KALEY v FC of T

Members:
PE Hack SC DP

Tribunal:
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Brisbane (heard in Canberra)

MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION: [2011] AATA 480

Decision date: 8 July 2011

PE Hack SC (Deputy President)

Introduction

1. The applicant, Mr Narendra Kaley, is an architect. In each of the 2007 and 2008 income years he made claims to deduct expenses said by him to have been incurred by him in connection with his profession as an architect. The Commissioner of Taxation rejected the claims. Mr Kaley seeks a review of the Commissioner's decision.

2. As will appear, I consider most of Mr Kaley's claims to be misconceived. As it seems to me Mr Kaley's claims are made on the basis of, at best, a fundamental misunderstanding of the provisions of the applicable legislation.

Background

3. I do not understand what follows to be in dispute. In February 2006 Mr Kaley commenced fulltime employment with Group GSA Pty Ltd. After a short period at his employer's Sydney offices he took up a position as site architect at a construction site in Greenway in the Australian Capital Territory. Mr Kaley drove his private motor vehicle from his residence to Greenway for the purposes of his employment. The employment with Group GSA Pty Ltd came to an end around March 2007.

4. Thereafter in June 2007 Mr Kaley commenced employment, again on a fulltime basis, with AC&A Architects. That employment was continuing at the time of the hearing.

5. In each of the 2007 and 2008 income years Mr Kaley earned income as a part time casual teacher at a Canberra tertiary institution.

6. In June 2007 the University of Western Sydney advertised an architectural competition and invited entries from registered architects. Mr Kaley started work on an entry however in December 2007 the university decided to abandon the competition. In or about March 2008 Mr Kaley was paid $1,000 by the university as an ex gratia payment.

7. In his 2007 income tax return, lodged on 14 August 2007, Mr Kaley disclosed income from employment by Group GSA Pty Ltd, the ACT Government and AC&A Architects. He claimed deductions for work-related car expenses of $3,450 and other work-related expenses of $2,544. On 20 August 2007 the Commissioner made an assessment of taxable income of $76,842 on the basis of Mr Kaley's return.

8. Then, on 28 August 2008, Mr Kaley lodged an amended return for 2007. His covering letter, requesting amendment, included the following:

"I sought help while reviewing my previous year's tax return and have found that my some of my important deductions were not declared at all while some tax offset items were probably omitted, therefore making them inaccurate.

I have therefore reworked my tax liability against my legally allowable deductions and a copy of the most authentic tax return is now attached.

…

I declare that all the information I have given in this letter, including any attachments, is true and correct."

9. A number of alterations were made to the amounts shown in the original return. In particular,

The effect of these alterations was to reduce Mr Kaley's taxable income from $76,842 to $61,209. On 1 December 2008 the Commissioner made an amended assessment of 2007 taxable income of $61,209 in accordance with the amended return lodged in August 2008.

10. In the meantime on 17 September 2008 Mr Kaley had lodged his 2008 return. He claimed a deduction of $3,450 as work-related car expenses, $12,318 for other work-related expenses and a net business loss of $20,568. The Commissioner made an assessment, based on that return, of a taxable income for 2008 of $29,917. That assessment is evidenced by a notice of assessment dated 16 October 2008.

11. In April 2009 the Commissioner commenced an audit of Mr Kaley's affairs. Mr Kaley was asked to provide documentation for various claims made in the 2008 year. For reasons that remained unclear Mr Kaley provided further information and documentation under cover of a series of documents, each called "Voluntary disclosure declaration". The scope of the audit was subsequently expanded to include the 2007 return and the deductions claimed in it. The audit was concluded in August 2009.

12. On 12 June 2009 the Commissioner made an amended assessment of 2007 taxable income of $62,694 by including interest income of $1,485.

13. The audit was completed in early August 2009. As a consequence of the audit the following adjustments were made to Mr Kaley's taxable income for 2007:

A notice of amended assessment was issued to Mr Kaley on 18 August 2009 giving effect to the conclusions of the audit and increasing the taxable income for 2007 to $83,346. Mr Kaley was notified by letter that an administrative penalty, at 50% of the shortfall amount, would be imposed and that no part would be remitted. Apparently through oversight, the Commissioner did not, as s 298-10 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 required, give notice of the assessment of administrative penalty and thus there is no administrative penalty.

14. On 8 September 2009 the Commissioner issued a notice of amended assessment to Mr Kaley for the 2008 income year with a taxable income of $68,657, an increase of $38,740. The Commissioner included the $1,000 university payment as personal services income and increased salary and wages income from $65,890 to $66,424. Additionally, the Commissioner disallowed;

On this occasion the Commissioner's view of administrative penalties was given effect to by a penalty assessment notice dated 8 September 2009 imposing shortfall penalty at 50% on the basis of recklessness.

15. It is next relevant to note that on 1 September 2009 Mr Kaley made a request for a private ruling in relation to the $1,000 university payment. That resulted in a ruling being made by the Commissioner on 23 December 2009 that the $1,000 was not personal services income. Emboldened by this ruling, Mr Kaley wrote to the Commissioner on 4 February 2010 seeking further amendments to his 2007 and 2008 assessments. Mr Kaley appeared to be of the view that the Commissioner's ruling that the $1000 was not personal services income had the result that it was "business income" and that Mr Kaley was thus entitled to the variety of "business" deductions he had originally claimed. In addition, the return differed from that lodged on 17 September 2008 by the inclusion in this version of "business income" of $1,000.

16. The Commissioner, wrongly, treated Mr Kaley's letter as a request for amendment with the result that, on 3 May 2010, a further amended assessment was made, evidenced by a notice of that day, which determined Mr Kaley's 2008 taxable income to be $39,917.

17. On 4 May 2010 Mr Kaley sought an extension of time within which to object to the 2007 amended assessment. On 18 June 2010 a decision was made to disallow the objection in full in respect to each of the 2007 and 2008 years. The error that led to the notice of amended 2008 assessment was detected. The letter of 18 June 2010 notifying Mr Kaley of the objection decision noted that Mr Kaley's 2008 tax return would be "re-adjusted". It is not clear to me whether an amended assessment was made to give effect to this conclusion. I have been unable to locate any notice of amended assessment from this time in the documents lodged with the Tribunal in accordance with s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).

18. In any event, on 22 November 2010 Mr Kaley sought review by the Tribunal of the Commissioner's objection decision for the 2007 and 2008 income years.

The Issues

19. It is convenient to deal with the issues in a similar manner to that in which they have been addressed in the Commissioner's written submissions. The issues, as I perceive them to be, are these:

20. I note, at the outset, that I have a distinctly unfavourable impression of Mr Kaley's credibility and the reliability of his evidence. I was left with the clear view that Mr Kaley paid no regard to the truth in making the claims that he did and that his claims were, for the most part, simply fabricated. That conclusion is best illustrated by reference to the manner in which the claims have been developed and advanced over the years.

21. It will be recalled that in his original return for 2007 Mr Kaley claimed work related car expenses of $3,450, other work related expenses of $2,544, gifts and donations of $45 and $176 for the cost of managing his tax affairs. Then came his letter of 28 August 2008, extracted above[1] See paragraph [8]. , by which Mr Kaley sought to amend his earlier return in the manner already noted, including, notably, abandoning the claim for a deduction for donations of $45 and reducing the earlier claim for a deduction for managing his tax affairs by half.

22. Mr Kaley was first asked to substantiate some of his claims for 2008, those relating to car expenses ($3,450), other work related expenses ($12,318) and clothing etc. expenses ($870) by letter dated 1 April 2009.

23. Mr Kaley's response to that letter was sent on 8 April 2009. Mr Kaley asserted that the claim of $870 for work-related clothing comprised protective boots ($450), socks ($20), jacket ($100), sweater ($100), other clothing (singlets and T-shirts were said to be included) ($50) and unspecified laundry costs ($150) as to which, Mr Kaley said "no substantiation [was] required"[2] Section 37 T-documents T11-147. .

24. The claim for motor vehicle costs was based on him having travelled at least 5,000 kilometres at the accepted rate of 69c per kilometre. In fact, so Mr Kaley said in the hearing, the "business" kilometres travelled was far in excess of 5,000 however that is the limit that may be claimed on the "per kilometre" basis.

25. The claim of other work-related expenses of $12,318 comprised,

26. Then, in a letter dated 18 April 2009, Mr Kaley started altering his explanations. Mr Kaley prepared, and sent to the Commissioner, a series of documents which asserted that "the original claim amount was an estimate and therefore was/could have been inaccurate/incorrect"[4] Section 37 T-documents T12-154. . The "new amount", said Mr Kaley:

"…was/has been calculated based upon actual expenditure incurred, supported by either a purchase bill or a transaction record in the bank statement."[5] Ibid.

Thus, in relation to clothing the $450 claim for protective boots was reduced to $350, a new claim of $440 for sunglasses was made and the balance of $420 was claimed as $1,789 to which was appended the notation "include. misc. clothing for family"[6] Ibid. .

27. With the same explanation about a possibly inaccurate estimate Mr Kaley substantiated his claim of $2,500 for "computer and depreciation expenses" with an invoice for the purchase of a computer in November 2006 for $1,235.30, an invoice for the purchase, in India, of a software horoscope package for the equivalent of $130, an invoice for the purchase in January 2007 of a digital camera for $464; an invoice for the purchase of a "turbocad" in March 2007 for $200 and an invoice for the purchase in May 2007 of a printer at $179.

28. The claim for books and journals was increased to $1,231 (from $1,100) and two invoices evidencing book purchases of $1,000 were provided. The home office running expenses claim of $2,500 was reduced to $1,384, a figure which is 40% of $3,460 although the source of that latter figure was not explained.

29. Mr Kaley explained the claim for "home office occupancy" of $5,512 as depreciation, on a diminishing value at 20%, on "home office plant and other assets" said to have been purchased in November 2003 for $27,560.

30. The claim for professional registration was reduced from $176 to $138 but no document evidencing that expense was produced. Mr Kaley produced an invoice for the purchase of a "palm tungsten E2" in July 2007 for $320.

31. The following day Mr Kaley produced a bundle of documents to the Commissioner including his electricity, gas and telephone accounts together with copies of bank statements and credit card statements. Those statements have been annotated by Mr Kaley by reference to his covering letter of 18 April 2009. Mr Kaley appears to be operating on the basis that it is sufficient substantiation of an expense to highlight an item on a statement and to indicate, by reference to his letter, the claimed category of the expense.

32. Mr Kaley provided further documents for the 2008 year in April and May 2009.

33. In June 2009 Mr Kaley undertook a similar exercise in relation to his 2007 claims. He explained the reduction, between the original return of 14 August 2007 and the amended return of 28 August 2008, of the amount declared for wages and salaries income on the basis of a "missing PAYG statement" however plainly enough that statement had been available when he lodged his original return. Moreover, the gross income shown on the supposedly "missing" statement, an amount of $3,208, does not explain the difference between the gross income from wages shown on the original and the amended returns. Mr Kaley's "declaration" simply shows, as the "original amount", the figure required to make good his explanation.

34. Mr Kaley's explanations for the altered deductions were again accompanied by the same "disclosure" that his earlier claim was an "estimate and therefore was/could have been inaccurate/incorrect". The original claim of $1,330 for work related clothing was detailed as being for protective boots ($180), jeans ($100), a belt ($45), sunglasses ($400), a helmet ($125), socks ($50), jacket ($200), leg warmers ($30), sweaters ($50) and laundry ($150). As I interpret Mr Kaley's declaration the claim for boots has been abandoned, the claim for jeans of $100 is maintained, the claim for sunglasses has increased to $409.60 (substantiated by a receipt, apparently from an optometrist, and the balance is now said to be $1,046.77, including "misc. clothing for family". With the document came Mr Kaley's bank and credit card statements, together with his coded annotations. Thus, for example, against an entry on the bank statement for 1 July 2006, an EFTPOS debit of $34.95 described on the bank statement as "Allens Stores P/L" Mr Kaley has written symbols (D3(04)) that indicate that that expenditure was part of his "balance" claim. I assume, although I do not propose to undertake the exercise of checking, that the total of the amounts with a similar notation is $1,046.77.

35. The claim to deduct $10,185 as "other work related expenses" is explained as expenses for a mobile phone ($840), internet access (($840), computer and depreciation expenses ($600), home office running expenses ($2,225), home office occupancy ($5,200), books and journals ($300), professional registration ($300), and stationery ($300). Again, this detail is accompanied by Mr Kaley's declarations that the original claim was "an estimate" which might be inaccurate or incorrect. Thus, as an example, the claim for home office running expenditure of $2,225 was pressed at $1,220 with no explanation beyond an altered percentage considered as "personal expenditure".

36. The manner in which Mr Kaley has presented his claims and the "evidence" supporting them leads me to conclude that he has simply claimed, in the first instance, the amounts he considered that he might be permitted (by reason of self-assessment) to deduct without prompting questions from the Commissioner and that, when pressed, he has simply combed his bank and credit card statements for any expenditure that might appear to support his claims, where necessary, amending or abandoning his claims to fit the documents available.

37. With that introduction I turn then to the various issues raised.

Work-Related Motor Vehicle Expenses

38. Expenditure or outgoings incurred by Mr Kaley will be deductible under s 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (the 1997 Act) if incurred in gaining or producing assessable income or if necessarily incurred in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing assessable income. However deductibility will be denied if the loss or outgoings is of a private or domestic nature.

39. Section 28-12 of the 1997 Act permits a variety of mechanisms for claiming motor vehicle expenses provided that they are otherwise deductible. A method for claiming a designated rate per kilometre is permitted. It is, however, trite that an employee cannot deduct the ordinary cost of travel to and from the usual place of employment[7] See eg Lunney v FCT (1958) 100 CLR 478 . . However there is a well-recognised exception to that rule where a taxpayer has differing places of work. Here the Commissioner accepts that the cost of Mr Kaley's travel from Greenway (where he was employed on the Centrelink project) to the Canberra Institute of Technology campus at Bruce, where he taught part-time, is deductible. The Commissioner accepts that, on this basis, an amount of $1,072[8] 64 days at 25 kilometres at $0.67c per kilometre. is allowable as a deduction for the 2007 year for motor vehicle expenses.

40. There is no other basis put forward by Mr Kaley that might justify the balance of the claim in 2007. It does not appear that Mr Kaley asserts that the motor vehicle expenses were a "business" expense in 2007 however, as will appear, I reject entirely the notion that Mr Kaley was ever carrying on a business.

41. In 2008 Mr Kaley has claimed both work-related car expenses of $3,450 and the further amount of $10,800 being, apparently, 40% (business use proportion) of the cost of a motor vehicle.

42. The latter claim may be readily disposed of. No provision in the either the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (the 1936 Act) or the 1997 Act permits the deduction of a proportionate share of a capital cost of a motor vehicle; at best for Mr Kaley, other matters being established, he might be entitled to deduct depreciation on a capital outlay however that is not how his claim is put.

43. The Commissioner's concession in the 2007 year is not continued in the 2008 year, presumably because the employment at Greenway ended in June 2007. There is no other basis on which Mr Kaley's motor vehicle expenses could properly be deductible. I reject that claim for the 2008 year as there is no evidence of use of a motor vehicle in the course of Mr Kaley's employment beyond, perhaps, the need to travel to and from his place of employment.

Clothing And Laundry Expenses

44. Clothing is generally the quintessential "private" expense although there are exceptions. One such exception permitted by the Commissioner is on clothing that is "protective" in nature[9] See Morris v FCT 2002 ATC 4404 ; (2002) 50 ATR 104 . . On that basis the Commissioner accepts that Mr Kaley is entitled to a deduction of $409 in the 2007 year for the cost of purchasing sunglasses. But the Commissioner submits that the balance of Mr Kaley's claims for both the 2007 and 2008 years are for clothing (or similar) expenses of a private nature which have not, in any event, been properly substantiated.

45. Each of the remaining items, with the possible exception of the claim for a helmet, is an item of ordinary and conventional clothing, worn conventionally. Without more, expenditure on such clothing is not ordinarily deductible. Nothing more is shown by Mr Kaley about the clothing or about the circumstances in which it was used. Uniforms, protective clothing, occupational specific clothing are examples that have been held to be, or regarded as being, deductible but the clothing in issue here does not answer any of those descriptions.

46. The exception is the claim for a helmet. That might be considered to be an item of protective clothing however Mr Kaley's evidence does not satisfy me that he incurred expense in acquiring a helmet. I would add that the boots originally claimed by Mr Kaley are of a brand noted for its formal foot wear than work footwear. I am not satisfied that any protective footwear was purchased and, in any event, it appears that this claim has been abandoned.

47. I would, for similar reasons, reject the claim for laundry expenses because it is not shown to be deductible and not shown to have been incurred.

Other Work Related Expenses - 2007

48. Mr Kaley's claims are for expenses for a mobile phone ($840), internet access ($840), computer and depreciation expenses ($600), home office running expenses ($2,225), home office occupancy ($5,200), books and journals ($300), professional registration ($300), and stationery ($300).

49. The documents produced by Mr Kaley demonstrate that he incurred expenditure on a mobile telephone and on internet subscription. What is absent is any demonstrated connection between that expenditure and gaining or producing assessable income. The Commissioner sought details from Mr Kaley of these expenses (and the other "work related expenses" for 2007) by letter dated 24 February 2011[10] Respondent’s evidence bundle, tab 3. . Mr Kaley's response[11] Respondent’s evidence bundle, tab 4. notes "that 2007-08 was the first year of the business". Yet later in the same letter Mr Kaley says of these particular expenses,

"None of these expenses were incurred for employment purposes. All these expenses are related to business activities."[12] Ibid.

50. It is for Mr Kaley to demonstrate the connection between the expenditure and gaining or producing assessable income. He has not done so, so far as these expenses are concerned.

51. The same is true of the balance of the expenses claimed under this head, with the exception of the claim for books and journals and professional registration. As to the former, Mr Kaley has produced receipts the demonstrate expenditure of $319[13] Cost Guide — 2006 edition — $187; Natspec Domestic 6-pack, $132. on what appear to be professional books or journals. In written submissions lodged following the hearing Mr Kaley described the purchases in a manner consistent with the carrying on of a business yet, on his own case, he was not then carrying on a business of an architect. He says, of one acquisition, that it was purchased "…to assist the Applicant in the design and documentation of a residential project". My impression, from his evidence at the hearing, was that the home in question was his own proposed dwelling. He does not suggest that the expenditure was of the nature of "self-education" expenses. I am, in any event, not satisfied that the necessary connection between the expense and the gaining or producing of assessable income has been demonstrated.

52. There remains the claim for professional registration of $300. The Commissioner appears to accept[14] Respondent’s outline of written submissions, paragraph 79 d. that such a claim might be deductible; his submission is that the expense has not been substantiated. That is true in part however there is, in the material supplied by Mr Kaley under cover of his letter of 9 June 2009, a document evidencing a payment of $228 made on 24 August 2006 to the ACT Planning and Land Authority and described in the receipt issued by that body as "Architects Board - registration". I accept that the payment has been substantiated in the manner required by s 900-115 of the 1997 Act and that the expense of registration is sufficiently incidental to Mr Kaley's employment as an architect as to make that expense deductible.

53. I would then regard the amount of $228 as the only deductible item under this head.

Was Mr Kaley Carrying On A Business?

54. The question whether Mr Kaley was carrying on a business is one of fact. In the present context, frequent reference is made to the judgement of Bowen CJ and Franki J in
Ferguson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[15] 79 ATC 4261 ; (1979) 37 FLR 310 at 314 where their Honours said:

"There are many elements to be considered. The nature of the activities, particularly whether they have the purpose of profit-making, may be important. However, an immediate purpose of profit-making in a particular income year does not appear to be essential. Certainly it may be held a person is carrying on business notwithstanding his profit is small or even where he is making a loss. Repetition and regularity of the activities is also important. However, every business has to begin, and even isolated activities may in the circumstances he held to be the commencement of carrying on business. Again, organization of activities in a business-like manner, the keeping of books, records and the use of system may all serve to indicate that a business is being carried on. The fact that, concurrently with the activities in question, the taxpayer carries on the practice of a profession or another business, does not preclude a finding that his additional activities constitute the carrying on of a business. The volume of his operations and the amount of capital employed by him may be significant. However, if what he is doing is more properly described as the pursuit of a hobby or recreation or an addiction to a sport, he will not be held to be carrying on a business, even though his operations are fairly substantial."

55. In the context of unsuccessful businesses, I have found the following summary of applicable principles useful:

56. I am quite unsatisfied that Mr Kaley was never carrying on a business whether as an architect, or as a palmist (or similar occupation).

57. In the first year of his claimed business as an architect Mr Kaley generated no income, he was, at all times during the year, in full-time employment, there is no evidence that he was ever consulted by any potential person or undertook any work of a professional nature beyond that called for by his employment or in connection with his entry in the university competition. His quite vague evidence seemed to suggest that the work he undertook, and for which he acquired a specification manual, was for his own dwelling[23] See eg the reference to “Kaleys Residence, Canberra ACT” at page 11 of the T-documents. . He provided copious details of the types of activities that a self-employed architected might undertake[24] See eg page 2 of Tab 4 of the Respondent’s evidence bundle. but no detail of any activity that he has actually undertaken.

58. His evidence about palmistry as a business was even more vague. It was, at best, a hobby.

59. I am then not satisfied that Mr Kaley ever carried on business in any form whether in the 2008 year or earlier.

60. That conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the particular deductions claimed by Mr Kaley to be business expenses in the 2008 year. I am not satisfied that they were deductible.

The University Payment

61. The Commissioner's helpful written submissions examine a series of cases concerning the nature, in an income sense, of prizes however those cases are not, in my view, relevant to the present case. The $1,000 was not a prize, it was an ex gratia payment to compensate for expenses thrown away when a competition was abandoned. The payment bears none of the hallmarks of income according to ordinary concepts.

62. Given my conclusion about the absence of a business I do not regard the payment of $1,000 as assessable income. I do not understand the Commissioner to now contend to the contrary.

The Imposition Of Penalties

63. Mr Kaley is indeed fortunate that the Commissioner's processes for the imposition of penalties miscarried in the 2007 year and that the notice required was not given. The shortfall in that and the following year was plainly brought about by recklessness on the part of Mr Kaley. In my view he simply claimed whatever he thought he might get away with. Given the Commissioner's concession in relation to the 2007 year penalty assessment I will set aside that aspect of the objection decision and substitute a decision that the objection to the 2007 penalty assessment be allowed in full.

64. I would affirm the objection decision for the 2008 penalty. No basis is shown for the remission of any of the penalty.

Conclusion

65. The result of this is that Mr Kaley's objections to the 2007 assessment ought be allowed only to the extent of,

The objection decision was otherwise correct. I will give effect to these conclusions by varying the 2007 objection decision. The 2008 objection decision will be affirmed.

Footnotes

[1] See paragraph [8].
[2] Section 37 T-documents T11-147.
[3] Only 50% of the total cost was claimed.
[4] Section 37 T-documents T12-154.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] See eg Lunney v FCT (1958) 100 CLR 478 .
[8] 64 days at 25 kilometres at $0.67c per kilometre.
[9] See Morris v FCT 2002 ATC 4404 ; (2002) 50 ATR 104 .
[10] Respondent’s evidence bundle, tab 3.
[11] Respondent’s evidence bundle, tab 4.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Cost Guide — 2006 edition — $187; Natspec Domestic 6-pack, $132.
[14] Respondent’s outline of written submissions, paragraph 79 d.
[15] 79 ATC 4261 ; (1979) 37 FLR 310 at 314
[16] Tweddle v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1942) 180 CLR 1 , 7
[17] Fairway Estates Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 70 ATC 4061 ; (1970) 123 CLR 153 , 165 citing Re Griffin; Ex parte The Board of Trade (1890) 60 L.J. Q.B. 235 , 237
[18] Thomas v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 72 ATC 4094 ; (1972) 46 ALJR 397 , 401
[19] John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 89 ATC 4101 ; (1989) 166 CLR 417 , 430
[20] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Glennan 99 ATC 4467 ; (1999) 90 FCR 538 , 555-6 at [72]
[21] Pedley v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 2006 ATC 2064 , 2091
[22] Case M67 80 ATC 479 , 482
[23] See eg the reference to “Kaleys Residence, Canberra ACT” at page 11 of the T-documents.
[24] See eg page 2 of Tab 4 of the Respondent’s evidence bundle.

 

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