King v Earl Cadogan

[1915] 3 K.B. 485

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(Judgment by: Pickford LJ)

Between: King
And: Earl Cadogan

Court:

Judges: Lord Cozens-Hardy MR

Pickford LJWarrington LJ

Subject References:
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Licensed Premises
Lease made before Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910
Increased Licence Duty
Liability of Grantor of Lease to pay Proportion of Increase
'Premium' payable by Lessee
Cost of rebuilding Premises by Lessee pursuant to Agreement for Lease
Surrender Value of prior Unexpired Lease

Legislative References:
Finance Act, 1912 (2 & 3 Geo. 5, c. 8) - s. 2

Judgment date: 7 July 1915

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Judgment by:
Pickford LJ

I agree. The question is whether the plaintiff comes within s. 2 of the Finance Act, 1912. The section was for the purpose of relieving the lessees of licensed houses with respect to the increased duty and it provided that a proportion should be deducted from their rent. Putting it shortly it provided that a proportion of it should be deducted from so much of their rent, or of the premiums, as is attributable to the fact of the house being a licensed house. The words are

"to recover as a debt due from, or deduct from any sum due to, the grantor of such lease or agreement for lease so much of any increase of the duty payable in respect of the licence under the provisions of the Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910, as may be agreed upon as proportionate to any increased rent or premium payable in respect of the premises being let as licensed premises, and, in default of agreement, the amount proportionate to such increased rent or premium shall be determined in manner directed by rules of Court by a county court in England or Ireland."

So that unless it is "increased rent or premium" the case does not come within this section.

A good deal of the argument before us was directed to show that this ought to be called a "premium" because it was intended that where an advantage was obtained by the lessor he should contribute in respect of it and that the advantage was equivalent to what he would get by the payment of a premium. Now that, I think, it is unnecessary to consider. I do not know whether the Act intended it, or whether that was the object of it, but the Legislature has thought fit to use perfectly well known words - "increased rent or premium" - and I do not think it is possible to say that the advantage to be derived by the landlord here can posssibly be brought within the meaning of those words. That seems to me to be quite sufficient to dispose of this case, and I do not propose to enter upon the other question.

I agree that this appeal should be dismissed.