Chapman v Freeman
[1978] 3 All ER 878(Decision by: Geoffrey Lane LJ)
Between: Chapman
And: Freeman
Judges:
Lord Denning Mr
Geoffrey Lane LJEveleigh LJ
Subject References:
Landlord and tenant
Business premises
Occupied for business purposes
Business purposes
Cottage let to hotel proprietor to house hotel staff
Occupation by staff convenient for hotel proprietor's business
No evidence that occupation by staff necessary for proprietor's business
Whether hotel proprietor occupying cottage 'for the purposes of a business carried on by him'
Legislative References:
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 - s 23(1)
Case References:
Ramsbottom v Snelson - [1948] 1 All ER 201; [1948] 1 KB 473; [1948] LJR 946; 112 JP 160; 46 LGR 139, DC; 31(2) Digest (Reissue) 912, 7554
Bagettes Ltd v G P Estates Co Ltd - [1956] 1 All ER 729; [1956] Ch 290, CA
Hobson v Tulloch - [1898] 1 Ch 424; 67 LJ Ch 205
Lee-Verhulst (Investments) Ltd v Harwood Trust - [1972] 3 All ER 619; [1973] QB 204, CA
Judgment date: 5 May 1978
Decision by:
Geoffrey Lane LJ
I agree. Mr and Mrs Andrews are employed at the Cornish Arms Hotel, Pendoggett, St Kew, in Cornwall. The owner of the hotel is Mr Freeman, the defendant in this case. He has the tenancy of a small cottage, only about 50 yards away from the door of the hotel, from the landlord who was originally Nora Ann Hawken. She died, and the administrator of her estate has given notice to the defendant tenant to quit.
It is said that the notice to quit (although it is perfectly regular and proper on the face of it) does not have the effect of determining the tenant's rights because (and this is the reason which is given) the premises are subject to s 23 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. In other words, it is alleged that it is a business tenancy and the requisite notices under Part II of the 1954 Act have not been given.
What has happened is that the tenant Mr Freeman has allowed Mr and Mrs Andrews to occupy the cottage without payment. That is very convenient both for them and for Mr Freeman. It means that no transport has to be provided for getting either Mr Andrews, who is the barman, or Mrs Andrews, who sometimes helps in the hotel, to work. It means that in this area where apparently accommodation is very hard to come by, the Andrews do not have to waste a lot of their time travelling to and from the hotel. It is said that in these circumstances the occupation is, first of all, occupation by the tenant Mr Freeman (and that is not disputed and very properly not disputed) and, secondly (and this is the rub), that the occupation is by the tenant for the purposes of a business within s 23 of the 1954 Act. Assuming without deciding (and it is quite unnecessary to decide this point in this particular case) that the business does not have to be carried on actively on the premises in question to come within s 23, can it be said that the defendant Mr Freeman occupies through the Andrewses for the purpose of the business?
One can imagine circumstances in which occupation similar to the occupation in the present case might very well fulfil the requirements of s 23: where perhaps the servant has duties to perform in the hotel which require that he must be on hand at all times otherwise he will not be able to perform those duties. But that is not this case or anything like it. It was merely a matter of convenience that the Andrewses should be housed in this particular cottage. That, to my mind, is not enough. The tenant must go beyond mere convenience and show that the occupation was in furtherance of his business activities, in other words, that it was for business reasons that he was occupying the cottage and not merely for reasons of convenience.
One can test the matter in this way: what would have been the situation if it had been Mr Freeman himself who had been living in this cottage and not Mr and Mrs Andrews? Could it have been said in those circumstances that Mr Freeman could properly look not to the Rent Act for protection but to Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 because he was occupying for the purposes of a business? That would be a startling result which seems to me to be unarguable. It is always, of course, going to be difficult for a judge to decide on which side of the line any particular case may fall, but I have no doubt in this particular case that the judge was in error, albeit understandably in error, and for those reasons I too would allows this appeal.