National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners
[1947] 2 All ER 217(Judgment by: Lord Normand)
National Anti-Vivisection Society
v Inland Revenue Commissioners
Judges:
Viscount Simon
Lord Wright
Lord Porter
Lord Simonds
Lord Normand
Judgment date: 2 July 1947
Judgment by:
Lord Normand
My Lords, the society claims exemption from income tax on its investment income on the ground that it is a body of persons established for charitable purposes only within the meaning of s 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1918. The trust purposes are to be found in resolutions passed by a general meeting of the society held on 31 July 1897, and by the council on 9 February 1898. Of these resolutions the first declares that the object of the society is to awaken the conscience of mankind to the equity of torturing animals for any purpose whatever; to draw public attention to the impossibility of any adequate protection from torture being afforded to animals under the present law; and so to lead the people of this country to call upon Parliament totally to suppress the practice of vivisection. By the second resolution, which is described as an explanatory resolution, the council affirmed that, while the demand for the total abolition of vivisection would ever remain the object of the society, the society was not thereby precluded from making efforts in Parliament for lesser measures, having for their object the saving of animals from scientific torture.
The first question in the appeal is whether these purposes do not demonstrate that the society is an association for political purposes and not an association or trust for charitable purposes. The distinction between a political association and a charitable trust has not been defined and I doubt whether it admits of precise definition. The Attorney General, however, submitted that any association which included among its objects the passing by Parliament of any legislation, unless it were an uncontroversial enabling Act, was to be considered a political association, and must be refused the privileges which the law allows to charities. But no authority was cited which would warrant so extreme a proposition. The formation of voluntary associations for the furtherance of the improvement of morals is familiar, and such associations are a well recognised sub-division of the fourth of Lord MacNaghten's divisions of charities in Pemsel's case. It is also familiar that trusts for preventing cruelty to animals or for improving the conditions of their lives have found a recognised place in that sub-division. Trusts for the benefit of animals are allowed to be charitable because, to quote the language of Swinfen-Eady LJ in Re Wedgewood ([1915] 1 ChD 122), they tend:
'... to promote and encourage kindness towards them, to discourage cruelty, and to ameliorate the condition of the brute creation, and thus to stimulate humane and generous sentiments in man towards the lower animals, and by these means promote feelings of humanity and morality generally, repress brutality, and thus elevate the human race.'
Societies for the amelioration of the condition of animals like other societies for the improvement of human morals do not as a rule limit their activities to one particular method of advancing their cause. Commonly they hope to make voluntary converts, and they also hope to educate public opinion and so to bring its influence to bear on those who offend against a humane code of conduct towards animals. But they seldom disclaim and frequently avow an intention of inducing Parliament to pass new legislation if a favorable opportunity should arise of furthering their purpose by that means. A society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, eg , may include, among its professed purposes, amendments of the law dealing with field sports or with the taking of eggs or the like. Yet it would not, in my view, necessarily lose its right to be considered a charity, and if that right were questioned, it would become the duty of the court to decide whether the general purpose of the society was the improvement of morals by various lawful means including new legislation, all such means being subsidiary to the general charitable purpose. If the court answered this question in favour of the society, it would retain its privileges as a charity. But, if the decision was that the leading purpose of the society was to promote legislation in order to bring about a change of policy towards field sports, or the protection of wild birds, it would follow that the society should be classified as an association with political objects and that it would lose its privileges as a charity. The problem is, therefore, to discover the general purposes of the society and whether they are in the main political or in the main charitable. It is a question of degree of a sort well known to the courts. The appellant society is a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, and it is not disputed that by the vigilance of its members it does much to prevent the infliction of cruelty on animals undergoing experiments. But it has chosen to restrict its attack upon cruelty to a narrow and peculiar field, and it has adopted as its leading purpose the suppression of vivisection by legislation. This is apparent from the resolutions which I have quoted. In the first of them the society condemns the existing legislation as an insufficient protection against the torture of animals, and sets forth as its object the total suppression of vivisection by new legislation passed by Parliament under pressure from an enlightened people. By the second resolution the counsel affirms that the total abolition of vivisection remains the object of the society but intimates that lesser Parliamentary measures for the protection of animals from scientific torture will also be pursued by the society. The society seems to me to proclaim that its purpose is a legislative change of policy towards scientific experiments on animals, the consummation of which will be an Act prohibiting all such experiments. I regard it as clear that a society professing these purposes is a political association and not a charity. If for legislative changes a change by means of government administration was substituted the result would be the same. In Bowman v Secular Society ( [1917] AC 442 ) Lord Parker said:
'... a trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held invalid, not because it is illegal ... but because the court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit.'
That was said in a case in which the society was advocating a very important change in the relations of the State and the community towards religion. I respectfully agree with the comment of Lord Greene MR ( [1946] 1 All ER 214 ) that Lord Parker's words do not apply when the legislation is merely ancillary to the attainment of what is ex hypothesi a good charitable object. For the charitable purpose, being dominant, would prevail as it did in Inland Revenue Comrs v Falkirk Temperance Cafe Trust and in Public Trustee v Hood , where it was held that, the main object of the gift being charitable, the gift was none the less valid because the testator had pointed out one of the means by which, in his opinion, the main object could best be attained and which in itself might not have been charitable if it had stood alone. But I regret that I cannot agree with Lord Greene MR in limiting the scope of Lord Parker's words to matters of acute political controversy. Whether a project for new legislation excites acute political controversy may depend on the prudence and good management of the promoters. If they have patiently prepared the way by a gradual education of the public they may succeed in eliminating much of the opposition. But I cannot imagine that it is probable that a measure for the suppression of the kind of research which is impugned by this society would pass without acute controversy. It excites little or no controversy at present because the immediate prospects of its success are negligible, but, if the efforts of the society were to bring success near, acute and bitter controversy would, it is almost certain, become inevitable. But in my opinion it is not relevant to inquire whether the change of policy, for such it would be, represented by the prohibition of experiments on animals, might be accompanied by controversy or not. The relevant consideration is that it would be a change of policy, and that this society makes the achievement of that change by legislation its leading purpose. That in my opinion settles the issue in this case. I think that the same reason explains the decision of Inland Revenue Comrs v Temperance Council of Christian Churches of England and Wales , and I adopt the words used of that case by Lawrence LJ in Public Trustee v Hood ([1931] 1 Ch 252):
'"... in that case the gift was not for the promotion of temperence generally, but was for the promotion of temperance mainly by political means ... '
The appellant society is similarly not a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals generally, but a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals by political means.
It would not, however, be right to pass by in silence the other question which occupied so much of the debate. This question, which in my opinion only arises on the assumption that the society is held not to be a political body, is in brief whether it is sufficient for it to prove that its purpose is to alleviate or prevent the suffering of animals or whether it must prove that on balance its purpose is beneficial to mankind. I confess that my opinion has wavered and that I was for long inclined to agree with the judgment of Lord Greene MR.
But after careful consideration of the speech of Lord Simonds, which I have had the advantage of reading in print, I have come to agree with it. I do not propose to attempt to add anything to what Lord Simonds has said on this part of the case.