Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs

46 FLR 409

(Judgment by: Smithers J)

Drake
vMinister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs

Court:
Federal Court of Australia -- General Division

Judges: Bowen CJ

Smithers J
Deane J

Legislative References:
Migration Act 1958 - s 12
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 - s 44; The Act
Migration Act 1958 - s 12
Judiciary Act 1903 - s 78B
Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 - The Act
Crimes Act 1914 - s 20(1)
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) - The Act
Dairy Industry Stabilization Act 1977 - s 11A; s 24A
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) - s 2

Case References:
Shell Company of Australia v Federal Commissioner of Taxation - [1931] AC 275
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro - (1926) 31 CLR 153-179
R v Trade Practices Tribunal ; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd - (1970) 123 CLR 361; [1970] ALR 449
R v Quinn ; Ex parte Consolidated Food Corporation - (1977) 16 ALR 569
R v Carngham - (1978) 22 ALR 183
Water Conservation & Irrigation Commission v Browning - (1947) 74 CLR 492
R v Cotham - [1898] 1 QB 802
Randall v Northcote Corp - [1910] 11 CLR 100
Shrimpton v Commonwealth - (1945) 69 CLR 613
R v Anderson ; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd - (1965) 113 CLR 177; [1965] ALR 1067
Finance Facilities Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation - (1971) 127 CLR 106
Sullivan v Department of Transport - (1978) 20 ALR 323
Winsor v Boaden - (1953) 90 CLR 345
Horne v Locke - [1978] 2 NSWLR 88
Paramac Printing Co Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation - (1964) 111 CLR 529
R v District Court ; Ex parte White - (1966) 116 CLR 644

Hearing date:
Judgment date: 3 May 1979

Sydney


Judgment by:
Smithers J

This case comes by way of an appeal from a decision of a Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and is brought under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975; see (1978) 1 ALN No 42. As such the appeal comes within the original jurisdiction of this court and is limited to questions of law. See generally Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323

The plaintiff, as the appellant is called on an appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, is a citizen of the United States of America and is 41 years of age. He entered Australia on 6 October 1968 and on 3 January 1978 was convicted of the offences discussed below. As a result of this conviction the Minister, the defendant in these proceedings, acting under s 12 of the Migration Act 1958 on 21 April 1978 ordered that the plaintiff be deported from Australia. The plaintiff appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which on 10 November 1978 affirmed the Minister's order. A stay of the order was granted under s 44(6) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act pending the determination of this appeal.

The plaintiff in his amended notice of appeal relies upon in effect four grounds: on the first ground that it was not competent for Mr Justice Davies to constitute the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to hear and determine the appeal, secondly that the Tribunal erred in law in proceeding on the basis that the plaintiff was an alien within the meaning of s 12 of the Migration Act 1958, thirdly that the Tribunal erred in law in proceeding on the basis that a plaintiff was a person who had been sentenced to imprisonment for one year or longer within the meaning of s 12 of the Migration Act 1958 and fourthly that the Tribunal erred in law in proceeding on the basis that prime importance was to be accorded to the policy statement of the defendant Minister.

With respect to the first and second grounds of appeal I am in agreement with the reasons and conclusions of Bowen CJ and Deane J, whose joint reasons for judgment I have had the advantage of reading.

The third ground of the amended notice of appeal is expressed in the following terms: "The Tribunal was in error of law in proceeding on the basis that the plaintiff was a person who had been sentenced to imprisonment for one year or longer within the meaning of s 12 of the Migration Act 1958 as amended." Under this ground it was argued that the sentence which had been imposed upon the plaintiff in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction in Darwin, Northern Territory on 3 January 1978 was not a sentence of imprisonment for one year or longer within the meaning of s 12 of the Migration Act 1958. The certificate of conviction states: "That the defendant was convicted by the said Court for that between the 28th day of September 1977 and the 9th day of December 1977 at Wollogorang in the said Territory he did possess a prohibited drug, to wit, cannabis AND UPON such conviction the said Court ordered that (the defendant) be imprisoned and kept to hard labour for the space of 12 months. And the said Court directed that after serving a period of 3 months, the offender shall be released upon his entering into a recognizance, himself in the sum of $400 in his own recognizance to be of good behaviour for the space of two years then next ensuing AND it was further ordered that the defendant pay the sum of $400 on or before the 3rd day of June 1978. And it was further ordered that in default of payment of the said sum the defendant be imprisoned and kept to hard labour for the space of 40 days." The defendant referred to in this certificate is now the plaintiff.

It is apparent that in imposing this sentence the magistrate was exercising the authority conferred upon him by s 5(1)(b) of the Northern Territory Criminal Law (Conditional Release of Offenders) Ordinance 1971 (No 34 of 1971). Section 5(1) provides:--

5(1) Subject to this section, where a person is convicted of an offence against a law of the Territory the Court by which he is convicted may, if it thinks fit by order --

(a)
release the person without passing sentence upon him upon his giving security, with or without sureties, by recognizance or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the court that --

(i)
he will be of good behaviour for such period as the court specifies in the order;
(ii)
...
(iii)
...

(b)
sentence the person to a term of imprisonment but direct that the person be released, upon his giving a like security to that referred to in the last preceding paragraph, either forthwith or after he has served a specified part of the sentence imposed upon him.

In delivering judgment the magistrate said: "In the case of Drake, for that offence of possession, he will be convicted but sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for 12 months but I direct his release after three months on him entering into his own recognizance of $200, to be of good behaviour for two years. In addition he is fined $400 in default, 40 days imprisonment with hard labour." The question is whether by that sentence the plaintiff was "sentenced to imprisonment for one year or longer" within the meaning of s 12 of the Migration Act. Section 12 is in the following terms:--

12 Where (whether before or after the commencement of this Part) an alien has been convicted in Australia of a crime of violence against the person or of extorting any money or thing by force or threat, or of an attempt to commit such a crime, or has been convicted in Australia of any other offence for which he has been sentenced to imprisonment for one year or longer, the Minister may, upon the expiration of, or during, any term of imprisonment served or being served by that alien in respect of the crime, order the deportation of that alien.

It is clear that there is a sense in which the plaintiff was sentenced to imprisonment for one year or longer but the question is whether that is the sense which should be attributed to the relevant expression in s 12. On its face the sentence specified in s 12 is a simple sentence pursuant to which the person sentenced is by force of the sentence required to undergo imprisonment for one year or longer. If the direction that the plaintiff be released after serving 3 months on his entering into a prescribed recognizance is part of the sentence imposed on the plaintiff on 3 January 1978 then the length of the imprisonment imposed upon the plaintiff would be determined by the provisions of the sentence as they would apply according to the circumstances that the plaintiff did or did not enter into the recognizance. If he did then by the very provisions of the sentence the term of imprisonment would extend for three months only.

It would seem appropriate in the absence of some indication to the contrary to construe the relevant provision in s 12 as referring to what is called by Gibbs ACJ in R v Carngham (1978) 22 ALR 183 at 187 a sentence of one "year's imprisonment simpliciter ". If one puts out of one's mind thoughts of all the various kinds of sentences which may be imposed by courts and then asks what kind of a sentence it is that is referred to in s 12, it appears to me that according to the natural meaning of the words, the answer would be it is a sentence which by its terms requires the person sentenced to serve one year at least in imprisonment. That is, a year's sentence at least simpliciter .

It was said by the High Court in Winsor v Boaden in a judgment delivered by Dixon CJ (1953) 90 CLR 345 at 347: "The word 'sentence' connotes a judicial judgment or pronouncement fixing a term of imprisonment. A term of imprisonment is the period fixed by the judgment as the punishment for the offence." But of course it inevitably happens where orders are made pursuant to s 5(1)(b) of the Criminal Law (Conditional Release of Offenders) Ordinance 1971, imprisonment for the term of imprisonment to which the person is sentenced under the introductory words of that sub-section is in whole or in part, merely conditional. Imprisonment for the whole of that term will depend upon the exercise by the person concerned of what is in essence an option to enter into a recognizance in accordance with the order made by the court under the release provisions of that sub-section.

Such a sentence is clearly not a sentence for one year's imprisonment simpliciter . Dealing with a situation in which the person had been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of "two years commencing on 10 April 1977 to be released after 10 October 1977 upon him entering into a recognizance under s 20(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Com) to be of good behaviour for the balance of the period of the sentence", it was said by Gibbs ACJ in R v Carngham , supra, at 187: "There can of course be no doubt that the sentence of imprisonment for two years which was imposed on the respondent in the present case was a sentence within the meaning of the Criminal Appeal Act. The question whether the order that the respondent be conditionally released after 10 October 1977 forms part of the sentence, or is collateral and distinct, although not easy of solution, permits only of brief discussion. In my opinion when a court acting under s 20(1) passes a sentence of imprisonment and orders the release of the convicted person after he has served a portion of that sentence it is not possible to sever the order for release and to treat it as something separate and distinct from the sentence of imprisonment. Such an order would be meaningless if it were not made in conjunction with the sentence of imprisonment to which it relates. On the other hand the sentence of imprisonment itself would have a materially different effect if it were not for the order for release. In these circumstances it seems to me that the order for release must be treated as a qualification of the sentence of imprisonment and that it is right to regard it as part of the sentence itself. Although there is some ambiguity in the concluding words of s 20(1), the phrase 'after he has served any portion of his sentence' in my opinion qualifies 'release', not 'order'. That is to say, the order must be made at the same time as the sentence is imposed, and not after portion of it has been served. From the moment when sentence is pronounced the convicted person is entitled to release after he has served portion of his sentence if he complies with the condition of the order. A sentence of two years' imprisonment simpliciter is quite different in its incidence and severity from a sentence of two years' imprisonment coupled with an order for conditional release after some months. The true nature of the sentence imposed can only be ascertained by looking at the order as a whole." It was held that the order for release formed part of the sentence and was subject to appeal as such. This view had the concurrence of the other four members of the High Court. It is true that these remarks were made with respect to a sentence in an extended meaning as defined by s 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) as follows: "includes any order made by the court of trial on conviction with reference to the person convicted, or his property, and any recommendation or order for deportation in the case of a person convicted". However, I do not think that this factor affects the force of what was said in R v Carngham , supra, if applied to a sentence in its ordinary meaning. All that was said by the learned judge is in reason and expression fully applicable to such a sentence. There is a qualitative difference between the reduction in the time spent in prison because of parole provisions or remissions for good conduct and that which follows the entering into a recognizance pursuant to an order such as that made in this case under s 5(1)(b) of the Criminal Law (Conditional Release of Offenders) Ordinance. Parole provisions and remissions are collateral with and distinct from the sentence. The order under s 5(1)(b) is part of the sentence. However, it should be noted that the learned Deputy President would not have had the advantage of access to the judgment in R v Carngham , supra, as his decision was given before the judgment was delivered.

It is to be noted that a sentence comprising what may be referred to as the period of imprisonment primarily imposed and the order for earlier release in accordance with s 5(1)(b) does finally dispose of the question of punishment of the offender in respect of the offence for which he is so sentenced. If he fails to observe the terms of the recognizance entered into thereunder such failure is a separate offence calling for punishment pursuant to s 6 of the Ordinance.

For present purposes the critical question is what is meant by the expression "has been sentenced to imprisonment for one year or longer" in s 12 of the Migration Act. In my view it would be natural to construe the expression as referring to a case where the decision of the court finally disposing of the question of the punishment of the offender, required him to be imprisoned for at least one year.

Section 12 of the Migration Act is a provision which in terms confers power upon the Minister to make an order for deportation of a convicted alien. According to that section the power to order deportation depends upon the degree of punishment ordered by the sentence which has actually been imposed upon the alien. In this respect it may be compared with s 13 which confers a power to order deportation of immigrants who have been convicted with an offence which "is punishable" by death or by imprisonment for one year or longer. It is clear that under s 12 the legislature is concerned with the extent of imprisonment to which the person is sentenced. Clearly liability to deportation is to depend upon the quality of the crime as reflected in the punishment to which the alien is sentenced by the court. The type of crime for which a person may be sentenced to one year's imprisonment simpliciter , and that in respect of which the view of the court is that punishment will be adequate if a shorter period of imprisonment or no imprisonment is actually imposed may be presumed to be quite different. It is a rational view that in choosing the language of s 12, Parliament intended to confer the power of deportation upon the Minister where the punishment ordered by the court is actually imprisonment for one year at least. But the sentence under consideration does not unconditionally subject the person sentenced to suffer imprisonment for one year. Indeed, the order of the court according to its own terms provides that if the person sentenced takes certain action the imprisonment to which he is to be subjected will be considerably less than one year. And the action in question is action which is within the power of the person sentenced to take. It is clear that the total sentence would not be adequately defined by saying that it is a sentence of imprisonment for one year. So to define it would be misleading and would define only one part of what is an indivisible whole.

Although as mentioned above there is a sense in which the requirement of the relevant words in s 12 might be satisfied by the sentence actually pronounced in this case, that sense is but technical, and pays no regard to the substance and true import of the sentence. In the subject matter with which the section is dealing, namely deportation, it would be surprising if Parliament should be thought to intend to act by reference to a technical test rather than considerations of substance. Also, one would not expect that a man who under the sentence of a court and by its terms is subjected to no imprisonment, should be subject to deportation under a statutory provision rendering him liable to deportation if sentenced to imprisonment for one year.

There is some support for the view that Parliament had in mind a sentence pursuant to which the court ordered imprisonment unconditionally, namely, imprisonment that would be suffered for the year at least, in the final part of s 12 where it is provided that the power of deportation arises "upon the expiration of, or during, any term of imprisonment served or being served by that alien".

The expression under consideration appearing as it does in a provision providing for the taking of very serious action by the Minister against the alien would ordinarily in case of doubt be read in the sense favourable to the alien.

Ground (iv)

Ground (iv) of the amended notice of appeal alleges that:--

(iv)
The Tribunal attached such importance to a policy statement of the Minister on the question of considerations relating to the deterrence of others as to result in a failure by the learned Deputy President of the Tribunal to exercise his own independent judgment.

As has been said by the Minister and accepted by the Tribunal on various occasions the duty of the Minister is to make a decision as to whether in all the circumstances it is in the best interests of Australia that the person in question be deported. This appears from para 4.02 of the policy as expressed in the Minister's letter of 28 March 1978. It is convenient to set forth the whole of the relevant parts of the statement of policy contained in that letter:--

Policy
Deportation of Criminals
4.01 A decision by the Minister to order the deportation of a person from Australia is made after consideration by the Minister of all the material facts and circumstances relating to that person. Every case is decided upon the basis of its individual circumstances.
4.02 The basic question considered by the Minister is whether in all the circumstances it is in the best interests of the Commonwealth of Australia that the person be deported.
4.03 The Australian community is entitled to protect itself by removing from amongst its members persons who have revealed by their conduct that they represent a threat to it or that their continued presence is inimical to its existence or welfare.
4.04 The Australian community, through the Parliament, has given to the Minister a discretion to be exercised on its behalf to cause the removal of such persons being immigrants or aliens.
4.05 Such persons will have revealed by their conduct either that they are prepared to overthrow existing institutions accepted by the community or that they are prepared to corrupt members of the community or that they are unprepared to accept and adhere to standards by the community of its members as revealed in its laws.
4.06 Although by reason of their conduct it may be open to the Minister to decide to deport such persons from Australia, the Minister may decide, after having taken into account all the material facts and circumstances, that the interests of the community in their deportation are outweighed by other considerations arising from their situation and the situation of people who would, on account of relationship, be affected by their deportation. The Minister might also be influenced by factors which would arise only if he were to order their deportation.
4.07 The following matters are taken into account when a decision is being made whether to order the deportation of a person from Australia:
The nature of the offence;
The circumstances of the commission of the offence;
The view of the offence expressed by the court before which the offender appeared;
The nature of the penalty;
The extent of rehabilitation of the offender;
The prospects of recidivism;
The necessity to prevent or inhibit the commission of like offences by other persons;
The previous criminal history of the offender;
The public interest;
The circumstances of the offender;
The circumstances of the family of or other persons having a relationship with the offender;
The obligations of the Commonwealth under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
4.08 ...
4.09 ...
4.10 Ministers have maintained the view that, since deportation forms no part of the punitive process, it should not cut short sentences imposed by the courts as punishment for crimes and that it is for the Governor-General or appropriate State Authority as the case may be, to decide such questions as the conditions under which a prisoner is required to serve out his sentence, the remission of any part of a sentence, or the release of a potential deportee on parole or for deportation.
4.11 When the Minister comes to consider whether he will order the deportation of a person he has before him in addition to other relevant material any statement which the potential deportee, and any other person whose interests may be affected has made when given the opportunity to state reasons why the deportation should not be ordered. The opinions of parole and prison officers as to the person's prospects of being rehabilitated satisfactorily in Australia are also submitted to the Minister, as, where relevant and available are psychiatric reports.
4.12 Where a potential deportee is serving a term of imprisonment the question of his deportation is not considered until shortly before he would ordinarily be released into the community ...
4.13 ...

The administration of the Migration Act in relation to the subject of deportation must proceed by reference to what is seen to be good government in the best interests of Australia. It would seem that the reference to the specific matters set forth in para 4.07 is intended as a guide to the kind of matters to which regard is had rather than a definitive statement that those specified are the only matters the Minister takes into account. This would seem to follow from the terms of para 4.02 and of para 4.06 which direct attention to the basic consideration, namely, what is best from the point of view of Australia ascertained by taking into account all material facts and circumstances. And in a subject such as deportation the range of matters and circumstances which may be material is obviously very wide. The best interests of Australia may sometimes according to circumstances, require decisions reflecting the liberal aspects of national attitudes and on other occasions require application of strict standards for the protection of the community. It is the function of the Tribunal in deportation cases to test the propriety of a deportation order against what is seen to be the best interests of Australia in the particular case and to act accordingly.

It might be thought that it would be open to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal not to decide for itself whether a decision made by an administrator was the right decision which ought to have been made in the circumstances but rather to satisfy itself that the decision of the administrator was one which an administrator acting reasonably might have made. But to do this would be to review the reasons for the decision rather than the decision itself. It is the actual decision which by virtue of s 25(1) and (4) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act the Tribunal is authorized and required to review. The duty of the Tribunal is to satisfy itself whether a decision in respect of which an application for review is duly instituted is a decision which in its view, was objectively, the right one to be made. Merely to examine whether the administrator acted reasonably in relation to the facts, either as accepted by him or as found by the Tribunal may not reveal this. In this connection the observations of Sheppard J in Horne v Locke [1978] 2 NSWLR 88-100 at 98 are in point. It is to permit implementation of the function of the Tribunal, as so understood, that there has been conferred upon the Tribunal extensive powers of investigation. Those powers are conferred so that the Tribunal may equip itself to make an appropriate recommendation or affirm the decision: see s 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act and Pt XXII of the Schedule thereto.

It is not easy to identify the concept according to which the Tribunal approached its task in this case. But the reasons for decision read as a whole do induce an impression that what the Tribunal was really engaged in doing was acting in a supervisory role. In this role it was necessary for the Tribunal to form judgments as to the validity of views which the Minister had taken with respect to various matters considered by him. The Tribunal did this. And it is a question whether having done so the Tribunal applied its own views to decide whether the Minister's decision was arrived at by a reasonable or justifiable application by him of ministerial policy and if so should be affirmed, or applied its own views to decide objectively for itself whether according to the standard of good government the Minister's decision was the right one. If the former then the Tribunal was acting in a supervisory role according to which it would tend to affirm the Ministerial decision not because the Tribunal considered it to be the right one but because it considered that it was a decision which might reasonably and rationally be made in the application of ministerial policy. There are persuasive indications in the reasons that the supervisory role was the role adopted by the Tribunal in this case.

In the first place it is apparent that the Tribunal accepted, essentially without question, that the answer to the problem before it was to be found in the Minister's statement of policy. But in the practical application of that policy the Tribunal concentrated on the statement of the stated policy in para 4.07. The assumption appears to have been that by ministerial action in accordance with that paragraph the problem would be solved. But this was to neglect the paramount statements in paras 4.02 and 4.06 that the basic consideration was the best interests of Australia ascertained by taking into account all material facts and circumstances.

This approach to the case was calculated to cause neglect also of the Tribunal's duty to have regard to considerations such as the human aspects of deportation. Even if one were tempted to restrict the range of relevant matters by reference to ministerial statements it should be noted that prior to March 1978 ministerial policy, according to the ministerial statement of 19 January 1961 contained paragraphs in the following terms:--

Migrant offenders who render themselves liable will certainly be considered for deportation.
It should be borne in mind that the general criminal law of the State are expected to prescribe punishment adequate to the crime. The deportation provisions of the Migration Act represent virtually a last resort to deal with the various serious cases where reform cannot be expected of the individual.

(These paragraphs are set out in Re Becker and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1977) 1 ALD 158 at 164 ; 15 ALR 696 at 702). Such an approach is certainly not indicated in a reading of para 4.07 of the present statement set out above. This is not to suggest that the Minister's policy even so expressed was to be taken literally. Such statement was itself subject to the overriding objective of administration according to standards of good government. But consideration of deportation as something of a last resort cannot cease to be material by reason of being omitted from ministerial policy as expressed at any particular time.

Features of the reasons which support the view that the role adopted by the Tribunal was the supervisory role may be indicated as follows: first the acceptance of ministerial policy as determinative, secondly the strict application thereof, thirdly the arrangement of the fourth part of the reasons according to the headings adopted in para 4.07 of the policy statement by the Minister, fourthly the investigation as a matter of importance of whether the Minister had misdirected himself in law as to the nature of his discretion in reaching his decision, fifthly, the intensive investigation of the matters to which the Minister had adverted and the weight allotted by him to various considerations, sixthly, the reconciliation with ministerial reasonableness of those views of the Minister with which the Tribunal disagreed, seventhly the literal application of para 4.07 of the policy statement, eighthly, the exclusion from consideration of subject matters other than those which were referred to in para 4.07 and other than those which the Minister himself had considered, and lastly, the absence from the reasons of any firm and unambiguous statement that the Tribunal itself was satisfied that the decision to deport the applicant was the right decision in the best interests of Australia.

Reference to these matters and the detailed examination of the reasons for the decision of the Tribunal necessarily involved in their consideration does not reflect upon the reasonableness or logic of the reasons for the Tribunal's decision. They are directed only to the problem of discerning the role which the Tribunal adopted in the performance of its functions.

Upon consideration of the fourth ground of appeal it has emerged that the factor which may be said to constitute error in the present case is not that the Tribunal applied considerations in accordance with the Minister's policy, with the expression of which, as a guide in relation to the subject matter, no substantial fault can be found, but that the Tribunal treated the application by the Minister of his policy as paramount. It is said that the Tribunal conducted its review on the basis that its function was but to satisfy itself that the decision of the Minister was arrived at by rational and reasonable application of that policy to the facts. That the Tribunal appears to have acted according to this concept, which I call the supervisory concept, does emerge from a careful reading of the reasons of the learned Deputy President pursuant to which he affirmed the decision of the Minister. The case for the plaintiff can only be seen to be established by taking the reasons in particular, as it were, and drawing inferences as to why it is that various aspects of the problem before the Tribunal were dealt with by the learned Deputy President in the way in which they were. This process is rendered the more difficult in that the manner in which various matters are dealt with is consistent with the view that the Tribunal proceeded by reference, either to the supervisory role or to a view of the function of the Tribunal as a body required to decide objectively for itself the essential rightness or wrongness of the Minister's decision. Whether it is established that the Tribunal actually proceeded merely in a supervisory capacity depends on whether there are in the reasons indications of this approach of significance which persuade the court that the Tribunal did so proceed.

Throughout the reasons for decision there are expressions of the opinion of the Tribunal as to the relevance and weight of the various policy considerations. Also, towards the end of the reasons there appears the conclusion that "on balance I have concluded that I should affirm the Minister's decision". Further, in the final paragraph, immediately following this conclusion, the Tribunal recounts certain of the matters which it has taken into account and the particular weight that it has given to some of them and concludes: "In my view, the balance of relevant factors favours the making of an order for the deportation of the applicant."

Accordingly, were it not for other features the correct conclusion would be that the Tribunal had come to its decision by forming its own view as to the rightness in the proper sense, of the Minister's decision. However, when one examines these other features of the reasons one is ultimately forced to a different conclusion, namely, that the Tribunal acted on the basis that the function of the Tribunal was only to satisfy itself that the Minister had applied his policy as stated in para 4.07 to the facts as he understood them in a way which whilst not always in harmony with that which the Tribunal itself would have adopted, was nevertheless reasonable. It would appear that the Tribunal did not approach the matter anew but accepted the Minister's policy as determinative with all the limitations that that involved. And it is important to note that despite the fact that the Minister's policy as expressed in para 4.02, as explained by the comments in para 4.06, made clear that the basic question was whether in all the circumstances it was in the best interests of Australia that the person be deported, and that this be decided by taking into account all material facts and circumstances, the Tribunal appeared to regard para 4.07 as the governing paragraph.

In the performance of the Tribunal's function it is essential that a policy adopted by an administrator should be under review to the same extent as his evaluation of relevant matters and his general process of reasoning, not for the purpose of deciding whether it was reasonable for the administrator to make the decision he did, but for the purpose of deciding whether, by the objective standard of good government it was the right decision to make.

It is clear from the reasons for decision that the Tribunal gave considerable attention to the law which the Minister applied in making his decision, to the weight given by the Minister to particular aspects of his policy and to the rationality of the reasoning which the Minister exercised or was presumed to have exercised in reaching his decision. The importance which is given to these matters is such as to support the contention that the Tribunal was engaged in the exercise of seeking to ascertain whether the Minister had acted reasonably in accordance with his policy, allowance being made however, for differences between the facts assumed by the Minister and those ascertained by the Tribunal, and for differences between weight given by the Tribunal to some factors and that given to those factors by the Minister.

The reasons of the Tribunal are set out under four headings, first "Facts", second "Law", third "Policy" and fourth "Application of the Policy to the Facts". Under the heading "Law" there appears in the opening paragraph a discussion not of the law to be applied by the Tribunal, but the law which ought to have been applied by the Minister. It proceeds on the basis that it is important for the Tribunal to be satisfied that the law applied by the Minister was correct and that he did not misdirect himself. It could be of interest to know what law the Minister applied, but such knowledge was not relevant to the law to be applied by the Tribunal. Nevertheless the Tribunal being impressed by the outward appearance of an error of law on the part of the Minister, who referred in his letter of 28 March 1978 to the Tribunal to his "discretion not to deport" was at pains to express a conclusion that it was satisfied that the Minister acted on a correct view of his discretion and added that the Tribunal was satisfied that the Minister "has considered the facts in this light". Of course if the Tribunal were examining whether the Minister's decision was sustainable as a valid decision, this exercise was essential and takes its place logically in the discussion, under the heading "Law". But standing as it does, in a section which must be considered to be speaking about the law relating to the exercise by the Tribunal of its functions it does suggest quite strongly that the process being applied by the Tribunal was directed not to the ultimate decision which it would make for itself but to the question of the quality of the Minister's decision as one that might reasonably and according to the law have been made by him. But, it was not the quality of the Minister's decision considered in this sense which was at stake. All that was in issue before the Tribunal was whether the decision he had made accorded with the best interests of Australia.

In the second paragraph under the heading "Law" the Tribunal refers to the conviction of 3 January 1978 and adds: "In considering whether or not he (that is the Minister) should make that order, the Minister, and this Tribunal on review, is required to take into account not merely the circumstances of the crime ..." The form of this comment suggests that for current purposes, the Tribunal considered that what the Minister was required to do was of relevance to its decision. Although the comment is logical and correct it nevertheless suggests that the Tribunal was devoting specific attention to the question of what matters the Minister had to consider.

Under the heading "Policy" the introductory words are: "The policy which the Minister follows in ordering the deportation of an immigrant being a criminal has been stated as follows ..." In view of the heading of the fourth section of the reasons for decision namely, "Application of the Policy to the Facts" this introduction, particularly in the absence of any discussion as to the adequacy or suitability of the policy, does indicate complete acceptance of the Minister's policy as the determinative criterion to be applied by the Tribunal to the issues before it. The Tribunal notes but does not discuss the policy paras 4.02 and 4.06 referred to above. Had those paragraphs been given weight the basis would have been set for an examination as to whether or not the decision of the Minister was in accord with the best interests of Australia, rather than whether it was a correct decision for the Minister to have made according to his application of his policy as expressed in para 4.07. When the reasons for decision take up the application of policy to the facts there is no express reference to the broader aspect, namely, the best interests of Australia. Emphasis is placed on para 4.07 and the first eleven subject matters listed therein and it is clear that in its consideration of the whole matter the Tribunal did not go beyond those eleven subject matters.

It may well be one consequence of this that in the reasons there is no discussion of the potential loss to Australia of the young Australian woman, now Mrs Drake, who is so highly spoken of by the Tribunal, or the boy Mark Drake who is similarly spoken of. This may be a matter of great importance because, possibly reflecting the mode of expression of the seventh subject matter in para 4.07, "the necessity to prevent or inhibit the commission of like offences by other persons", the Tribunal has accorded to the deterrence aspect a significance which largely determines its ultimate decision. But of course from the point of view of the interests of Australia the deterrent benefit to be gained by deportation of the plaintiff may be achieved at too great a cost. This failure to consider the potential loss as opposed to the merely personal interests of the wife and son, would seem to flow from the strict application of the subject matters specified in para 4.07.

It is to be noted also that item 7 in para 4.07 unlike other subject matters is expressed in such a way that a special measure of weight is attached to it. It speaks of the "necessity" to prevent further offences. It may be that this item is to be read as doing no more than indicating a subject matter but in the examination of the application of the policy to the facts the Tribunal itself, as though responding to the tone of item 7, ascribes special weight to this particular item.

In the Tribunal's reasons for decision after the statement of the policy which the Minister follows is described, it is observed "in addition the Minister appears to give more weight to certain types of crimes than to others". Again this is a comment which is very relevant if one is considering the reasonableness of what the Minister did. It may have some persuasive relevance to the real function of the Tribunal. However, this observation is but one of a number of observations which point to an interest in what the Minister does or has done which is out of proportion when looked at in the light of the true function of the Tribunal. Thus the Tribunal thought it necessary expressly to explain the policy of the Minister as set out in the letter which accompanied the Minister's written statement of policy and to record as a matter of significance that: "I do not take the letter as a statement of policy that persons convicted in trafficking in drugs or sex offences against young children will be deported unless the Minister exercises his discretion to the contrary. I take the policy of the Minister to be that laid down in the policy statement ... with the additional indication that the Minister gives particular weight to convictions for crimes involving sex offences against children and trafficking in or distribution of drugs. The Minister gives additional weight to offences of this character because they involve injury to or corruption of young people. On an application to the Tribunal, the weight to be given to each of the various factors which the Minister has enunciated in his policy will be determined by the Tribunal conducting the review, though the Tribunal will be influenced by any pattern which has developed in decisions of the Minister or in decisions of this Tribunal." To my mind this passage seems to concede paramount importance to what the Minister has enunciated. Certainly the Tribunal asserts that it itself will assess the weight to be given to the various factors enunciated in the Minister's policy, but it must do this whether it is proceeding in a supervisory role merely to examine the reasonableness of the policy and the reasoning of the Minister thereunder as factors justifying the decision of the Minister, or whether it is considering whether the decision is a right one from the point of view of the best interests of Australia.

It is significant that the Tribunal finding that "no special policy with respect to drug trafficking offences was expressed save in so far as it was stated in the Minister's letter to which I have referred", sought clarification of the Minister's policy in this respect from counsel for the Minister. The Tribunal was advised that the Minister's policy was that "the factors set out in the policy statement should be taken into account and that each case should be considered on its own merits, taking into account the facts set out in s 4 of the policy statement". Again if one were considering whether the Minister's decision was a reasonable application of his policy, to seek such clarification was of importance, but it had little, if anything, to do with the basic question whether in the view of the Tribunal the particular matter had any significance from the point of view of the best interests of Australia.

In dealing with the Minister's assessment of the seriousness of the plaintiff's crime, the Tribunal pointed out that it is not prepared to adopt the view of such seriousness expressed by the Minister. The Tribunal states:--

For my own part, I am not prepared to adopt a view of the seriousness or gravity of an offence which is inconsistent with that adopted by the law and the court concerned with the sentencing of the offender" but added:--
To regard it as particularly severe or grave is to take a view of it which is inconsistent with the view taken by the law and by the court which imposed the sentence. However, the Minister's statement as to the severity of the offence was perhaps an inexact reference to the nature of the offence which is akin to trafficking in drugs.

It would appear to me that these observations reflect and reflect only a conception that it was of importance to the Tribunal that the Minister's assessment of the matter be seen to have been reasonable. Again this would be correct if one were examining the mind of the Minister in the application of his policy but it had little to do with the basic question with which the Tribunal was concerned.

In the same vein the Tribunal states: "The rationale for giving additional weight to the offence of trafficking in drugs is not difficult to perceive." This is an observation quite relevant by whatever concept the Tribunal was proceeding but in its immediate context following immediately after the discussion and explanation as to what the Minister regarded as serious, the primary indication is that once again the Tribunal was rationalizing what the Minister had done. Similarly the Tribunal refers to the aspect of deportation as punishment, and expresses the view that punishment is a task of the court which deals with the offence, but adds: "However, the deportation of a person convicted of a drug offence may be justified firstly as a personal deterrent to the offender and secondly as a deterrent to other persons ..." This observation is an apt one in the context of a consideration of whether the decision of the Minister could be accepted as reasonable rather than as part of the real task before the Tribunal. The task before the Tribunal was not to ascertain what was justified, but what was right according to standards of inherent rightness or wrongness having regard to the interests of the country. Dealing however, with the question of deterrence the Tribunal states: "The Minister and the Tribunal, are I think, entitled to take the view that, in respect of offences involving corruption ... It is appropriate that it (the Tribunal) should do so and the policy stated by the Minister requires the Tribunal to take into account 'The necessity to prevent or inhibit the commission of like offences by other persons'." It may be observed that this reference to the Minister being entitled to take the view expressed is apt if the enquiry is whether the Minister's decision was reasonable. Although it is correct to say that the desirability of preventing or inhibiting the commission of like offences by other persons is a proper subject for consideration of the Tribunal it does seem to transmute the situation to say that the policy stated by the Minister requires the Tribunal to take into account the necessity to prevent or inhibit the commission of such offences. However, if one were considering the reasonableness of the processes of the Minister in the application of his policy one would naturally take into account the view of the Minister of "the necessity to prevent or inhibit the commission of like offences" as something to which the Minister would properly have regard.

Coming to that section of the reasons which are headed "Application of the Policy to the Facts" the opening sentence states "I turn now to consider the facts in the light of the Minister's policy". Here again the concession that the Minister's policy is paramount is clear. It is under this heading that the final decision is reached. And it is to be observed that in the processes of arriving at the final decision each of the first 11 subject matters referred to in para 4.07 of the policy are dealt with and no other subjects such as for example the potential loss to Australia of Mrs Drake and Mark Drake are introduced. In dealing with these subject matters the Tribunal states its view of the appropriate weight which should be given to them. But it is true to say that the discussion proceeds as one in which the Tribunal is not necessarily seen to be expressing its views for the purpose of making up its mind as to how it would evaluate those factors for a fresh decision of its own. On the subject of recidivism the Tribunal states:--

In my view it is probable that the applicant will not offend again and highly unlikely that he will again be involved in drug trafficking in this country" but adds:--
However, he has shown sufficient weakness of character over a long period of time for the possibility of some further dishonest or reprehensible conduct to be taken into account. There is certainly the possibility that other undesirable conduct will be entered into with the view to obtaining money though, on the balance of probabilities, I think it is likely that no further criminal offences will occur.
The necessity to prevent or inhibit the commission of like offences by other persons is I think the factor of greatest weight justifying the deportation of the applicant. He did not enter into a casual offence. On his evidence he entered into an association with a well-known businessman for the growing of marihuana. The circumstances of the offence had wide publicity. It being desirable to deter trafficking in drugs by deporting immigrants who have offended, the deportation of this applicant seems to be justified.

This express reference to the deportation being "justified" imparts to these observations the quality of being directed to support the Minister's decision as a reasonable one notwithstanding the Tribunal's own view of the chances of recidivism, and as accepting as the critical criterion of deportation that deportation was justifiable rather than that it was the right course to adopt. The application of this justification test would be appropriate for examining whether the Minister's action was reasonable but not appropriate for the purposes of determining whether, from the broad point of view it was right. Had the Tribunal been engaged in making up its own mind one would have expected some statement such as "I am satisfied that the decision of the Minister is in accordance with good government and therefore the decision of the Minister should be affirmed".

In the concluding section of the reasons of the Tribunal it examines the circumstances of the offender and the circumstances of his family. It records various matters which "weigh against deportation" of "substantial weight". A forceful case is made. But the final factor and the determining factor in the reasons is that the offence of which the applicant was convicted "warrants the imposition of an order of deportation as a deterrent to others from committing offences of a like nature". Here again it is significant that the decision is expressed in terms most apt in the exercise of what I have called the supervisory role. The Tribunal does not say that it is satisfied that in the interests of good government the order of the Minister should be affirmed. It said "the balance of relevant factors favours the making of an order for the deportation of the applicant". This phrase also is quite apt to refer to the confirmation of an order already made in the process of the application by the Minister of his policy in a reasonable way. And if that is all that it is it does not satisfy the requirements of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act.

It is quite clear that the Tribunal was satisfied that according to the tests applied by the Minister in the strict application of his policy the Minister's decision was reached regularly and reasonably, but one searches in vain for an unambiguous statement that the Tribunal itself was satisfied on the evidence as found by it that deportation was the right course. The result is that although the reasons of the Tribunal fully and logically perform the task in which the Tribunal engaged, one is forced to the conclusion that that task did not represent the function that the Tribunal was actually required to perform and on this basis there was an error of law: see Paramac Printing Co Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1964) 111 CLR 529and 543 at 542, and R v District Court ; Ex parte White (1966) 116 CLR 644 at 657.

On the whole I am persuaded that the Tribunal intended to and did act merely as a supervisory body and accordingly the fourth as well as the third grounds of appeal are established.

It is a consequence of the establishment of the third ground of appeal that I would order that the appeal be allowed with costs and the matter be returned to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be dealt with in accordance with the finding that the order of the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of 21 April 1978 was made without the requirements of s 12 of the Migration Act 1958 having been fulfilled.