State Government Insurance Office (Qld) v Crittenden

117 CLR 412

(Judgment by: McTiernan ACJ)

State Government Insurance Office (Qld)
vCrittenden

Court:
Supreme Court of Queensland

Judges:
McTiernan ACJ
Taylor J
Menzies J
Windeyer J

Hearing date: 7 June 1966, 8 June 1966
Judgment date: 9 September 1966

Sydney


Judgment by:
McTiernan ACJ

This appeal is from the Full Court of Queensland. It involves a question under The Motor Vehicles Insurance Act of 1936 (as amended) of that State. The title of the Act is: "An Act to Require the Owners of Motor Vehicles to Insure against their Liability to Pay Compensation on Account of Injuries to Persons caused by, through, or in connection with such Motor Vehicles, and for other purposes." Section 3 requires every owner of a motor vehicle as a condition of annual registration of such vehicle to indemnify himself by a contract of insurance against "all sums for which he or his estate shall become legally liable by way of damages in respect of such motor vehicle for accidental bodily injury (fatal or non-fatal) to any person ... where such injury is caused by, through, or in connection with such motor vehicle". The question with which we are concerned is whether the liability against which insurance must be procured extends to cases of negligence which occasion loss of service or consortium. Construing the section broadly, the insurance must be against liability for bodily injuries or death caused by the use of the motor vehicle. It is argued for the appellant corporation that the word "for" requires a narrower construction. I do not agree with this argument. The word "for" has a sense identical and co-extensive with "on account of". That phrase is used in the title to the Act. The title is not part of the Act, although it is an aid to its construction. It seems that the draftsman considered the word "for" more suitable than the phrase "on account of" when drafting s. 3. The action for loss of service or consortium extends to cases of negligent driving of motor vehicles occasioning such deprivation. This remedy exists independently of the rights of the injured party. But upon analysis of the circumstances the damages recoverable for such loss are "on account of" the injury caused by the negligent driving. They are in the case of loss of consortium (i.e., service and society) in requital for the bodily injury caused to the plaintiff's wife. I think, therefore, the indemnity extends to the damages which the plaintiff would recover in this action if he be successful.

In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed.