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Edited version of your written advice

Authorisation Number: 1051413632397

Date of advice: 16 August 2018

Ruling

Subject: Deductibility of exclusivity fee

Question

Is the outgoing described as an ‘Exclusivity Fee’, paid by a wholly owned subsidiary of the taxpayer deductible in accordance with section 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (‘ITAA 1997’)?

Answer

No.

This ruling applies for the following period:

Income year ended 30 June 2015

The scheme commences on:

1 July 2014

Relevant facts and circumstances

Employment offers

Rights to the item

Consideration under the Subsequent Agreement

Pricing/determining the Exclusivity Fee and its value in perpetuity

Relevant legislative provisions

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 section 8-1

Reasons for decision

Application of the single entity rule in section 701-1

The consolidation provisions of the ITAA 1997 allow certain groups of entities to be treated as a single entity for income tax purposes. Under the single entity rule (SER) in section 701-1 the subsidiary members of a consolidated group are taken to be parts of the head company. As a consequence the subsidiary members cease to be recognised as separate entities during the period they are members of the consolidated group with the head company of the group being the only entity recognised for income tax purposes.

The meaning and application of the SER is explained in Taxation Ruling TR 2004/11 Income tax: consolidation: the meaning and application of the single entity rule in Part 3-90 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. As a consequence, the actions and transactions of the subsidiary members of the taxpayer’s tax consolidated group are treated for income tax purposes as having been undertaken by the taxpayer as the Australian head company of the taxpayer’s income tax consolidated group.

Section 8-1

Section 8-1 of the ITAA 1997 allows a deduction for losses and outgoings to the extent to which they are incurred in gaining or producing assessable income except where the outgoings are of a capital, private or domestic nature, or relate to the earning of exempt income or a provision of the taxation legislation excludes it.

Section 8-1 of the ITAA 1997 provides:

The Commissioner accepts that the Exclusivity Fee paid by the Company was incurred to gain or produce assessable income. Accordingly, the issue to be determined is whether the Exclusivity Fee paid is a loss or outgoing of a capital nature or a revenue nature.

There is no statutory definition of 'capital' or 'capital nature'. The leading authority on whether or not a loss or outgoing is in the nature of capital is Sun Newspapers Ltd & Anor v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1938) 61 CLR 337; (1938) 5 ATD 87; (1938) 1 AITR 403 (Sun Newspapers). The judgment of Dixon J in Sun Newspapers at CLR 359; ATD 93-94; AITR 410 provides that:

The test for identifying whether an outgoing is capital or revenue is to ask what a payment is really for, in the sense of what is it intended to effect from a practical and business point of view, and whether what is paid for is capital or revenue, in the sense described by Dixon J (AusNet Transmission Group Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 255 CLR 439).

In Sun Newspapers at 363, Dixon J outlined three matters to consider when making the distinction between capital and revenue:

1. The character of the advantage sought

The character of the advantage sought provides guidance as to the nature of the expenditure. In GP International Pipecoaters Pty Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 170 CLR 124 at 137; 90 ATC 4413 at 4419; (1990) 21 ATR 1 at 7, the High Court made the following statement:

The exclusive right to use the item in Australia is an important part of the collection of rights the Company obtained under the Subsequent Agreement. Pursuant to the Subsequent Agreement, the Company was granted exclusive use of the item in Australia and Entity X undertook not to licence the item to any other entity in Australia for the duration of the Subsequent Agreement.

The character of the advantage sought from paying the Exclusivity Fee can be summarised as acquiring the exclusive rights of the item within Australia. The term of this right is perpetual and:

The right to use the item amounts to the acquisition of an asset or an advantage, which, consistent with the decision of British Insulated & Helsby Cables v. Atherton (1926) AC 205, is likely to be capital in nature.

In consideration of the character of the advantage sought, the Company acquired an asset under the Subsequent Agreement, being the exclusive right to use the item within Australia, and the Exclusivity Fee formed part of the cost of that acquisition.

All business expenditure is likely to be made with the intention of securing some commercial advantage. It is necessary to establish is the effect of the expenditure and how long it will likely endure. In the case of British Insulated & Helsby Cables v. Atherton (1926) AC 205 at 547, Viscount Cave LC said:

The term 'enduring' was referred to by Rich J in Herring v. FCT (1946) 72 CLR 543, who stated that 'by enduring it is not meant that the asset or advantage should last forever. It is a matter of degree…’. However, in considering whether the character of the advantage sought has an enduring benefit, the benefit does not have to be everlasting. This approach was confirmed by Latham CJ in Sun Newspapers at 355 where he said:

In his leading judgment in BP Australia Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 112 CLR 386 (‘BP’) [1966] AC 224 at 267, Lord Pearce commented that “The longer the duration of the agreements, the greater the indication that a structural solution was being sought”. In BP, the average term of the multiple agreements was 5 years, which was said not to point towards either revenue or capital. However, “had they been for 20 years, that fact would have pointed to a non-recurring payment of a capital nature.”

The Subsequent Agreement does not contain an end date, meaning the exclusive use of the item in Australia for which The Company paid the Exclusivity Fee continues in perpetuity. The Company can terminate the Subsequent Agreement at any time, however, this right does not change the agreed term.

The character of the advantage of the Exclusivity Fee secures an enduring benefit for the business because the term of the Subsequent Agreement continues in perpetuity. The enduring benefit obtained from paying the Exclusivity Fee includes:

Therefore, the Company has brought into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of its trade which, according to the case of British Insulated & Helsby Cables v. Atherton (1926) AC 205, should be treated as attributable to capital.

2. The manner in which the advantage is to be used, relied upon or enjoyed

In National Australia Bank v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 80 FCR 352; 97 ATC 5153; (1997) 37 ATR 378 (‘NAB’), the Full Federal Court considered National Australia Bank was entitled to a deduction under subsection 51(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 in respect of the sum of $42 million which it paid to the Commonwealth for an exclusive right to participate as the lender under the scheme of housing loan assistance to members of the Australian Defence Force in respect of their home loans for a period of 15 years. The Court held that the payment was of a revenue nature as it did not enlarge the framework within which the National Australia Bank carried on its activities. Rather, it was incurred as part of the process by which the National Australia Bank operated to obtain regular returns by means of regular outlay. The Court determined that the payment was in the nature of a marketing expense and had a revenue rather than capital nature.

In BP, the company claimed deductions for amounts paid to service station proprietors so that those proprietors would deal exclusively in its products for a fixed period. The average length of these agreements was five years, although in some cases they did extend to fifteen years. The Privy Council held that the real object of the outgoing was not the agreements to deal with the proprietors but the orders that would flow from those recurrent agreements. The advantage sought was the promotion of sales by up to date marketing methods which had become necessary and the expenditure was therefore deductible as being on revenue, rather than capital, account.

The purpose behind BP Australia’s payment was characterised as being able to obtain a customer’s business as a result of making a “marketing” payment. Lord Pearce highlights that issues of marketing are part of the “continuous demands of trade”. This “continuous” nature of marketing means that associated expenses are generally recurrent in nature and therefore more likely to be revenue rather than capital in nature.

In both BP and NAB, the payments were held to be on revenue account as the character of the advantage sought was not to secure an asset, but to allow the business to carry on as they had in previous years. As such, the advantage sought was compared to a marketing expense. The expense was said to be part of the process by which the companies operated to obtain regular returns by means of regular outlay and therefore not a payment to enlarge the framework within which the companies carried on their activities.

In the present case, when the Company entered into the Subsequent Agreement, it was doing more than allowing the business to carry on as it had under the Initial Agreement. The entering into of the Subsequent Agreement was more than a pricing structure change. Rather, a lump sum payment was payable to secure exclusive rights to the item within Australia.

Pursuant to the Subsequent Agreement, the Company acquired an asset and a greater advantage in its line of business because:

The advantage that is sought to be gained by the incurring of the Exclusivity Fee is the Company’s ability to be the exclusive provider of the item within Australia whereby the Company would be the face of the item. This is a resource that has provided the Company a commercial advantage against (potential) direct competitors and enabled them to expand their customer base.

Unlike the BP and NAB cases, it cannot be said that the advantage sought by the Company in this instance was in the nature of marketing because it was incurred to gain the exclusive rights to the item within Australia and was not a regular outlay to obtain regular returns. Neither was the Exclusivity Fee paid to secure customer orders.

Therefore, the Exclusivity Fee is not simply a marketing expense or an expense that allowed the Company to continue to allow its customers to use the item to generate revenue.

Based on the above considerations, the Exclusivity Fee is correctly characterised as enlarging the profit-yielding structure of the Company’s business rather than being a working expense. As pointed out in the Sun Newspapers case, expenditure incurred by a business that establishes or enlarges the profit yielding structure of the business is considered to be capital in nature.

It was material in the cases of NAB and BP that the fees were based on expected income over the term that the fees related to. In both cases the taxpayer expected to fully recoup the fee. Therefore the fee could properly be said to relate to the character of the advantage sought, being the income derived over the term the fee related to.

The court in NAB referred to the observations of Lord Denning MR in Murray v Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd [1967] Ch 1038. The question there was whether a lump sum paid in exchange for covenants not to compete was a capital or income receipt. At 1052 Lord Denning said:

Unlike in NAB, the financial modelling provided does not evidence that the Exclusivity Fee was derived as the present value of the anticipated profit stream to be earned by the making of the payment. Rather, the modelling demonstrates that the Company would earn profits and returns on its investment at levels acceptable to it, over and above the amount paid for the Exclusivity Fee, after taking account of the net impact of the increased profit-earning capacity generated by the Company having the exclusive use and provision of the item in Australia.

3. The means adopted to obtain it

The third element refers to the method of payment including whether the payment is regular or one-off.

The NAB case provides that the absence of recurrence of a payment suggests that an outgoing is capital in nature, but it is not conclusive. As pointed out by Dixon J in the Sun Newspapers case at 362:

In Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1953] 89 CLR 428, the consideration payable for the purchase of land was the agreement to make payments over a 50 year period based on a percentage of the rents received in relation to the land, were held to be on capital account. Fullagar J made the following comments in his judgment:

Furthermore, as noted by Hill J in the Pine Creek Goldfields Ltd v FC of T (1999) 99 ATC 4382 in relation to the third element:

In NAB, the significance of the payment being a non-recurring lump sum was diluted by the fact that the Bank wanted to make periodic payments and the Commonwealth insisted on a lump sum payment in advance; the agreement contemplated 16 annual payments in addition to the initial lump sum payment, and had the 16 annual payments been made, they would have been on revenue account.

There was no option for the Company to pay the Exclusivity Fee via periodic instalments or a lump sum payment. It was a one off fee to acquire the exclusive rights to the item within Australia in perpetuity. Furthermore, no further expenditure or recurring expenditure is to be incurred by the Company in relation to the continued holding and enjoyment of the privileges and rights conferred by the Exclusivity Fee.

Therefore, the Exclusivity Fee, being a once and for all lump sum payment for the rights obtained as a result of making that payment weighs towards the Exclusivity Fee being in the nature of a capital outgoing.

Conclusion

In determining whether an item of expenditure is capital or revenue, no one single factor is determinative. Rather, all relevant factors must be considered collectively.

After examining all the relevant factors and your circumstances, it is considered that the Exclusivity Fee is capital or of a capital nature. Accordingly, paragraph 8-1(2)(a) of the ITAA 1997 is engaged and the taxpayer is precluded from an income tax deduction under section 8-1 of the ITAA 1997 for the payment of the Exclusivity Fee by the Company.


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