DAVSA FORTY-NINTH PTY LTD ATF KRONGOLD FORD BUSINESS UNIT TRUST v FC of T

Members:
FD O'Loughlin SM

Tribunal:
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Melbourne

MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION: [2014] AATA 337

Decision date: 29 May 2014

FD O'Loughlin J

29 May 2014

1. The Applicant claims, and the Commissioner disputes, entitlements to ITCs[1] Input tax credits within the meaning of the GST Act, ss 11–20 and 11–25. pursuant to the GST Act[2] A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth). for the Relevant Period[3] The GST periods: 1/7/2005 – 30/9/2005; 1/1/2006 – 30/6/2006; 1/7/2006 – 30/6/2007; 1/7/2007 – 30/9/2007; 1/4/2008 – 30/6/2008; 1/7/2008 – 30/9/2008. and a decreasing luxury car tax adjustment pursuant to the LCT Act[4] A New Tax System (Luxury Car Tax) Act 1999 (Cth). associated with purchases of motor vehicles. The disputed claims arise in circumstances where the Applicant carried on activities described as a one man business by its principal who had a genuinely held belief that they would, or could, be profitable and that they constituted a business but on an objective view, the possibility of making profits or gains was close to, if not actually, zero.

2. The Applicant also disputes the appropriate amount of penalty levied pursuant to the Administration Act.[5] Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth).

3. The Commissioner has denied the ITC claims on a number of bases.

4. The ITCs will be available:

5. The decreasing LCT adjustment will be available if luxury cars were supplied to the Applicant when it was registered under Part 2-5 of the GST Act, LCT was paid on those supplies because the Applicant didn't quote for the supplies, the motor vehicles were intended for use for a quotable purpose, and the Applicant has only used the motor vehicles for a quotable purpose.[8] LCT Act, s 15–30.

Did the Applicant carry on an enterprise?

6. The heart of the dispute lies in whether the Applicant carried on an enterprise and acquired the motor vehicles subject to LCT to be used/held as trading stock. The Applicant claims it conducted a one man business that was an enterprise. The Commissioner disputes this. It is necessary to consider the Applicant's activities in some detail to resolve this difference in view.

The Applicant's activities

7. The following facts describing the Applicant's activities are taken from the Applicant's objection document which was adopted by the Applicant as its submissions and which the Commissioner accepts corresponds with the evidence given by Mr Krongold, the Applicant's director and principal, who was responsible for the Applicant's activities and was the person conducting what the Applicant contends was a one man business.

8. The evidence also discloses the following:

What constitutes an enterprise?

9. The term enterprise is defined.[9] GST Act, s 9–20. That definition is -

10. The first test the Applicant must satisfy if it is to be entitled to ITCs as a result of making a creditable acquisition is that the motor vehicles were purchased for a creditable purpose in carrying on an enterprise.[10] GST Act, s 11–15(1).

11. Given the structure of the definition of an enterprise, activities that constitute a business will always constitute an enterprise. Therefore, it is necessary to identify what a business is and how activities are tested as part of that characterisation process.

What constitutes a business?

12. There is a non-exhaustive definition of business in s 195-1 of the GST Act. It mirrors the income tax legislation definition. However, on its own, it offers little guidance as to what constitutes a business.

13. Whether an activity or series of activities constitutes carrying on a business and whether a particular activity forms part of any business:

14. In undertaking the examination and characterising the activities in question:

15. The Commissioner contends that the common indicia of a business are as outlined in his ruling TR 97/11. In that ruling the Commissioner sets out tests that are substantially consistent with the foregoing. One test articulated in the ruling, whether the activity has a significant commercial purpose, warrants comment.

16. In support the Commissioner refers to what Walsh J said in
Thomas v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.[33] (1972) 72 ATC 4094 . The phrase significant commercial purpose used by his Honour was used in concluding that growing pine trees did not constitute a business activity. In Thomas, the pine trees had been planted and allowed to become overgrown, there was never an expectation of an average net return of more than $100 per year and the total value of those trees was fairly trivial.[34] (1972) 72 ATC 4094 at 4099 . His Honour did not suggest that it was necessary to establish that a significant commercial purpose exists before activities can constitute a business. Such a test would tend to contradict authorities to the effect that activities may constitute a business even where carried on in a limited way in preparation for larger scale operations.[35] Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [ 35] and the authorities there cited. The other authority referred to in the ruling[36] Hope v The Council of the City of Bathurst (1980) 144 CLR 1 . suggests quite the contrary.[37] Gibbs and Stephen JJ. at 144 CLR 3. Possibly the rule should be that if there is a significant commercial purpose then there will be a business and without it other matters need to be considered.

17. It should be observed that in
Ferguson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation Bowen CJ and Franki J said:[38] [ 1979] FCA 29 at [ 15] .

Section 6 of the Income Tax Assessment Act defines "business" stating that it includes any profession, trade, employment, vocation or calling, but does not include occupation as an employee. This does not afford much assistance in the present case. It is necessary to turn to the cases. There are many elements to be considered. The nature of the activities, particularly whether they have the purpose of profit-making, may be important. However, an immediate purpose of profit-making in a particular income year does not appear to be essential. Certainly it may be held a person is carrying on business notwithstanding his profit is small or even where he is making a loss. Repetition and regularity of the activities is also important. However, every business has to begin and even isolated activities may in the circumstances be held to be the commencement of carrying on business. Again, organization of activities in a business-like manner, the keeping of books, records and the use of system may all serve to indicate that a business is being carried on. The fact that, concurrently with the activities in question, the taxpayer carries on the practice of a profession or another business, does not preclude a finding that his additional activities constitute the carrying on of a business. The volume of his operations and the amount of capital employed by him may be significant. However, if what he is doing is more properly described as the pursuit of a hobby or recreation or an addiction to a sport, he will not be held to be carrying on a business even though his operations are fairly substantial

What constitutes an enterprise?

18. Identifying an enterprise requires a similar enquiry. The concept includes activities in the form of a business and/or in the form of an adventure in the nature of trade which are wider than activities that constitute a business simpliciter.[39] See State Superannuation Board (NSW) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4382 at 4389 Sheppard J. referred to without disapproval on appeal by Davies J in State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of Taxation above at 548 . While these concepts are wider,[40] See State Superannuation Board (NSW) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4382 at 4392 Sheppard J. referred to with approval on appeal by Davies J in State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of Taxation above at 547 . and therefore constitute a lower standard to be satisfied,[41] See State Superannuation Board (NSW) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4382 at 4389 Sheppard J. it is still necessary for the activities to have the essence of business activities.[42] State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of Taxation above Davies J at 547–548 . When used as a noun the term form means, among others, the visible shape or configuration of something, the particular way in which a thing exists or appears, or the type or variety of something[43] http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/form?q=form. and, depending on the context, can besynonymous with, among others, the terms shape, condition, mode, manner, way, style, guise, complexion, pattern, model, and exemplar.[44] Roget’s Thesaurus http://www.roget.org/scripts/qq.php. Similarly, when used as a noun the term nature means, among others, basic or inherent features, character, or qualities of something or the innate or essential qualities or character of something[45] http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/nature?q=nature. and, depending on the context, can be synonymous with, among others, the terms kind, sort, ilk, type, species, genus, genre, designation, description, style, manner, character, the like of, and the likes of.[46] Roget’s Thesaurus http://www.roget.org/scripts/qq.php.

19. By including agencies of government in the definition of enterprise[47] GST Act, s 9–20(1)(g). the legislature specifically brought these bodies within the GST system. Accordingly, the concepts of activities in the form of a business or in the form of an adventure or concern in the nature of trade are not meant to embrace merely activities of bodies such as government departments including, for example, the Respondent's organisation, that may operate in a business like way but are not businesses as such.[48] State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of Taxation above Davies J at 547–548 . The concepts in the form of a business or in the form of an adventure or concern in the nature of trade are intended to do other work; consistent with two of the presumptions of statutory construction that all provisions of a statute do some work, and are there for a purpose,[49] Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [ 71] per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ and the cases there cited and see in the context of taxation legislation Envestra Limited v F.C. of T. [ 2008] FCA 249 at [ 31] per Mansfield J. and where different wording is used in a statute, it is to be taken that the legislative intent is to denote different things.[50] See Prestcold (Central) Ltd v Minister of Labour [ 1969] 2 WLR 89 (Court of Appeal) at p 97 per Lord Diplock; Registrar of Titles (WA) v Franzon (1975) 132 CLR 611 at 618 per Mason J with whom Barwick CJ and Jacobs J agreed.

20. Two further considerations bear on the required analysis: first, the impact of the s 9-20(2) limitations on what constitutes an enterprise and, second, the impact of the definition of carrying on[51] GST Act, s 195–1. in the context of an enterprise which includes steps taken in the course of commencement of the enterprise.

21. The s 9-20(2) limitations on what constitutes an enterprise create two qualifications to what otherwise might be an enterprise.

22. The first s 9-20(2) qualification is that a series of activities undertaken by any entity that constitute a private recreational pursuit or hobby is not an enterprise.[52] GST Act, s 9–20(2)(b). Possibly, this does little more, if anything, than codify general principles governing what constitutes a business. This limitation applies to all entities. There is a conceptual difficulty in an entity other than an individual carrying on a hobby[53] As observed by McKerracher J in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Swansea Services Pty Ltd above at [ 100] . but such an entity can do so if it is a vehicle for an individual's pursuit.[54] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Swansea Services Pty Ltd above at [ 100] and [ 101] . In circumstances where the Applicant contends that its activities were a one man business, the Applicant's activities can be regarded as the manifestation of its director Mr Krongold's pursuits, however those pursuits are characterised, and his purposes or intentions for pursuing the activities undertaken by the Applicant, whatever those purposes or intentions were, are to be attributed to the Applicant.

23. The second s 9-20(2) qualification is that a series of activities undertaken by an individual that does not have a reasonable prospect of profit or gain is not an enterprise. This is a discrete test applied to individuals and partnerships comprising individuals or mostly individuals. This test is not expressed to apply to other entities, which begs the question whether other entities are not subject to this qualification, the answer to which is left uncertain by the legislation.

24. As noted above there is a presumption that where the legislature says different things it is to be taken that the legislative intent is to denote different things.

25. The Explanatory Memorandum[55] A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Bill 1998, Explanatory Memorandum. includes the following comments concerning the additional test for an individual or a partnership of individuals or mostly of individuals:

Certain things are excluded from being an enterprise. For example, hobbies, private recreational pursuits and employee wages are not subject to GST. For individuals and partnerships there must also be a reasonable expectation of profit or gain.[56] A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Bill 1998, Explanatory Memorandum, page 9. (Emphasis added)

and

2.3 Enterprise has been defined very broadly. Several of the things included as enterprises are included not so that they charge GST on their supplies, but so that they can become registered and obtain input tax credits.

2.4 Hobbies or recreational activities and activities where there is no reasonable expectation of profit or gain are specifically excluded from being enterprises.[57] A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Bill 1998, Explanatory Memorandum.

26. Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 do not track what the legislation says and, as a result, do not achieve what the name of the document in which they appear implies is intended. The extract from page 9 of the Explanatory Memorandum does track the legislation and does assist. This extract suggests that the reasonable expectation of profit test, an objective test, is an additional test for individuals and partnerships of all or mostly individuals. If it is an additional test, the necessary implication is that that test is additional to a testing regime that does not include the added test and is, therefore, not required of other entities.

27. That the definition of carrying on[58] GST Act, s 195-1. in the context of an enterprise includes steps taken in the course of commencement of the enterprise raises two considerations. First, because something must be taken to exist if it is being carried on, the necessary implication of this definition is that the steps taken in commencement of an enterprise mark the start of the period when an enterprise exists. Second, what is a step taken in the course of commencement of the enterprise as opposed to a step taken outside the scope of the enterprise or before an enterprise is commenced?

28. The enquiry called for is to identify the essential character of the step taken, and, in the present circumstances involving disputed ITCs, the essential character of the acquisition.[59] Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 190 FCR 449 at 473 [ 103] Gordon J with whom Edmonds J agreed. It does not matter that the thing acquired might also be used for private or domestic purposes, if the circumstances are such that the thing acquired was for the establishment and/or conduct of an enterprise then ITCs are allowable.[60] Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 190 FCR 449 at 473 [ 103] Gordon J with whom Edmonds J agreed.

29. Commencing an enterprise is not always the same thing as preparing for commencing an enterprise.[61] Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 190 FCR 449 at 465 [ 71] Dowsett J. Timing becomes an issue. Building up an inventory or collection to the point of eventually being able to sell individual pieces for profit has been accepted as carrying on an enterprise,[62] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Swansea Services Pty Ltd above at [ 76], [ 77] and [ 104] . as has acquisition of a capital asset to be used in carrying on an enterprise or business;[63] Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 190 FCR 449 at 473 [ 103] Gordon J with whom Edmonds J agreed. the latter as doing something in the course of the commencement or termination of the enterprise. It follows then that acquisition of items that will be the circulating capital and turned over in the course of business activity and held on revenue account, even where the circulating capital is the initial circulating capital of the business,[64] Vincent v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 124 FCR 350 at 368 [ 75] Hill , Tamberlin and Hely JJ. must also so qualify.

30. Drawing these considerations together, a series of activities will constitute an enterprise if those activities constitute a business or, having the essential features or appearance of a business, the activities are at the margin of being characterised as a business but do not constitute a business.

The Applicant's Contentions

31. The Applicant contends that:

The Commissioner's contentions

32. The Commissioner contends that:

The enterprise question

33. The Commissioner's primary contention is:

The Applicant did not acquire the motor vehicles in carrying on an enterprise. The activities, or series of activities that the Applicant claims constituted its "enterprise", did not meet the definition of "enterprise …. amongst other things, the Applicant's activities, or series of activities, were not done:

  • (a) in the form of a business; or
  • (b) in the form of an adventure or concern in the nature of trade.

34. The Commissioner accepts that the indicia of activities that constitute a business can be used as a touchstone to evaluate whether activities meet the definition of enterprise and that the words in the form of used in that definition may mean that it extends the reach of the term enterprise to include activities that would not otherwise be regarded as a business.

35. The Commissioner supports his contention by reference to the indicia of a business identified in his ruling TR 97/11

36. Whether intentionally or otherwise, in one relevant respect the summation of the Commissioner's ruling contended for in his submissions departs from the terms of the ruling in one respect that may have a bearing in the present matter. The summary of the indicia of a business listed in the ruling concerning profitability is:

whether the taxpayer has a purpose of profit as well as a prospect of profit from the activity

37. Prospective profitability, and/or a strong likelihood of it, is a positive indicator of the most important criterion for whether someone is carrying on a business (and by extension an enterprise), namely intention to make profits. However, an objective view that profits are unlikely is not fatal to the analysis that a person is engaging in activities intending to make profits. People can be misinformed, or even misguided, in their thinking or assessment of the prospective financial returns that might be enjoyed as a result of a series of activities. Similarly, onlookers may objectively form a view that the financial prospects of a series of activities are not good, or are even hopeless, and it may transpire that those activities are successful; just as activities that may objectively be thought likely to produce success may transpire to be abysmal failures. History has many stories of unexpected good, and bad, fortunes.

38. The present Applicant should be regarded as an entity that has engaged in a series of activities that have sufficient indicia of business to be regarded as carrying on an enterprise, or to have been carrying out steps in the commencement of an enterprise. The Applicant can and has demonstrated that:

39. While finely balanced, where intention to make profits is the most important criterion to be met, and intentions are matters that have subjective elements to them, the conclusion is that the motor vehicles were acquired in carrying on an enterprise. The motor vehicles were acquired with the view that they would be sold at a profit as a part of that enterprise. There is little doubt that if any of the motor vehicles were to be sold at a profit, that profit would be a business profit. Some of those motor vehicles may have been acquired with an additional intention or purpose that they be used privately in the period between acquisition and sale. All motor vehicles other than the VZ Commodore Monaro UFB041, the VZ Commodore HSC coupe UCC592, the Ford GT v-GT066, the Cobra GT WIN665 and the Citroen Diesel WMC482 bear a number of kilometres travelled that suggest private use and the Applicant admits private use of some of them.

40. Private use of assets acquired does not preclude those assets being assets acquired in carrying on an enterprise.[69] Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 190 FCR 449 at 473 [ 103] Gordon J with whom Edmonds J agreed What it does prevent is full ITCs being allowed given the apportionment rules.[70] GST Act, ss 11–5(a), 11–15(2) and 11–25. The extent to which ITCs are allowable is a question of appropriate apportionment. The evidence does not disclose an appropriate basis. Accordingly the Applicant has not established an entitlement to ITCs in respect of all motor vehicles other than the VZ Commodore Monaro UFB041, VZ Commodore HSC coupe UCC592, Ford GT v-GT066, Cobra GT WIN665 and the Citroen Diesel WMC482.

The Commissioner's other contentions

41. Given the conclusion concerning the enterprise question, the remaining bases on which the Commissioner defends his objection decision need to be considered.

Tax Invoices not held as required

42. For the purchases of the motor vehicles listed in Table 4 above, the evidence does not disclose that the Applicant held valid tax invoices either at all or at the requisite time for the ITCs claimed as required by, s 29-10(3) of the GST Act. While contracts for the purchases were held and provided in evidence, no evidence of tax invoices was led for three of the motor vehicles listed and for fourth motor vehicle the tax invoice was dated after the period for which the ITCs were claimed for that vehicle.

43. That being the case, the Applicant has not established an entitlement to the ITCs claimed in respect of those motor vehicles and fails in its challenge to the Commissioner's objection decision in respect of the ITCs for these motor vehicles.

Consideration not paid in relevant period

44. The Applicant was a cash basis GST payer and entitled to ITCs in the period when consideration was paid.[71] GST Act, s 29-10(2).

45. The evidence discloses that the consideration for the purchases of the motor vehicles in Table 5 above was only paid to the extent shown.

46. Accordingly the Applicant has not established an entitlement to the ITCs to the extent claimed in respect of those motor vehicles. The Applicant fails in its challenge to the Commissioner's objection decision in respect of the ITCs for these motor vehicles to the extent that the purchase prices were not paid.

47. The Commissioner makes similar contentions regarding the Volkswagen Passat UTD757 and the Citroen Diesel WMC482. They cannot be accepted. The evidence shows that before 30 June 2006 and 2008 the Applicant had become a borrower from lenders separate from the vendors of these vehicles for the full balance of the purchase price. A taxpayer on a cash basis who borrows money and pays the purchase price, or consideration for the supply, has paid the amount of the consideration and is entitled to the ITCs associated with the purchase, assuming all other requirements are met, notwithstanding that the loan may not have been paid in full in the relevant period.

Second hand motor vehicles purchased privately

48. Four of the motor vehicles listed in Table 1,[72] The Holden Astra QTB807, the BMW X5 Wagon TEC828, the Jeep Wagon TNL711, and the Mazda Hatch DHM421 were purchased second hand from people not registered for GST.

49. As such there was not a taxable supply of the motor vehicles as required for ITCs to be allowed under the usual rules.[73] GST Act, s 11-5. Further, there was not a taxable on- supply of the motor vehicles by the Applicant in the Relevant Period and receipt of consideration in respect of such a supply[74] GST Act, s 66-15. for ITCs to be allowed under the second hand goods rules.[75] GST Act, s 66-15.

50. Accordingly the Applicant has not established an entitlement to the ITCs claimed in respect of those motor vehicles and fails in its challenge to the Commissioner's objection decision in respect of these ITCs.

51. In these circumstances it is not strictly necessary to consider the Commissioner's additional contention that the evidence does not disclose s 66-17 records were maintained to allow ITCs in respect of second hand goods. Nevertheless, the Applicant has produced at least some of the purchase contracts for these motor vehicles making it highly likely that it could establish that the s 66-17 records are held.

Luxury car limits

52. The Commissioner contends that for the motor vehicles listed in Table 7, s 69-10 caps the GST entitlement to 1/11th of the luxury vehicle cap.


Table 7 Motor vehicles the subject of a LCT adjustment claim
Table 7 Motor vehicles the subject of a LCT adjustment claim
Vehicle
VZ Commodore Monaro UFB041
VZ Commodore HSC coupe UCC592
Jaguar XX Coupe VXK666
Ford GT v-GT066
Citroen Diesel WMC482

53. If the Applicant was entitled to quote in respect of the acquisition of these motor vehicles then any ITC entitlement would not be limited by the luxury vehicle cap. The Applicant would have been entitled to quote in respect of these motor vehicles if, at the time of quoting, it had the intention of using these motor vehicles by holding them as trading stock and for no other purpose.

54. The kilometres travelled by the Jaguar XX Coupe VXK666 are not consistent with an intention of sole use of this vehicle only as trading stock and accordingly the Commissioner's contentions in relation to this motor vehicle must be accepted.

55. The conclusions concerning carrying on an enterprise and the minimalist use of the remaining motor vehicles suggests that the sole use test should be regarded as satisfied for the remaining four motor vehicles. Accordingly, the Commissioner's contentions in relation to the remaining motor vehicles are not accepted.

ITC entitlements conclusions

56. Table 8 (annexed) sets out in a table form the reason why ITCs in respect of the motor vehicles the subject of this review are not allowable based on the foregoing reasons. With the exception of the Ford GT v-GT066, the Applicant is not entitled to any of the ITCs as claimed.

LCT adjustment

57. The Applicant claims a LCT adjustment in respect of the periods and motor vehicles listed in Table 9 below.


Table 9 Motor vehicles the subject of a LCT adjustment claim
Table 9 Motor vehicles the subject of a LCT adjustment claim
Vehicle Period LCT paid
VZ Commodore Monaro UFB041 1/7/2005 - 30/9/2005 $1,662.05
VZ Commodore HSC coupe UCC592 1/7/2005 - 30/9/2005 $4,952.81
Jaguar XX Coupe VXK666 1/7/2006 - 30/6/2007 $29,072.41
Ford GT v-GT066 1/4/2008 - 30/6/2008 $1.977.98
Citroen Diesel WMC482 1/4/2008 - 30/6/2008 $7,655.93

58. The Commissioner denies entitlement to the adjustment on two grounds. First, that the Applicant was not entitled to quote its ABN in respect of these purchases of these motor vehicles as it did not intend to acquire these motor vehicles for a quotable purpose and did not use them solely for that quotable purpose, namely to be held as trading stock. Second, because the Applicant is only entitled to a decreasing adjustment for the period it becomes aware of the adjustment entitlement and, if that is a later period than the period in which the purchases were made then the entitlement arises in the later period. The Commissioner contends that the evidence shows that the Applicant became entitled to the adjustment in the period after the Relevant Period when revised BAS were lodged, namely April 2009.

59. For the reasons set out above, the Applicant should be taken to have established that all of these motor vehicles except the Jaguar were acquired for the requisite purpose and was entitled to quote. Further, the Applicant should be regarded as having used those motor vehicles consistently with that purpose. But for considerations below, the Applicant would be entitled to the LCT adjustment sought.

60. Again for reasons set out above, the Applicant has not established that the Jaguar vehicle was not at least partly acquired for private purposes. Further, the Applicant has not established that that vehicle was used only as trading stock in the period since acquisition. The test for LCT relief is strict. It does not allow relief if the vehicle is used for multiple purposes. Accordingly the Applicant is not entitled to the adjustment sought.

61. The Commissioner's second contention concerning the timing of entitlements to LCT adjustments is conclusive. Any entitlement to an adjustment is not in the Relevant Period.

Penalty

62. The forgoing conclusions mean that the Applicant had tax shortfalls.

63. As noted in Stewart and the Commissioner of Taxation[76] [ 2013] AATA 845 the Administration Act creates a penalty regime for false or misleading statements that lead to shortfall amounts.

64. Subsection 284-75(1) of Schedule 1 to the Administration Act applies if:

65. As noted above there have been false or misleading statements and there have been tax shortfalls as a consequence. The Applicant is therefore potentially liable to a penalty.[77] Administration Act, Schedule 1, s 284-75(1).

66. The Commissioner has assessed administrative penalty at the base rate of 25% of the tax shortfall based on his calculation of what that shortfall was at the lack of reasonable care level.

67. It is apparent that the Applicant consulted his accountant and tax agent.

68. In these circumstances the Applicant cannot be criticised for failure to make an attempt to have his tax affairs dealt with properly. It will be recalled that that system of penalties is not designed to punish tax short falls per se. As noted by Hill J in
Walstern v Commissioner of Taxation[78] 2003 ATC 5076 at [ 106] . in recounting the explanation given at the time of introduction of the earlier, but similarly structured, tax penalty regime:

The Minister assisting the Treasurer, Mr Baldwin said, inter alia:

The whole idea of the new understatement penalties is to ensure that people do not get penalised when they have made an honest and genuine attempt to correctly determine their taxable income.

69. The Applicant consulted a tax agent. That constitutes a reasonable attempt to comply with the law, or in other words, reasonable care.

70. The remaining question is whether the Applicant's tax agent took reasonable care. The evidence led does not disclose what steps the Applicant's agent took. Accordingly on the evidence led, the Applicant has not discharged the onus of showing that both he and its tax agent took reasonable care.

Penalty remission

71. Again as noted in Stewart and the Commissioner of Taxation, the Commissioner and the Tribunal on review have a discretion to remit penalties. The Administration Act does not set out any guidelines for exercising that discretion. The issue is simply whether it is appropriate in the circumstances to remit penalties in whole or in part. A significant consideration in the exercise of this discretion is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the taxpayer, the outcome would otherwise be harsh or produce an unjust, inappropriate or unreasonable outcome.[79] Sanctuary Lakes Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [ 2013] FCAFC 50 at [ 248]–[ 249] Griffiths J with whom Edmonds J agreed.

72. On the evidence led, a penalty calculated by reference to the reduced shortfall at the 25% rate for failure to take reasonable care or failure to have adopted a reasonably arguable position does not produce an inappropriate result.

Decision

73. The Tribunal sets aside the objection decision in relation to ITCs claimed in respect of the Ford GT v-GT066 and penalty in respect thereof and in lieu thereof allows the objection in part and otherwise affirms the decision under review.

ANNEXURE
Table 8 ITC entitlement conclusions
Table 8 ITC entitlement conclusions
Vehicle Not acquired in relevant period Second hand cars No tax Invoice Consideration not all paid in period Admitted Private use Excessive Km 1/11th LCL
Saab SRA 205* X       X X  
Suzuki STD648* X            
Jaguar XCF080* X         X  
VZ Commodore Monaro UFB041     X X      
VZ Commodore HSC coupe UCC592     X X      
Volks Golf UBG360     X   X X  
Volks Passat UTD757     X   X X  
Jaguar XX Coupe VXK666           X X
Holden Astra QTB807   X       X  
BMW X5 Wagon TEC828   X          
Jeep Wagon TNL711   X          
Mazda Hatch DHM421   X          
Ford GT v-GT066              
Cobra GT WIN665 X     X      
KIA Wagon WKB290     X   X X  
Citroen Diesel WMC482     X        

Footnotes

[1] Input tax credits within the meaning of the GST Act, ss 11–20 and 11–25.
[2] A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth).
[3] The GST periods: 1/7/2005 – 30/9/2005; 1/1/2006 – 30/6/2006; 1/7/2006 – 30/6/2007; 1/7/2007 – 30/9/2007; 1/4/2008 – 30/6/2008; 1/7/2008 – 30/9/2008.
[4] A New Tax System (Luxury Car Tax) Act 1999 (Cth).
[5] Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth).
[6] Within the meaning of the GST Act, s 9–20.
[7] Within the meaning of the GST Act, s 29–70.
[8] LCT Act, s 15–30.
[*] Any entitlements to ITCs associated with these motor vehicles were not included the Applicant’s objection and are not, therefore, the subject of the present review by the Tribunal.
[*] Any entitlements to ITCs associated with these motor vehicles were not included the Applicant’s objection and are not, therefore, the subject of the present review by the Tribunal.
[*] Any entitlements to ITCs associated with these motor vehicles were not included the Applicant’s objection and are not, therefore, the subject of the present review by the Tribunal.
[*] Any entitlements to ITCs associated with these motor vehicles were not included the Applicant’s objection and are not, therefore, the subject of the present review by the Tribunal.
[9] GST Act, s 9–20.
[10] GST Act, s 11–15(1).
[11] Spriggs v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 239 CLR 1 French CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at 19 [59] ;, Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 1589 Sackville J at [34] .
[12] Spriggs v Federal Commissioner of Taxation above at 19 [59] , Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [35] .
[13] Spriggs v Federal Commissioner of Taxation above at 19 [59] .
[14] Spriggs v Federal Commissioner of Taxation above at 19 [59] , Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [35] .
[15] Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [35] .
[16] Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [35] referring to Evans v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 89 ATC 4540 Hill J at 4555 .
[17] Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [35] and the authorities there cited.
[18] Spriggs v Federal Commissioner of Taxation above at 19 [59] , Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [35] .
[19] Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [35] and the authorities there cited.
[20] Spriggs v Federal Commissioner of Taxation above at 20 [60] .
[21] Spriggs v Federal Commissioner of Taxation above at 19 [60] and the authorities there cited.
[22] Spriggs v Federal Commissioner of Taxation above at 19 [59] referring to Evans v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 20 ATR 922 Hill J at 939 , Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [34] .
[23] Spriggs v Federal Commissioner of above at 19 [59] .
[24] Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [35] referring to Ferguson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 79 ATC 4261 Bowen C.J. and Franki J. at 4264.
[25] E.g. not for profit organisations and government run railways: see State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 21 FCR 535 at 547–8 Davies J with whom Burchett J agreed.
[26] Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [35] and the authorities there cited.
[27] Thomas v Federal Commissioner of Taxation Walsh J (1972) 72 ATC 4094 Walsh J at 4100 .
[28] State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of Taxation above at 548 Davies J with whom Burchett J agreed.
[29] Tweddle v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1942] HCA 40 ; (1942) 180 CLR 1 Williams J at 7, Ronpibon Tin NL & Anor v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 15 ; (1949) 78 CLR 47 at P 60 and adopted in more contemporary authority in Commissioner of Taxation v BHP Billiton Finance Limited [2010] FCAFC 25 Edmonds J at [18] .
[30] Spassked Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2003] FCAFC 282 Gyles J at [127] .
[31] Fletcher and Others v The Commissioner of Taxation of The Commonwealth of Australia (1991) 173 CLR 1 at 17–18 Mason C.J., Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ., Spassked Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2003] FCAFC 282 Hill and Lander JJ at [64] and Ell v Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCA 71 at [111] Emmett J and the authorities there cited and in a GST context see Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 190 FCR 449 at 465–466 [72] Dowsett J and at 473 [103] Gordon J with whom Edmonds J agreed, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Swansea Services Pty Ltd (2009) 72 ATR 120 at 141 [73] to [75] .
[32] Spassked Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2003] FCAFC 282 Hill and Lander JJ at [64]. An illustration of the absence of need to refer to subjective matters is the approach taken by Wilson J in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Whitfords Beach Pty. Ltd. (1982) 150 CLR 355 at 399/400 .
[33] (1972) 72 ATC 4094 .
[34] (1972) 72 ATC 4094 at 4099 .
[35] Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation above at [ 35] and the authorities there cited.
[36] Hope v The Council of the City of Bathurst (1980) 144 CLR 1 .
[37] Gibbs and Stephen JJ. at 144 CLR 3.
[38] [ 1979] FCA 29 at [ 15] .
[39] See State Superannuation Board (NSW) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4382 at 4389 Sheppard J. referred to without disapproval on appeal by Davies J in State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of Taxation above at 548 .
[40] See State Superannuation Board (NSW) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4382 at 4392 Sheppard J. referred to with approval on appeal by Davies J in State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of Taxation above at 547 .
[41] See State Superannuation Board (NSW) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4382 at 4389 Sheppard J.
[42] State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of Taxation above Davies J at 547–548 .
[43] http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/form?q=form.
[44] Roget’s Thesaurus http://www.roget.org/scripts/qq.php.
[45] http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/nature?q=nature.
[46] Roget’s Thesaurus http://www.roget.org/scripts/qq.php.
[47] GST Act, s 9–20(1)(g).
[48] State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of Taxation above Davies J at 547–548 .
[49] Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [ 71] per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ and the cases there cited and see in the context of taxation legislation Envestra Limited v F.C. of T. [ 2008] FCA 249 at [ 31] per Mansfield J.
[50] See Prestcold (Central) Ltd v Minister of Labour [ 1969] 2 WLR 89 (Court of Appeal) at p 97 per Lord Diplock; Registrar of Titles (WA) v Franzon (1975) 132 CLR 611 at 618 per Mason J with whom Barwick CJ and Jacobs J agreed.
[51] GST Act, s 195–1.
[52] GST Act, s 9–20(2)(b).
[53] As observed by McKerracher J in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Swansea Services Pty Ltd above at [ 100] .
[54] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Swansea Services Pty Ltd above at [ 100] and [ 101] .
[55] A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Bill 1998, Explanatory Memorandum.
[56] A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Bill 1998, Explanatory Memorandum, page 9.
[57] A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Bill 1998, Explanatory Memorandum.
[58] GST Act, s 195-1.
[59] Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 190 FCR 449 at 473 [ 103] Gordon J with whom Edmonds J agreed.
[60] Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 190 FCR 449 at 473 [ 103] Gordon J with whom Edmonds J agreed.
[61] Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 190 FCR 449 at 465 [ 71] Dowsett J.
[62] Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Swansea Services Pty Ltd above at [ 76], [ 77] and [ 104] .
[63] Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 190 FCR 449 at 473 [ 103] Gordon J with whom Edmonds J agreed.
[64] Vincent v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 124 FCR 350 at 368 [ 75] Hill , Tamberlin and Hely JJ.
[65] GST Act, s 29-10(3).
[66] GST Act, s 29-10(2).
[67] GST Act, s 66-15.
[68] GST Act, s 69-10.
[69] Russell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 190 FCR 449 at 473 [ 103] Gordon J with whom Edmonds J agreed
[70] GST Act, ss 11–5(a), 11–15(2) and 11–25.
[71] GST Act, s 29-10(2).
[72] The Holden Astra QTB807, the BMW X5 Wagon TEC828, the Jeep Wagon TNL711, and the Mazda Hatch DHM421
[73] GST Act, s 11-5.
[74] GST Act, s 66-15.
[75] GST Act, s 66-15.
[76] [ 2013] AATA 845
[77] Administration Act, Schedule 1, s 284-75(1).
[78] 2003 ATC 5076 at [ 106] .
[79] Sanctuary Lakes Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [ 2013] FCAFC 50 at [ 248]–[ 249] Griffiths J with whom Edmonds J agreed.

 

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