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This edited version has been archived due to the length of time since original publication. It should not be regarded as indicative of the ATO's current views. The law may have changed since original publication, and views in the edited version may also be affected by subsequent precedents and new approaches to the application of the law.

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Edited version of your private ruling

Authorisation Number: 1012605180483

Ruling

Subject: Lump sum payment to medical officer for working in medical centre

Questions and Answers:

1. Does your receipt comprise a derivation of income under the ordinary concepts as outlined in section 6-5 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997)?

2. Does your receipt, or any part thereof, comprise a capital gain in respect of CGT event D1 under section 104-35 of the ITAA 1997?

3. Are the small business CGT concessions under Division 152 of the ITAA 1997 available to you in relation to the transaction?

This ruling applies for the following period

Year ending 30 June 2014

The scheme commenced on

1 July 2013

Relevant facts and circumstances

You received a lump sum payment (the "purchase price") from the purchasing company under a contract referred to as "Sale of Practice". You were approached by the company to relocate from one centre and to practice at the company's centre.

Under the contract, you must operate from the company's premises and engage the support services of the company at the exclusion of any others for a period of X years. However, there is scope for you to extend the contract for another X years. In the situation where you extend your contract, you will be paid a further separate lump sum payment.

Other relevant terms and assumptions of the contract include:

Relevant legislative provisions

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Section 6-5

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Section 104-35

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Section 118-20

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Section 995-1

Reasons for decision

Summary

Personal skills, knowledge and reputation are not capital in nature. As a practitioner, you are an independent contractor, earning income from the exercise of your personal skills, in your personal services business. You are not earning income through a business structure that you own. It follows the restrictive covenant you are subject to ties your provision of personal services (which is revenue in nature) rather than restrains a business structure (of a capital nature). Also, the courts have held payments similar to your $X payment are revenue in nature.

Detailed reasoning

No business structure

Section 995-1 of the ITAA 1997 states the term 'business' includes any profession, trade, employment, vocation or calling, but does not include occupation as an employee.

In ATO ID 2011/87, the Commissioner ruled sole medical practitioners are not employees. In the Commissioner's Decision Impact Statement on Primary Health Care Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 419; 2010 ATC 20-181; 76 ATR 749, the Commissioner classified a medical practitioner that worked in a medical centre as an "independent contractor".

In paragraphs 103 and 104 of Taxation Ruling TR 2001/14 (about non-commercial business losses), the term 'business structure' is described as a structure that provides the framework of the business or their profit yielding subject; usually a collection of capital assets. It states:

Paragraphs 262 and 263 of Taxation Ruling TR 2001/8 (about a personal services business) make the following distinctions between a 'personal services business' and a business using 'business structure':

Paragraphs 12 and 59 of Taxation Ruling TR 1999/16 (about the goodwill of a business) state:

Paragraphs 70 and 71 of Taxation Ruling TR 95/35 (about compensation receipts) state:

In your case, we consider your old practice was not a business structure since it did not comprise of a collection of assets (per TR 2001/14) and was merely a kind of business that derived income solely as a result of your personal skill and effort (per TR 2001/8). Your equipment is not a CGT asset (since it is a depreciating asset). We believe our view that your old practice was not a business is supported by clause 3.1 in your Sale of Practice contract, which has 'exclusions from sale' assets that would ordinary comprise of a business structure (such as lease rights). Since goodwill is something that attaches to a business and since goodwill (that emanates from personal reputation and skills) cannot be dealt with or transferred separately from the business with which it is associated (per TR 1999/16), using a 'look-through approach' (per TR 95/35), we consider a bona fide sale of goodwill, as purported in your Sale of Practice contract, did not occur.

For the same reasons, we consider your new practice is not a business structure since it comprises of no assets (apart from your personal skill and reputation, which is not a CGT asset) that are saleable or transferable by you.

Not capital proceeds from entering into restrictive covenant

Section 104-35 of the ITAA 1997 states CGT event D1 happens if you create a contractual right or other legal or equitable right in another entity. It provides the following example:

Taxation Ruling TR 95/3 states a restrictive covenant is an agreement between two or more parties to refrain from doing some act or thing (paragraph 6); that a restraint of trade implies that a person has contracted to give up some freedom which otherwise he would have had (paragraph 34); that a restraint of trade entitles the covenantee to protect an interest, which will usually be an interest in property, typically the goodwill of a business (paragraph 39).

In distinguishing the relevant tax treatments, paragraph 17 of TR 95/3 states:

Paragraphs 128 to 136 of TR 95/3 provide the following two examples of restrictive covenants:

Taxation Ruling No 2307 deals with the decision of Taxation Board of Review No. 3 reported as Case R123, 84 ATC 791; Case 4 28 CTBR 13, where It was held that a payment to a VHL footballer did not constitute assessable income because the contract was construed to restrain the taxpayer earning income from a former sporting profession. The judgment said:

In FC of T v Cooling 90 ATC 4472 (Cooling), it was held where a business taxpayer is given a cash incentive to enter into a lease of business premises, the incentive is income of the taxpayer because: (i) the leasing of the premises occupied are acts of the taxpayer in the course of its business activity, just as much as the trading activities that give rise more directly to the taxpayer's assessable income; and (ii) the transaction entered into by the firm was a commercial transaction; the purpose of it was to obtain a commercial profit by way of the incentive payment.

In FC of T v Montgomery 99 ATC 4749; 42 ATR 475 (Montgomery), the inducement received by the taxpayer for executing an agreement to lease business premises was held by the majority to be ordinary income. The majority said:

In McLean v FCT; Dean v FCT (1996) 32 ATR 647 (McLean), retention payments made by a parent company to the senior managers of a subsidiary, as an incentive to ensure they remained in the employ of the subsidiary after it was sold, were assessable as ordinary income. Northrop J found that, in substance and reality, the payments were the product of the managers' income-earning activities and that the "continual employment was at the very heart of the receipt".

In your case, we consider your payment was not for a restrictive covenant of a capital nature (per the example of Oil Co in TR 95/3) that restricted a business structure (you owned) and tied it to exclusively operate from a new premise. We previously explained our view why we consider you did not operate under a business structure but, instead, provided personal services as an independent contractor.

Also, we consider your payment was not for a restrictive covenant of a capital nature (per the examples in section 104-35 and Case R123) that sterilized you from conducting a certain business or profession. If that was the case you would not have had to work at the new practice but, instead, merely had to cease working at the old practice.

Since the restrictive covenant in your contract tied you to providing your personal services (as an independent contractor) for a period of X years in the new practice, despite not being an employee, we consider your restrictive covenant is revenue in nature (per the example of Penelope in TR 95/3).

Since the restrictive covenant in your contract tied you to using the premises and services provide by the new centre, which are revenue expenses connected to the day-to-day earning of your assessable income, we consider your contract was similar to the kind of lease inducement in the case Cooling, which was revenue in nature.

Since the restrictive covenant in your contract and the payment you received was connected to the quality of your personal reputation and skills, which made you an "attractive target", we consider your payment is revenue in nature (per the examples of Montgomery and McLean). As previously stated (per TR 1999/16) your reputation and skills are not, in themselves, capital in nature.

Isolated commercial transaction

Taxation Ruling TR 92/3 is about whether profits on isolated transactions are income, i.e., whether an isolated transaction is a 'commercial' (rather than capital) transaction. Paragraphs 7 and 9 state:

Paragraph 40 of TR 92/3 includes the case of Cooling as an example of an isolated commercial transaction, where Hill J said:

In your case, we consider your payment was a commercial transaction, with the purpose of obtaining a commercial profit (per TR 92/3 and Cooling).

Anti-overlap provisions

Should the Commissioner have erred in concluding your payment was not related to the disposal and/or acquisition of CGT assets, such payments are considered to be receipts from an isolated commercial transaction.

It follows the anti-overlap provisions in section 118-20 of the ITAA 1997 would operate to reduce any capital gain arising as a result of relevant CGT events by the amount of income assessed under section 6-5 of the ITAA 1997.


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