Holland and Anor v. Hodgson and Anor

(1872) L.R. 7 C.P. 328

(Judgment by: Kelly CB, Blackburn J, Mellor J, Hannen J, Channell B, Cleasby B)

Between: Holland and Anor
And: Hodgson and Anor

Exchequer Chamber

Kelly CB

Blackburn J

Mellor J

Hannen J

Channell B

Cleasby B

Subject References:
Mortgagor and Mortgagee

Judgment date: 23 May 1872

Judgment by:
Kelly CB

Blackburn J

Mellor J

Hannen J

Channell B

Cleasby B

The owner in fee of a worsted mill, at which he carried on the business of a worsted spinner and stuff manufacturer, mortgaged it to the plaintiffs. By a deed of arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, subsequently executed, the mortgagor assigned all his property to the defendants as trustees for the benefit of his creditors. Under this latter deed the defendants seized certain looms which were in the mill that was mortgaged. These looms were attached to the stone floors of the rooms of the mill by means of nails driven through holes in the feet of the looms, in some cases into beams which had been built into the stone, and in other cases into plugs of wood driven into holes drilled in the stone for the purpose. It was necessary that the looms should be so attached for the purpose of steadying them and keeping them in a true direction, perpendicular to the line of the shafting, by means of which the steam power was applied to them. It was impossible to remove the looms without drawing the nails; but this could be done easily and without any serious damage to the flooring. The plaintiffs brought trover for the looms:-

Held (affirming the decision of the Court below), that the looms passed by the mortgage of the mill as part of the realty, and the action was therefore maintainable.

Mather v. Fraser (2 K. & J. 536), and Longbottom v. Berry (Law Rep. 5 Q.B. 123), followed; Hellawell v. Eastwood (6 Ex. 295) discussed.

ERROR from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in favour of the plaintiffs upon a special case stated by order of nisi prius in the following terms:-

George Mason, of Horton, near Bradford, in Yorkshire, in the year 1869 carried on the business of a worsted spinner and stuff manufacturer at Bank Top Mill, at Horton, aforesaid, of which he was owner.
By a mortgage, dated the 7th of April, 1869, the said George Mason conveyed to the plaintiffs in fee the said mill, with several closes of land, cottages, and other hereditaments and premises therein described, the parcels thereof, so far as they relate to the said mill being as follows:-
"All that worsted mill lately occupied by the firm of Messrs. Thomas Ackroyd and Sons, situate at Horton Bank Top, in the parish of Bradford, in the county of York, with the warehouse, counting-house, engine-house, boiler-house, weaving shed, washhouse, gasworks, and reservoirs belonging, adjoining, or near thereto, and also the steam-engine, shafting, going-gear, machinery, and all other fixtures whatever which now or at any time hereafter during the continuance of this security shall be set up and affixed to the said hereditaments and premises hereby granted and assured or intended so to be, or any part thereof."
The said deed, which may be referred to by either party, was not registered under the Bills of Sale Act.
The said George Mason, by a deed dated the 3rd of July, 1869, assigned to the defendants all his estate and effects, to be administered as under a bankruptcy. The said deed was duly registered, and everything happened to make it a valid deed under s. 192 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, and the clauses of the Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1868, relating to such deeds.
Under the last-mentioned deed the defendants took possession of, and sold, amongst other things in the said mill, the property mentioned in the next paragraph as claimed by the plaintiffs. Other articles both in the Bank Top Mill and in another mill, which had been also mortgaged by the said George Mason to the plaintiffs, have been in dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but by abandonment of some claims and payment into court as to others, the matters in dispute are now reduced to the articles mentioned in the next paragraph.
The plaintiffs claim the following articles as passing by the words of the deed of the 7th of April, 1869, set out in the 2nd paragraph: 436 looms sold at 1038l.4s. [F1]
The looms, which are the machines for weaving worsted stuff and other fabrics, were placed in various rooms in Bank Top Mill, some on the ground floor and some on the first floor. In all cases they were driven by steam power, which was applied to them in the following manner: The steam-engine worked or gave motion to the shafting and going-gear, which consisted of long shafts passing from one end to the other of each room, and having fixed upon them at proper intervals large concentric wheels called drums, from which the required motion was communicated to the looms by means of leather bands, which could be applied to, and disconnected from, the looms at pleasure. The steam-engine and the shafting and going-gear were unquestionably fixtures, and passed as such to the plaintiffs under their said mortgage.

The looms slightly varied in size, but each was about 7 ft. long by 3 ft. wide, and from 3 to 4 ft. high, and weighed about 7 or 8 cwt. Each loom stood upon four feet, one at each corner, each foot being a flat piece of iron about 3 in. long by 11/2 in. broad, with a hole drilled through it about three-eighths of an inch in diameter. It is essential to the proper working of a loom that it should stand on a level, and be steady and keep its true direction perpendicular to the line of the shafting. If it merely rested by its own weight upon the floor, it would be liable in working to be shaken and drawn sideways from the true line. In order to keep the looms in question steady and in their proper position for working, the following methods were adopted:-

In the case of the looms which were in rooms on the ground floor, the floors of which rooms were formed throughout of stone flags, the method adopted was as follows: Holes about half an inch or three-quarters in diameter were drilled or cut in the stone floor in the places where two of the four feet of each loom at opposite corners would stand. Into each of these holes was driven a plug of wood, so as to fill it up completely and make a tight fit. Then the loom was placed in position and brought to a proper level by thin pieces of wood packed, where necessary, under the loom feet, and then a nail about 4 in. long, in some cases with a flat head, and in others with a square bolted head, was driven through the hole in the loom feet into the wooden plug. The other two feet of each loom were left free. In the case of the looms which were in rooms on the upper floors, the method adopted for keeping the looms steady and in their proper position for working was somewhat different. The floors of these rooms, like the others, were principally formed of stone flags, but beams of wood about 4 in. wide and 3 in. thick were built into the floor along the lines upon which the loom feet stand, and the nails used for keeping the looms in these rooms steady and in their proper position for working were driven at once into these beams, instead of into wooden plugs, as in the case of the looms on the ground-floor rooms.

The rooms in the upper floors were built and arranged specially to receive the looms, and the purpose for which the beams were introduced was to supersede the necessity of drilling or cutting holes for the wooden plugs. After the nails had been driven into the wooden plugs or beams, as above described, the looms could not be removed without drawing the nails from the wooden plugs or beams, but this could easily be done without any serious injury to the floors. It was not necessary, for the purpose of keeping the looms in their proper positions for working, that the nails so driven into the wooden plugs or beams, as above described, should have heads. Spikes without heads would equally have answered the purpose, and if such spikes had been used the looms could have been lifted up and removed and again placed in their proper position for working without disturbing or removing the spikes.

Paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of the case referred to articles mentioned in the 5th paragraph, the facts in relation to which it is not necessary to set out, inasmuch as they were not the subject of controversy in the argument.

Amongst the articles in the Bank Top Mill which were sold by the defendants, and which were claimed by the plaintiffs under their said mortgage, but as to which there is now no dispute between the parties, the defendants having paid money into court in respect of the same, there were several articles of machinery, besides the steam-engine and the shafting and going-gear, which were unquestionably fixtures, and passed, as such, to the plaintiffs under the said mortgage.
The question for the opinion of the Court is, whether any and which of the articles now in dispute passed to the plaintiffs as against the defendants.

The Court of Common Pleas (Willes, Keating, and Montague Smith, JJ.) gave judgment for the plaintiffs as to the looms, it being admitted by the counsel for the defendants that the case was, as to them, undistinguishable from Longbottom v. Berry, [F2] upon which judgment the defendants brought error.

Dec. 1, 1871; Feb. 9, 1872. Field, Q.C. (Kemplay, Q.C. with him), for the defendants, contended that the looms were not so annexed to the freehold as to be fixtures, but that being annexed slightly merely for the purpose of their convenient use as chattels and not to improve the inheritance, they remained merely chattels. They cited Hellawell v. Eastwood; [F3] Longbottom v. Berry; [F4] Parsons v. Hinde; [F5] Turner v. Cameron; [F6] Hutchinson v. Kay; [F7] Cullwick v. Swindell; [F8] Mather v. Fraser; [F9] Walmsley v. Milne; [F10] Trappes v. Harter; [F11] Waterfall v. Penistone; [F12] Climie v. Wood; [F13] Lancaster v. Eve; [F14] Boyd v. Shorrock; [F15] Wood v. Hewett; [F16] Reg. v. Lee; [F17] Fisher v. Dixon; [F18] Ex parte Barclay; [F19] Gibson v. Hammersmith Ry. Co.; [F20] Martin v. Roe; [F21] Ex parte Cotton. [F22]

Cave, for the plaintiffs, contended that the articles in question were fixtures, and as such passed by the mortgage as part of the freehold. He cited Haley v. Hammersley; [F23] Hallen v. Runder; [F24] Ex parte Bentley; [F25] Re Dawson, Tate, & Co. [F26]

Field, in reply, cited Begbie v. Fenwick; [F27]

The Patent Peat Company, Limited. [F28]

Cur. adv. vult.

May 23. The judgment of the Court (Kelly, C.B., Blackburn, Mellor, and Hannen, JJ., and Channell and Cleasby, BB.) was delivered by BLACKBURN, J.

In this case George Mason, who was owner in fee of a mill occupied by him as a worsted mill, mortgaged the mill and all fixtures which then were, or at any time thereafter should be set up and affixed to the premises, in fee to the plaintiffs. The mortgage deed was not registered as a bill of sale, and Mason, who continued in possession, assigned all his estate and effects to the defendants as trustees for the benefit of his creditors. The defendants under this last deed took possession of everything. The plaintiffs brought trover. The defendants paid money into court, and there was a replication of damages ultra.

A case was stated shewing the nature of the articles, and how and in what manner they were affixed to the mill. As the deed was not registered under the Bills of Sales Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 36), it was by s. 1 of that Act void as against the defendants as assignees for the benefit of creditors so far as it was a transfer of "personal chattels" within the meaning of that Act; and as by s. 7 the phrase "personal chattels" is declared in that Act to mean inter alia "fixtures;" it was void (as against these defendants) so far as it was a transfer of fixtures as such.

Since the decision of this Court in Climie v. Wood [F29] it must be considered as settled law (except perhaps in the House of Lords) that what are commonly known as trade or tenant's fixtures form part of the land, and pass by a conveyance of it; and that though if the person who erected those fixtures was a tenant with a limited interest in the land he has a right, as against the freeholder, to sever the fixtures from the land, yet if he be a mortgagor in fee he has no such right as against his mortgagee. Trade and tenant's fixtures are, in the judgment in that case, accurately defined as

"things which are annexed to the land for the purposes of trade or of domestic convenience or ornament in so permanent a manner as to become part of the land, and yet the tenant who has erected them is entitled to remove them during his term, or it may be within a reasonable time after its expiration."

It was not disputed at the bar that such was the law; and it was admitted, and we think properly admitted, that where there is a conveyance of the land the fixtures are transferred, not as fixtures, but as part of the land, and the deed of transfer does not require registration as a bill of sale. But we wish to guard ourselves by stating that our decision (so far as regards the registration) is confined to the case before us, where the mortgagor was owner to the same extent of the fixtures and of the land. If a tenant having only a limited interest in the land, and an absolute interest in the fixtures, were to convey not only his limited interest in the land and his right to enjoy the fixtures during the term, so long as they continued a part of the land, but also his power to sever those fixtures and dispose of them absolutely, a very different question would have to be considered. As it does not arise, we decide nothing as to this.

We are not to be understood as expressing dissent from what appears to have been the opinion of Wood, V.C., in Boyd v. Shorrock, [F30] but merely as guarding against being supposed to confirm it. In Climie v. Wood [F31] the jury had found as a fact that the articles there in question were tenant fixtures, and that finding was not questioned. Neither the Court of Exchequer nor the Court of Exchequer Chamber had occasion there to consider what would constitute a fixture. In the present case there is no such finding. The controversy was confined to the looms, the nature of which, and the mode of their annexation, were described in the case. In the court below it was properly admitted that there was no real distinction between those looms and the articles which the Court of Queen's Bench, in Longbottom v. Berry, [F33] decided to be so annexed as to form part of the land. Judgment was accordingly given for the plaintiffs, without argument, leaving the defendants to question Longbottom v. Berry [F33] in a court of error.

The present case is therefore really, though not in form, an appeal against the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench in Longbottom v. Berry, [F33] and was so argued. There is no doubt that the general maxim of the law is, that what is annexed to the land becomes part of the land; but it is very difficult, if not impossible, to say with precision what constitutes an annexation sufficient for this purpose. It is a question which must depend on the circumstances of each case, and mainly on two circumstances, as indicating the intention, viz., the degree of annexation and the object of the annexation. When the article in question is no further attached to the land, then by its own weight it is generally to be considered a mere chattel; see Wiltshear v. Cottrell, [F34] and the cases there cited. But even in such a case, if the intention is apparent to make the articles part of the land, they do become part of the land: see D'Eyncourt v. Gregory. [F34] Thus blocks of stone placed one on the top of another without any mortar or cement for the purpose of forming a dry stone wall would become part of the land, though the same stones, if deposited in a builder's yard and for convenience sake stacked on the top of each other in the form of a wall, would remain chattels.

On the other hand, an article may be very firmly fixed to the land, and yet the circumstances may be such as to shew that it was never intended to be part of the land, and then it does not become part of the land. The anchor of a large ship must be very firmly fixed in the ground in order to bear the strain of the cable, yet no one could suppose that it became part of the land, even though it should chance that the shipowner was also the owner of the fee of the spot where the anchor was dropped. An anchor similarly fixed in the soil for the purpose of bearing the strain of the chain of a suspension bridge would be part of the land. Perhaps the true rule is, that articles not otherwise attached to the land than by their own weight are not to be considered as part of the land, unless the circumstances are such as to shew that they were intended to be part of the land, the onus of shewing that they were so intended lying on those who assert that they have ceased to be chattels, and that, on the contrary, an article which is affixed to the land even slightly is to be considered as part of the land, unless the circumstances are such as to shew that it was intended all along to continue a chattel, the onus lying on those who contend that it is a chattel.

This last proposition seems to be in effect the basis of the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas delivered by Maule, J., in Wilde v. Waters. [F35] This, however, only removes the difficulty one step, for it still remains a question in each case whether the circumstances are sufficient to satisfy the onus. In some cases, such as the anchor of the ship or the ordinary instance given of a carpet nailed to the floor of a room, the nature of the thing sufficiently shews it is only fastened as a chattel temporarily, and not affixed permanently as part of the land. But ordinary trade or tenant fixtures which are put up with the intention that they should be removed by the tenant (and so are put up for a purpose in one sense only temporary, and certainly not for the purpose of improving the reversionary interest of the landlord) have always been considered as part of the land, though severable by the tenant. In most, if not all, of such cases the reason why the articles are considered fixtures is probably that indicated by Wood, V.C., in Boyd v. Shorrock, [F36] that the tenant indicates by the mode in which he puts them up that he regards them as attached to the property during his interest in the property.

What we have now to decide is as to the application of these rules to looms put up by the owner of the fee in the manner described in the case. In Hellawell v. Eastwood [F37] (decided in 1851) the facts as stated in the report are, that the plaintiff held the premises in question as tenant of the defendants, and that a distress for rent had been put in by the defendants under which a seizure was made of cotton-spinning machinery called "mules," some of which were fixed by screws to the wooden floor, and some by screws which had been sunk in the stone floor, and secured by molten lead poured into them. It may be inferred that the plaintiff being the tenant only had put up those mules; and from the large sum for which the distress appears to have been levied (2000l.) it seems probable that he was the tenant of the whole mill. It does not appear what admissions, if any, were made at the trial, nor whether the Court had or had not by the reservation power to draw inferences of fact, though it seems assumed in the judgment that they had such a power. Parke, B., in delivering the judgment of the Court, says,

"This is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of each case, and principally on two considerations; first, the mode of annexation to the soil or fabric of the house, and the extent to which it is united to them, whether it can easily be removed integrè salve et commode or not without injury to itself or the fabric of the building; secondly, on the object and purpose of the annexation, whether it was for the permanent and substantial improvement of the dwelling, in the language of the civil law, perpetui usûs causâ, or in that of the year book, pour un profit del inheritance, or merely for a temporary purpose and the more complete enjoyment and use of it as a chattel."

It was contended by Mr. Field that the decision in Hellawell v. Eastwood [F38] had been approved in the Queen's Bench in the case of Turner v. Cameron. [F39] It is quite true that the Court in that case said that it afforded a true exposition of the law as applicable to the particular facts upon which the judgment proceeded; but the Court expressly guarded their approval by citing from the judgment delivered by Parke, B., the facts upon which they considered it to have proceeded:

"They were attached slightly so as to be capable of removal without the least injury to the fabric of the building or to themselves, and the object of the annexation was not to improve the inheritance, but merely to render the machines steadier and more capable of convenient use as chattels."

As we have already observed, trade or tenant fixtures might in one sense be said to be fixed "merely for a temporary purpose;" but we cannot suppose that the Court of Exchequer meant to decide that they were not part of the land, though liable to be severed by the tenant.

The words "merely for a temporary purpose" must be understood as applying to such a case as we have supposed, of the anchor dropped for the temporary purpose of mooring the ship, or the instance immediately afterwards given by Parke, B., of the carpet tacked to the floor for the purpose of keeping it stretched whilst it was there used, and not to a case such as that of a tenant who, for example, affixes a shop counter for the purpose (in one sense temporary) of more effectually enjoying the shop whilst he continues to sell his wares there.

Subject to this observation, we think that the passage in the judgment in Hellawell v. Eastwood [F38] does state the true principles, though it may be questioned if they were in that case correctly applied to the facts. The Court in their judgment determine what they have just declared to be a question of fact thus:

"The object and purpose of the connection was not to improve the inheritance, but merely to render the machines steadier and more capable of convenient use as chattels."

Mr. Field was justified in saying, as he did in his argument, that as far as the facts are stated in the report they are very like those in the present case, except that the tenant who put the mules up cannot have been supposed to intend to improve the inheritance (if by that is meant his landlord's reversion), but only at most to improve the property whilst he continued tenant thereof; and he argued with great force that we ought not to act on a surmise that there were any special facts or findings not stated in the report, but to meet the case, as shewing that the judges who decided Hellawell v. Eastwood [F40] thought that articles fixed in a manner very like those in the case before us remained chattels; and this is felt by some of us at least to be a weighty argument. But that case was decided in 1851. In 1853 the Court of Queen's Bench had, in Wiltshear v. Cotterill, [F41] to consider what articles passed by the conveyance in fee of a farm. Among the articles in dispute was a threshing machine, which is described in the report thus:

"The threshing machine was placed inside one of the barn (the machinery for the horse being on the outside), and there fixed by screws and bolts to four posts which were let into the earth."

Hellawell v. Eastwood [F40] was cited in the argument. The Court (without, however, noticing that case) decided that the threshing machine, being so annexed to the land, passed by the conveyance. It seems difficult to point out how the threshing machine was more for the improvement of the inheritance of the farm than the present looms were for the improvement of the manufactory; and in Mather v. Fraser [F42] Wood, V.C., who was there judge both of the fact and the law, came to the conclusion that machinery affixed not more firmly than the articles in question by the owner of the fee to land, for the purpose of carrying on a trade there, became part of the land.

This was decided in 1856. And in Walmsley v. Milne [F43] the Court of Common Pleas, after having their attention called to a slight misapprehension by Wood, V.C., of the effect of Hellawell v. Eastwood, [F40] came to the conclusion, as is stated by them, at p. 131,

"that we are of opinion, as a matter of fact, that they were all firmly annexed to the freehold for the purpose of improving the inheritance, and not for any temporary purpose."

The bankrupt was the real owner of the premises, subject only to a mortgage which vested the legal title in the mortgagee until the repayment of the money borrowed. The mortgagor first erected baths, stables and a coach-house, and other buildings, and then supplied them with the fixtures in question for their permanent improvement. As to the steam-engine and boiler, they were necessary for the use of the baths. The hay-cutter was fixed into a building adjoining the stable as an important adjunct to it, and to improve its usefulness as a stable. The malt-mill and grinding-stones were also permanent erections, intended by the owner to add to the value of the premises. They therefore resemble in no particular (except being fixed to the building by screws) the mules put up by the tenant in Hellawell v. Eastwood. [F44] It is stated in a note to the report of the case that, on a subsequent day, it was intimated by the Court that Mr. Justice Willes entertained serious doubts as to whether the articles in question were not chattels.

The reason of his doubt is not stated, but probably it was from a doubt whether the Exchequer had not, in Hellawell v. Eastwood, [F44] shewn that they would have thought that the articles were not put up for the purpose of improving the inheritance, and from deference to that authority. The doubt of this learned judge in one view weakens the authority of Walmsley v. Milne, [F45] but in another view it strengthens it, as it shews that the opinion of the majority, that as a matter of fact the hay-cutter, which was not more firmly fixed than the mules in Hellawell v. Eastwood, [F44] must be taken to form part of the land, because it was "put up as an adjunct to the stable, and to improve its usefulness as a stable," was deliberately adopted as the basis of the judgment; and it is to be observed that Willes, J., though doubting, did not dissent. Walmsley v. Milne [F45] was decided in 1859. This case and that of Wiltshear v. Cotterill [F46] seem authorities for this principle, that where an article is affixed by the owner of the fee, though only affixed by bolts and screws, it is to be considered as part of the land, at all events where the object of setting up the articles is to enhance the value of the premises to which it is annexed for the purposes to which those premises are applied.

The threshing machine in Wiltshear v. Cotterill [F46] was affixed by the owner of the fee to the barn as an adjunct to the barn, and to improve its usefulness as a barn, in much the same sense as the hay-cutter in Walmsley v. Milne [F45] was affixed to the stable as an adjunct to it, and to improve its usefulness as a stable. And it seems difficult to say that the machinery in Mather v. Fraser [F47] was not as much affixed to the mill as an adjunct to it and to improve the usefulness of the mill as such, as either the threshing machine or the hay-cutter. If, therefore, the matter were to be decided on principle, without reference to what has since been done on the faith of the decisions, we should be much inclined, notwithstanding the profound respect we feel for everything that was decided by Parke, B., to hold that the looms now in question were, as a matter of fact, part of the land.

But there is another view of the matter which weighs strongly with us. Hellawell v. Eastwood [F48] was a decision between landlord and tenant, not so likely to influence those who advance money on mortgage as Mather v. Fraser, [F47] which was a decision directly between mortgagor and mortgagee. We find that Mather v. Fraser, [F47] which was decided in 1856, has been acted upon in Boyd v. Shorrock [F49] by the Court of Queen's Bench in Longbottom v. Berry, [F50] and in Ireland in Re Dawson. [F51] These cases are too recent to have been themselves much acted upon, but they shew that Mather v. Fraser [F47] has been generally adopted as the ruling case. We cannot, therefore, doubt that much money has, during the last sixteen years, been advanced on the faith of the decision in Mather v. Fraser. [F47] It is of great importance that the law as to what is the security of a mortgagee should be settled; and without going so far as to say that a decision only sixteen years old should be upheld, right or wrong, on the principle that communis error facit jus, we feel that it should not be reversed unless we clearly see that it is wrong. As already said, we are rather inclined to think that, if it were res integra we should find the same way. We think, therefore, that the judgment below should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Attorneys for plaintiffs: Jacobs, North, & Vincent, for North.
Attorneys for defendants: Flowers & Nussey.


Other articles were mentioned in this paragraph of the case, but it is unnecessary to enumerate them, as the case was not argued with respect to them.


Law Rep. 5 Q.B. 123.


6 Ex. 295; 20 L. J. (Ex.) 154.


Law Rep. 5 Q.B. 123.


14 W. R. 860.


Law Rep. 5 Q.B. 306.


23 Beav. 413; 26 L. J. (Ch.) 457.


Law Rep. 3 Eq. 249.


2 K. & J. 536; 25 L. J. (Ch.) 361.


7 C. B. (N.S.) 115; 29 L. J. (C.P.) 97.


2 C. & M. 153.


6 E. & B. 876; 26 L. J. (Q.B.) 100.


Law Rep. 3 Ex. 257; Law Rep. 4 Ex. 328.


5 C. B. (N.S.) 717; 28 L. J. (C.P.) 235.


Law Rep. 5 Eq. 72.


8 Q.B. 913.


Law Rep. 1 Q.B. 241.


12 Cl. & F. 312.


5 D. M. & G. 403.


2 Dr. & P. 603; 32 L. J. (Ch.) 337.


7 E. & B. 237; 25 L. J. (Q.B.) 129.


2 M. D. & D. 725.


3 D. F. & J. 587; 30 L. J. (Ch.) 771.


1 C. M. & R. 266.


2 M. D. & D. 591.


Ir. Law. Rep. 2 Eq. 218.


24 L. T. (N.S.) 58.


17 L. T. (N.S.) 69.


Law Rep. 4 Ex. 328.


Law Rep. 5 Eq. 72.


Law Rep. 4 Ex. 328.


Law Rep. 5 Q.B. 123.


1 E. & B. 674; 22 L. J. (Q.B.) 177.


Law Rep. 3 Eq. 382.


16 C. B. 637; 24 L. J. (C.P.) 193.


Law Rep. 5 Eq. at p. 78.


6 Ex. 295; 20 L. J. (Ex.) 154.


6 Ex. 295; 20 L. J. (Ex.) 154.


Law Rep. 5 Q.B. 306.


6 Ex. 295; 20 L. J. (Ex.) 154.


1 E. & B. 674; 22 L. J. (Q.B.) 177.


2 K. & J. 536; 25 L. J. (Ch.) 361.


7 B. C. (N.S.) 115; 29 L. J. (C.P) 97.


6 Ex. 295; 20 L. J. (Ex.) 154.


7 C. B. (N.S.) 115; 29 L. J. (C.P.) 97.


1 E. & B. 674; 22 L. J. (Q.B.) 177.


2 K. & J. 536; 25 L. J. (Ch.) 361.


6 Ex. 295; 20 L. J. (Ex.) 154.


Law Rep. 5 Eq. 72.


Law Rep. 5 Q.B. 123.


Ir. Law Rep. 2 Eq. 222.

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