Thompson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
102 CLR 3151959 - 1204C - HCA
(Judgment by: McTiernan J)
Between: Thompson
And: Federal Commissioner of Taxation
Judges:
Dixon CJ
McTiernan JFullagar J
Kitto J
Menzies J
Subject References:
Taxation and revenue
Estate duty
Exemption
Estate bequeathed for 'public educational purposes'
Masonic schools
Whether 'public'
Legislative References:
Estate Duty Assessment Act 1914 (Cth) (No 22) - s 8
Judgment date: 4 December 1959
SYDNEY
Judgment by:
McTiernan J
The question for decision depends upon s. 8 (5) of the Estate Duty Assessment Act 1914-1947. What has to be decided is whether the schools mentioned in the case stated are devoted to "public educational purposes". The Act leaves those purposes undefined. The schools in question were founded, and have always been used, for educational purposes. But no boy or girl may attend any of the schools who is not the child of a freemason. This, of course, does not prevent the purposes of the school being educational. The word "public" in the present context does not signify State ownership or support. Its meaning is "public" as distinguished from "private" educational purposes. Schools carried on for personal gain are beyond the scope of the exemption which is made in favour of "public educational purposes". These schools, in this case, do not exist for the personal gain of anybody. The purposes meant by the expression which is being considered are not only charitable purposes. The expression has not a technical meaning. It embraces purposes pertaining to "public education". In ordinary parlance "public educational purposes" includes the instruction of youth in State or private schools in accordance with a curriculum adapted to their general educational needs. The word "public" involves no discrimen excluding from the scope of the expression a school which provides such education for a particular class of boys or girls, especially if an appreciable number of them attend the school. No implication is proper which would make the criteria of the law of charity defining a section of the public a decisive test of whether the school is devoted to "public educational purposes". Sub-section (8) of s. 5 adds a particular statutory meaning to the ordinary meaning of "public educational purposes". But these words in sub-s. (5) retain their ordinary meaning. In my opinion the bequest can rest upon the exemption which is granted in respect of benefactions for "public educational purposes". It is not necessary to consider whether the bequest is strictly an endowment of the schools within the particular statutory meaning given by sub-s. (8) of s. 8. I would answer the first question "Yes". The appellants conceded that they could not contend for a favourable answer to the second question. But, as in my opinion, the first question should be answered Yes, the second and third questions do not arise.