellants did manufacture saccharin. It is difficult to define the word; and I shall not endeavour to find a better definition than has been given. I do not think the word is synonymous with "make." For example, you "make" a bridge, but you do not "manufacture" it. It is not the "manufacturing" of a bridge; it is the "making" of it. That is only one instance. It may be that in some particular instances the word "manufacture" is equivalent to "make." But we must endeavour to arrive at some sort of definition of "manufacture," and I think that where any process of art is used upon some substance it is "manufactured." To say that a person does not "manufacture" a thing because it has the same name after the process has been passed upon it as it had before seems to me - but I suppose I am wrong - to be simply a question of words. If there had happened to be another word for saccharin of the strength of 550, different from saccharin of the strength of 330, it would almost - I will not say quite - follow from the reasoning of my learned brothers that this would have been a manufacture. I cannot think that that is so.

Take the case of the manufacture of steel; and let it be steel before it goes into the works: apply some process to it and it becomes a particular sort of steel. But it is steel both before and after, although steel of different qualities. Is not that the manufacture of steel? I should have thought so. Take the manufacture of wool. It is wool when it is on the sheep's back; it is wool when it has passed through the process of sorting and picking which it has to go through in the mill. Is not that the manufacture of wool? I should have thought it most certainly was, although the name "wool" is applied to it both before the process begins and after it has ended.

I think, therefore, that this saccharin was "manufactured," using the word in its ordinary sense. But I gather that some reliance is placed upon the opposite view for this reason - that it was already a commercial article when it was only of 330 strength, and that it could have been used in commerce without undergoing this process. The same remark applies to steel and to many other substances which may be quoted. They are manufactured although they could have been used in commerce before the process was passed upon them. For some commercial purposes which they knew would be beneficial to them the appellants changed the strength of this substance into another strength; and I think they were, in so doing, passing upon it a process of art, which, although it left it in the main the same substance, still was a manufacture of that saccharin.

That being so, in my opinion the word "manufacture" of saccharin does cover a process such as this. But I am aware we have to consider the meaning of the word "manufactured" in the Finance Act, 1901, where the word is used in the body of the Act in the same sense apparently as the word "made" in s. 5. I do not think that that consideration carries the matter a great deal further. I rather feel that we ought not to interfere with the ordinary sense of this word unless we can see something which compels us to do so. I cannot help thinking that in giving their decision as they have there has been some apprehension on the part of my brothers that another duty will be charged upon this stuff when it is made, as it has been said, for the second time. I do not know how that is, but I conceive I have nothing to do with it. I think the intention of the Legislature was to say that there shall be an inspection of the works belonging to persons who manufacture saccharin, and that in so dealing with the matter in s. 9 they were preventing the possibility of abuses such as those which have been indicated by the Attorney-General. I feel that with hardship or no hardship we have nothing to do. I think, however, the Legislature must give protection to the Revenue if it is required; but I understand it is not in practice required. I think that that sort of consideration ought not to influence us in our decision, if we should come to the conclusion that "manufacture" does include this sort of process.

I only desire to say one other word: "made" and "manufactured" appear to be used in the same sense in respect of the manufacture of glucose in s. 5 of the Act of 1901. Sub-s. 2 of that section provides that "The duty on glucose may be charged either on the quantity actually manufactured ...." I think that the word "manufactured" must be read as equivalent to the word "made" in sub-s. 1 of the section, where it says "on glucose made." That refers to the result, and the words are in the case of glucose synonymous; but I cannot quite see why, if for the purposes of that section the two words are synonymous, it makes any difference to my reading of the word "manufacture" in s. 9. That section refers to the process. It is said "because you manufacture it, because you cause it to undergo a process, not because you make it, you ought to have the licence." The two sections appear to me to be dealing so far with a different subject-matter.

I can only say I have come to this conclusion with much regret. I know it to be a subject of much doubt, or we should have been able to be in agreement upon it.

My learned brothers being of the other opinion, the result is that the appeal will be allowed.

Conviction quashed.

Solicitors for appellants: H. Pumfrey Jones & Co., for W. J. Sharratt, Manchester.

Solicitor for respondent: Solicitor of Inland Revenue.