RAFFERTY v FC of T

Members:
G Hughes M

Tribunal:
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Melbourne

MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION: [2017] AATA 636

Decision date: 10 May 2017

Dr G Hughes (Member)

Reconstitution

1. This application was heard by the Tribunal on 17 and 18 May 2016. The Tribunal's decision was reserved as of 7 September 2016. On 7 March 2017 the President of the Tribunal exercised his power under s 19D (2)(b) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act), reconstituting the Tribunal and appointing me to continue this proceeding. Section 19D(4) of the AAT Act provides:

The reconstituted Tribunal must continue the proceeding. For this purpose, it may have regard to any record of the proceeding before the tribunal as previously constituted (including a record of any evidence taken in the proceeding).

The President did this after he was formally requested to do so by Deputy President S A Forgie and he had consulted the Tribunal as previously constituted.

2. In writing these reasons for decision, I had regard to all documents, including the documents the Respondent had provided under s 37 of the AAT Act. I also had regard to documents admitted into evidence in the course of the hearing and a Transcript of Proceedings for case number 2015/3723.

Background

3. The Applicant was seeking a review of a decision by the Respondent on 27 March 2015 to disallow in full her objection to a Notice of Amended Assessment issued for the income year ending 30 June 2013 (FY2013).

4. On an audit of the Applicant's income tax return for FY2013, the Respondent had disallowed claimed deductions amounting to $22,147.00 for work related car expenses. The Respondent issued an amended assessment for FY2013, giving rise to a taxation shortfall amount owed by the Applicant. The Respondent also assessed the Applicant as being liable to an administrative penalty of 25% of the shortfall amount, being $2,895.00, on the basis that the Applicant had failed to take reasonable care in preparing her tax return for FY2013. On objection and at the Tribunal, the Applicant disputed both the decision not to allow the deductions in question and the imposition of an administrative penalty.

5. The Applicant asserted that the deductions for her work related car expenses were allowable on the basis that she was required to carry bulky tools and equipment to and from work. The equipment comprised safety and protective clothing and equipment supplied to her by her employer.


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Legislation

6. Section 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 allows a deduction for losses and outgoings to the extent to which they are incurred in gaining or producing assessable income. Specifically, it provides that:

(1) You can deduct from your assessable income any loss or outgoing to the extent that:

  • (a) it is incurred in gaining or producing your assessable income; or
  • (b) it is necessarily incurred in carrying on a *business for the purpose of gaining or producing your assessable income.

(2) However, you cannot deduct the loss or outgoing under this section to the extent that:

  • (a) it is a loss or outgoing of capital, or of a capital nature; or
  • (b) it is a loss or outgoing of a private or domestic nature; or
  • (c) it is incurred in relation to gaining or producing your *exempt income or your *non-assessable non-exempt income; or
  • (d) a provision of this Act prevents you from deducting it.

7. In the event that a car expense is deemed to be deductible, division 28 of the Act sets out several methods for determining the deductable amount. The particular methods which may be applicable depend on the facts of each case. Extensive submission were made on how division 28 of the Act should be applied, however for the reasons that follow the Tribunal does not consider it necessary their application.

8. In considering the arguments and reaching my conclusion I was also mindful of section 14ZZK of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (TAA) which provides that:

On an application for review of reviewable objection decision:

  • (a) the applicant is, unless the Tribunal orders otherwise, limited to the ground stated in the taxation objection to which the decision relates; and
  • (b) the applicant has the burden of proving:
    • (i) if the taxation decision concerned is an assessment - the assessment is excessive or otherwise incorrect and what the assessment should have been; or
    • (ii) in any other case - that the taxation decision concerned should not have been made or should have been made differently.

Discussion

9. There were, in effect, four issues for consideration by the Tribunal:

  • (a) In order to determine whether the expenses were deductable:
    • (i) whether the Applicant was required to wear protective gear at work; and
    • (ii) if so, whether it was necessary for her to transport the gear by car between work and home;
  • (b) if the expenses were deductable, whether the Applicant had correctly calculated her deduction for work-related car expenses; and
  • (c) if the Applicant had incorrectly claimed or incorrectly calculated her deduction, whether an administrative penalty should apply.

Whether the Applicant was required to wear protective gear at work

10. During the FY2013, the Applicant was employed as a stevedore by DP World Australia Ltd (DP World) as a Variable Salaried Employee (VSE). A VSE is a permanent employee, regularly engaged to work, who is paid the minimum salary in accordance with the applicable enterprise agreement.

11. The Applicant performed a number of functions at DP World. For a majority of her shifts (98 out of 109) in FY2013, the Applicant was primarily engaged in either driving a straddle or performing clerical work. The Tribunal was told that a straddle is a piece of machinery used for lifting containers.

12.


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The Respondent contended that during the relevant year the Applicant would have only been required to make a maximum of two changes of uniform. The Respondent contended that personal protective equipment (PPE) was not required for the clerical work whilst the only additional equipment required for straddle driving was a headlight for night work.

13. The Applicant disputed the Respondent's contention in this regard. She gave evidence that whilst driving a straddle itself did not necessitate the use of PPE or a change of clothes, it could never be predicted whether and to what extent her duties would require her to perform other tasks as well.

14. The Applicant emphasised that although she may have been rostered to do straddle work, and been paid at the straddle rate, the company record would not necessarily be an accurate indication of the task she actually undertook. In other words, the company records did not necessarily reflect how much work she undertook which required a greater range of PPE.

15. It was not uncommon, according to the Applicant, to perform more than one role in a shift, nor was it uncommon for this to create the need to change high-visibility clothing between tasks due to contamination from grease and sweat. The Applicant further explained that, unlike other industries, stevedores are expected to work across the full range of weather conditions. When working on a ship, conditions were extremely greasy and dirty.

16. The Applicant said that the nature of her job was such that she was constantly changing clothing. She had the potential to change her role two or three times. This impacted on the amount of clothing she was required to store.

17. Citing the International Labour Organisation Code of Practice, the Applicant observed that PPE for stevedores included:

  • • protective footwear;
  • • safety helmets;
  • • overalls;
  • • appropriate foul-weather clothing;
  • • high-visibility clothing/outer garments;
  • • gloves;
  • • hearing protection;
  • • weather and heat-resistant clothing.

18. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant may have been required to have access to the full range of PPE, given the potential diversity of her tasks. It also accepts that the Applicant may have required one, and perhaps two, changes of uniform. The next question is whether, and to what extent, she was required to transport this equipment between home and work.

Whether it was necessary for the Applicant to transport the gear by car between work and home

19. It was not in contention that as a general proposition, expenses involved in travelling from home to work and back again are not deductible. In
Lunney v Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 100 CLR 478 at 485, the High Court described the issue of whether travel between home and work is tax deductable as:

… a question of income tax law which has been accepted as settled for the last two generations. It is whether the fares are paid by ordinary people to enable them to go day by day to their regular place of employment or business and back to their homes are deductable expenses…

20. Taxation Ruling TR95/34 Income tax: employees carrying out itinerant work - deductions, allowances and reimbursements for transport expenses sets out the exception to the general rule. The exception applies where a taxpayer is required to carry bulky tools and/or equipment which are essential for his or her employment and in respect of which there was no other way of conveying that equipment to work. TR95/34 outlines at [63] that this exception would not apply if the equipment was transported to and from work as a matter of convenience or personal choice.

21.


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In
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Vogt (1975) 5 ATR 274, Waddell J allowed the travel expenses of a musician who transported bulky musical equipment between his home and various places of work. His Honour considered that there were three matters relevant to a determination of the essential character of the expenditure at 279:

Firstly, the expenditure was incurred as part of the operations by which the taxpayer earnt his income. Secondly, it was essential to the carrying on of those operations; there was no other practicable way of getting his instruments to the places where he wants to perform. Thirdly, in a practical sense, the expenditure should be attributable to the carriage of the taxpayer's instrument rather than to his travel to the places of performance. The mode of his travel was simply a consequence of the means which he employed to get his instruments to the place of performance, that is by carrying them in the motor vehicle which he drove.

22. It is thus necessary to determine what equipment the Applicant was required to transport between home and work.

23. The Applicant emphasised that she was required to have the requisite PPE with her at the workplace for any situation which arose. She was required to have both wet weather gear and other gear available at all times, including, spare clothing as required. She said that the PPE which she transported were essentially items that she cleaned and maintained at home in order to keep them usable and suitable for work use. Apart from anything else, high-visibility clothing could lose its visibility if covered in grease. She stated that she only transported items to her home for the purposes of home laundering.

24. In the Tribunal's opinion, there was no necessity for the Applicant to transport her hard hat, safety glasses, hearing protection or head light. There is no reason, on the evidence before the Tribunal, why she was required to transport these items home in order to clean them. Her overalls were laundered by the employer. The Respondent contended, and the Tribunal agrees, that it would only have necessary, and justifiable, for the Applicant to transport her shirts and trousers, and occasional wet weather gear.

25. Having concluded what equipment it was necessary for the taxpayer to carry out his or her income producing activity, it is next necessary to consider whether the weight or dimensions of this gear were such that it required transportation and, if so, whether the use of a motor vehicle was necessary or was simply a matter of personal preference.

26. Relevant to this issue is the question of whether the equipment was bulky. The Respondent observed that there was no exact definition of bulky. Bulky can embrace equipment which is cumbersome to carry, due to its size and weight. The term is not defined in TR95/34, but a number of cases are illustrative in determining what is or is not bulky.

27. In
Re Crestani and Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 40 ATR 1037, Senior Member Block concluded that the taxpayer's box of tools, which was 10 inches wide, 10 and a half inches high and about 22 and a half inches long, and which weighed approximately 27 kilos, was bulky. It was not easy to lift and could not conveniently be carried any distance. Senior Member Block observed at [7]:

I do not think that the term "bulky" should be construed to refer only to an article which is of large size, such as the musical instruments which were the subject of the decision in FCT v Vogt… The term is, in my view, more aptly to be construed as similar to "cumbersome" in the sense that it is not easily portable.

28. In
Re Yeates and Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 92 ATR 980, the Tribunal rejected a claim for the deduction of travelling expenses between home and work by an aircraft pilot who claimed he was required to carry extremely heavy flight manuals and other materials, as well as earphones and a video camera, in two bulky bags for which there is no secure storage at the Sydney airport base. The


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Tribunal was persuaded by evidence from the employer that only a few of these items were actually required on board the aircraft, and therefore did not fall within the exception.

29. As noted above, a distinction must be drawn between circumstances in which the taxpayer has no option but to transport the gear in his or her vehicle, and circumstances where this is simply a matter of personal preference. In
Re Sciberras and Commissioner of Taxation [2011] AATA 509, the Tribunal rejected a claim based on the transportation of tools by a fuel tanker driver to and from work. The Applicant in that case asserted that he required the tools in order to promptly restore his vehicle to roadworthiness when the need arose. The Tribunal found that the Award did not require the Applicant to carry tools to work or to repair his vehicle. The employer had an alternative scheme for repairs and furthermore, numerous of the items were shown to be matters of personal choice. The tools were not used to produce the result for which the Applicant was employed. As Senior Member Letcher observed at [48], "Mr Sciberras has attempted to elevate a choice into a condition, an option into a requirement".

30. The Tribunal does not consider that the gear which was essential for the Applicant to transport was in itself bulky, assuming of course that she was able to leave the remainder of her PPE in secure storage at work. The question then becomes whether the Applicant's employer provided suitable storage facilities for the Applicant's essential work clothing.

31. TR95/34 sets out at [64] the general rule that a deduction is not allowable if a secure area for storage of equipment was provided at the workplace. The adequacy of security measures is clearly a question of fact.

32. It was not disputed the Applicant had a personal locker at her workplace. The Applicant's evidence was that her locker was approximately 171cm tall, 30cm wide and 45cm deep. A photograph of the locker was tendered in evidence. The Applicant told the Tribunal that PPE which she was required to wear, including a jacket, overalls and pants, do not all fit in my locker when you take into account that my personal property also needs to be apportioned.

33. At most, according to the Respondent, the Applicant would have been required to transport her shirts and trousers, and these could not be considered bulky. The Respondent contended that, given the size of her allocated locker, the Applicant could have stored 2 full changes of uniform for each shift that she worked or, to the extent that the equipment did not fit, whatever remained would not be bulky.

34. The Applicant acknowledged that some of the gear which she stored, such as a rain jacket and jumper, were not part of the PPE requirements but were relevant to occupational health and safety procedures. She acknowledged that she would not be sent home for not wearing such gear but that if she was particularly cold, she would not be able to perform her shift.

35. The Applicant explained that her personal items included her lunch. Her personal supplies included six cans of Coca-Cola. She said she drank Coca-Cola like other people drink coffee.

36. A witness statement was tendered from Vlad Jotic, Senior Manager, Corporate Development, of the Applicant's employer. He said he had been employed at DP World since August 2008. He confirmed the dimensions of the lockers which were made available for employees for the purpose of storing their PPE.

37. Mr Jotic considered that the locker space was sufficiently large and secure to store the Applicants entire allocation of PPE, even if the Applicant was required to perform and/or switch between different tasks during his shift. He explained that, although certain tasks would expose employees to more grease, dirt and grime compared with other tasks, it would not be expected that an employee needed to change clothing more than twice in a shift.

38. Mr Jotic was not available for cross-examination in relation to his witness statement. However, further evidence was provided by Nicholas O'Connell, National Manager of Optimisation and Efficiency for DP World. Mr O'Connell's evidence was consistent in all material respects with Mr Jotic's witness statement.

39.


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In
Re Ford and Commissioner of Taxation [2014] AATA 361, the Tribunal rejected, as a matter of fact, the taxpayer's contention that he could not fit his essential gear - comprising a bag, overcoat, raincoat and wet weather boots - into a locker provided by his employer, Rail Corp without squashing or forcing the rigid-framed bag. This led Deputy President Frost to conclude at [25] - [27]:

Once it is accepted that all the equipment that is essential, to Mr Ford's employment activity… would fit into the secure locker provided for him at Moss Vale station, his deduction claim must fail… given those findings, then to the extent that Mr Ford carries essential equipment between work and home, he does so as a matter of personal choice. His circumstances do not support a re-characterisation of his transport expenses out of the category of non-deductable private transport into that of a deductable work related activity.

40. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal concludes that the size of the storage space made available to the Applicant was adequate for her essential equipment.

41. The suitability of the space does, however, require a further consideration of its security. The Applicant told the Tribunal that the storage facility provided by the Respondent was susceptible to break-in. Mr Jotic stated that in my time as the Operations Superintendent, I was not made aware of any locker break-ins nor of any thefts from lockers. Mr Jotic also stated that he had undertaken a search of the complaints register, maintained by DP World and there are no registered complaints of break-ins of the lockers in the 2013 income year.

42. The Applicant took issue with the assertion that personal goods were secure and that there had been no reports of theft. She alleged there was a code of silence which hindered investigations into incidents that occurred. She argued that the fact that management was never made aware of break-ins, or theft from lockers, had to be viewed in this context.

43. The Applicant said that the lockers themselves were not secure despite the fact that they had individual locks. The locker room could be accessed by anyone even though it was a female locker room. The room had a deadlock but it was commonly left open or jammed ajar by a rubbish bin or cleaning sign. The room was essentially accessible by anyone inside the terminal boundary. The Respondent contended, and the Tribunal agrees, that the security of the locker room was not the relevant consideration. The relevant matter in this case is the security of the individual lockers.

44. A witness statement was tendered from a workmate of the Applicant, Sharon Lee Bowker, describing incidences of unauthorised access to female lockers, and referring also to the unique culture and behaviours at the workplace.

45. The Applicant told the Tribunal that my workplace is not like a normal workplace, and that if I was to leave property lying around - like I left a pair of safety glasses laying around - they wouldn't be there in two hours' time.

46. The Applicant further articulated her perception of the work environment in the following terms:

Anything that is not locked up goes missing. As in, boots have gone missing that have been left out. Shoelaces have been taken out of boots because someone else needed them. Helmet - you leave your helmet lying around, it goes. Gloves that get left lying around go.

47. In response to a question from the Respondent's counsel as to why equipment would be stolen if it was issued by the employer in any event, the Applicant explained that it would be re-sold. The Respondent asserted that, given that items were labelled with the employer's logo, they would have little saleable value if taken.

48. The adequacy of security measures was considered by the Tribunal in
Re Reany and Commissioner of Taxation [2016] AATA 672. The taxpayer was seeking a deduction in respect of the transport of bulky tools and


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equipment from home to work. The taxpayer's evidence in that case was that he elected to take the tools and equipment each night because he did not believe the storage lockers provided by his employer were secure. He thought they could be easily broken into and that his tools and equipment could be stolen. The Tribunal concluded in that case that, on the facts, the Applicant's necessary or essential tools and equipment could in fact be securely stored in his locker at work and on this basis, the claim for a deduction of travelling expenses was rejected. In support of this conclusion, At [56], Senior Member Walsh emphasised that:

Mr Reany's view that the storage lockers were not secure is simply that, his view. It is not supported by objective evidence. As stated, the one break in that did occur at the worksite occurred after the end of the 2012 year, and further, it is unclear from the evidence whether the break-in was to workshop/shed or to the lockers within the workshop/shed.

49. The Tribunal is not convinced, on the evidence before it, that the locker facility made available to the Applicant was insecure. It is persuaded in particular by the evidence of the employer in this regard. It accepts that the Applicant held concerns about the security off her belongings, but this was not necessarily a view shared by a cross-section of workmates. The fact that the Applicant chose to be cautious with her belongings does not mean that those belongs were otherwise unsafe if left in the facilities provided by her employer.

50. Having considered the evidence, the Tribunal has found that the expenses the Applicant incurred travelling to and from work do not satisfy the exception to the general rule that such expenses are private expenses. It follows that they do not satisfy the requirements of pursuant to section 8-1 of the Act. The Applicant therefore cannot be said to discharge her burden of proving that the assessment which disallowed the deductions was excessive or otherwise incorrect.

Whether the Applicant correctly calculated her deduction

51. In submissions and at the hearing, the amount of the deduction that could be claimed was also disputed. Given the Tribunal's conclusion in relation to the deductibility of the expenses claimed by the Applicant, it is unnecessary to focus in this decision on the dispute between the parties as to whether the amount of the deduction was correctly calculated.

Administrative penalty

52. In addition to objecting to the assessment disallowing the deduction, the applicant has objected to the subsequent assessment that she was liable to pay an administrative penalty. The Applicant had sought a deduction of $22,147 for work related car expenses. Following the notice of amended assessment in relation to the Applicant's FY2013 income, the Applicant was assessed as being liable to a 25% penalty, pursuant to Item 3 in Section 284-90 of Schedule 1 of the TAA.

53. Section 284-75 of Schedule 1 to the TAA provides:

You are liable to an administrative penalty if:

  • (a) you make a statement to the Commissioner or to an entity that is exercising powers or performing functions under a * taxation law * (other than the * Excise Acts); and
  • (b) the statement is false or misleading in a material particular, whether because of things in it or omitted from it.

Note: This section applies to a statement made by your agent as if it had been made by you: see section 284-25.

54. Section 284-80(1) of the TAA provides:

You have a shortfall amount if an item in this table applies to you. That amount is the amount by which the relevant liability, or the payment or credit, is less than or more than it would otherwise have been.

Shortfall amounts
Item You have a shortfall amount in this situation:
1 A *tax-related liability of yours for an accounting period, or for a *taxable importation, or under the Superannuation (Unclaimed Money and Lost Members) Act 1999, worked out on the basis of the statement is less than it would be if the statement were not false or misleading

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55. Section 284-90(1) of Schedule 1 of the TAA provides:

The base penalty amount under this Subdivision is worked out using this table and section 284-224 if relevant:

Base penalty amount
Item In this situation: The base penalty amount is:
   
3 You have a *shortfall amount as a result of a statement described in subsection 284-75(1) or (4) and the amount, or part of the amount, resulted from a failure by you or your agent to take reasonable care to comply with a *taxation law (other than the *Excise Acts) 25% of your *shortfall amount or part
   

Whether an administrative penalty was correctly imposed

56. The Tribunal has found that the expenses claimed were not deductible. It must therefore consider whether the assessment that the Applicant was liable to a penalty was excessive or otherwise incorrect. The Respondent submitted that the assessment of a 25% administrative penalty was correct.

57. Specifically, the Respondent contended that the Applicant's failure to take reasonable care arose on the basis that the claim for work related car expenses should not have been made at all, and that, further, when the claim was made, reasonable care was not given in making the relevant communications. The Respondent relied particularly on the Applicant's evidence at the hearing, where she admitted under cross examination that she had advised her tax agent that her locker at work was tiny. When it was then put to her that this advice formed the basis… or was the reason why a car expense was made in the first place, she agreed.

58. The Tribunal cannot avoid the conclusion that the Applicant failed to take reasonable care in the preparation of her tax return for the relevant financial year, notwithstanding the fact that she may have acted in good faith. She engaged the services of a tax agent who should have been aware of the correct taxation treatment of the expenses claimed as deductions. It remained the Applicant's responsibility to properly record matters relating to her tax affairs and to draw the relevant facts to the attention of the tax agent.

59. The Tribunal makes no determination as to whether fault ultimately lay with the Applicant or the tax agent. As noted in section 284-75 of Schedule 1 to the TAA, the effect of section 284-25 of Schedule 1 to the TAA is that the provisions relying to penalties relate to statements made by a taxpayer's tax agent as if they were made by the taxpayer.

60. The fact remains that the amount claimed by way of deduction was very high in comparison to the Applicant's income, and out of keeping with the manner in which her previous tax returns had been prepared. The Applicant, or her agent should, in the Tribunal's opinion, have been aware that


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the claimed deduction was unlikely to be sustainable. The Applicant further admitted at the hearing that she described her locker to her tax agent as tiny and agreed that this was the basis on which the claim for the car related expense was made in the first place. Given the findings of fact made above in relation to the locker, this statement and the lack of subsequent enquiries made before reliance on it in claiming the deduction are indicative of a lack of reasonable care.

61. The Applicant argued that the of the administrative penalty should not be imposed on the basis that she had used a registered accountant, provided him with details of expenses incurred and paid an additional fee to have vehicle expenses calculated. She also asserted that she had demonstrated in her view appropriate justification for her claim.

62. Section 284-75(5) of Schedule 1 of the TAA provides:

You are not liable to an administrative penalty under subsection (1) or (4) for a statement that is false or misleading in a material particular if you, and your * agent (if relevant), took reasonable care in connection with the making of the statement.

63. The Tribunal does not consider that sections 284-75(5) of Schedule 1 of the TAA can be applied in this case. The wording of that provision is conjunctive, requiring the taxpayer and their agent to have taken reasonable care in preparing the statement which lead to the penalty. As noted above, the Tribunal cannot avoid the conclusion in this case that the Applicant failed to take reasonable care.

64. Despite her submission noted above at [61], the Applicant did not rely on the safe harbour provisions contained section 284-75(6) of Schedule 1 of the TAA in relation to the conduct of her tax agent. She relied only on section 284-75(5) of Schedule 1 to the TAA. This was raised at the hearing, where the Respondent advised that there was no objection for leave to be granted for the Applicant to expand her grounds of review if she sought to rely on the safe harbour provisions. The Applicant nevertheless determined that she did not wish to do so.

65. Considering the above arguments, the Tribunal finds that the imposition of an administrative penalty on the Applicant's shortfall amount, calculated at 25% pursuant to Item 3 in Section 284-90 of Schedule 1 of the TAA, was correct.

Whether the administrative penalty should be remitted

66. Finally, the Applicant argued that the penalty should be remitted as a result of the exercise of the general discretion under s 298-20 of Schedule 1 of the TAA which provides:

Remission of penalty

  • (1) The Commissioner may remit all or a part of the penalty.
  • (2) If the Commissioner decides:
    • (a) not to remit the penalty; or
    • (b) to remit only part of the penalty;

    the Commissioner must give written notice of the decision and the reasons for the decision to the entity.

67. The Tribunal does not consider that a claim by the Applicant for remission can be sustained. The Tribunal considers that the circumstances contemplated by Section 298-20 of Schedule 1 to the TAA do not exist in the present case. The Section is essentially designed to address hard or perverse applications of the penalty regime imposed by the Act. In the present instance, the Applicant may not have had dishonest intent, but the fact remains that her income tax return for the relevant financial year claimed a significant deduction to which she was not entitled, and for which must therefore bear the consequences.

68. For the reasons set out above the Tribunal finds that the penalty was correctly imposed, calculated and that no basis for remission can be established. The Applicant has not satisfied the Tribunal that the assessment that she is liable to an administrative penalty on her shortfall amount, calculated at 25% pursuant to Item 3 in Section 284-90 of Schedule 1 of the TAA, is excessive or otherwise incorrect.

Decision

69. For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal confirms the decision under review.


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