House of Representatives

Family Law Legislation Amendment (Superannuation) Bill 2000

Explanatory Memorandum

(Circulated by authority of the Attorney-General,the Honourable Daryl Williams AM QC MP)

REGULATION IMPACT STATEMENT

Problem Identification

The present difficulty with the treatment of superannuation on marriage breakdown can largely be attributed to three factors:

Australia's superannuation system has developed rapidly since 1980; there has been substantial growth in the coverage of superannuation in the community and in the value of superannuation savings; and the system is characterised by a variety of schemes and choices that can be made about the timing of retirement and the form in which benefits are taken; and
despite this growth and variety, the provisions of the Family Law Act dealing with superannuation do not provide much guidance, with little by way of express reference to superannuation; and
although the existence of a superannuation interest is increasingly recognised by parties negotiating a family law settlement, there is no mechanism for superannuation held in one spouse's name to be divided or transferred to the other, nor can the Family Court order a third party (such as a superannuation fund trustee) to provide benefits to a former spouse at some future time, even though this might be the fairest outcome for both spouses.

The impact of these difficulties has generally fallen on the non-superannuated spouse, most particularly on women out of the workforce because of homemaker and child-rearing responsibilities. The Australian Institute of Family Studies ('AIFS') in its 1986 Settling Up report found that superannuation played no part in the property division in the majority of property settlements, and where superannuation had not been taken into account, about 75 per cent of respondents had received no advice on its relevance.

More recently, the AIFS, in its 1999 working paper entitled Superannuation and Divorce in Australia , found that whilst superannuation has grown in importance as a family asset since the time of Settling Up superannuation is still, in more than half of all cases, not considered in the division of property. In fact the AIFS study suggested that the figures in the working paper were not significantly different to those found by Settling Up .

At the same time, superannuated spouses experience difficulties under the present arrangements. The lack of flexibility in dealing with superannuation means that current property must often be traded away in exchange for an asset that may not be able to be realised for many years. This leaves one party with the realised asset of the house, yet with no retirement income, and the other party with no realisable assets but often significant retirement income.

The current approach to superannuation in family law

Under the Family Law Act, the Family Court has a broad discretion to re-allocate property in a way that is just and equitable. In doing so, the Court must take into account the contributions each spouse has made to the marriage (that is, to the acquisition, conservation and improvementof property, or to the welfare of the family), their respective needs and their ability to fulfil them.

Typically a superannuation interest does not fall within the definition of property for the purposes of the Family Law Act because it is not generally able to be accessed before the member satisfies a condition of release. The Family Court cannot give effect to a re-allocation of property between spouses by making an order to divide a superannuation interest.

Through the 1980s there was no clear or consistent approach to dealing with superannuation adopted by the Family Court, and a variety of approaches were developed. More recently, the Family Court has endeavoured to achieve greater consistency but is faced with earlier decisions as well as an unsatisfactory legislative situation. The approaches open to the Family Court can be summarised as follows:

a superannuation interest is a factor to be taken into account as a matter relevant to the needs of the non-contributing spouse - if the Court is satisfied that the spouse is adequately provided for as to his or her future retirement, the superannuation interest may be ignored altogether;
a superannuation interest may be taken into account in a general way when considering what orders to make in respect of other property of the parties;
the value of a superannuation interest may be offset against the value of other assets; or
proceedings may be adjourned, or an order made but its operation deferred, until superannuation entitlements are received.

Problems with the current approach

The current treatment is not satisfactory. The variety of approaches creates uncertainty, especially for those seeking to negotiate a settlement rather than relying on a court determination. Other key problems are:

valuation : there are difficulties in determining the value of superannuation interests, especially in defined benefit schemes because the final benefit will depend upon events (eg. retirement age, vesting rules, resignation, death, or changes in personal circumstances including remarriage and/or parenthood) that will not be known at the time of the settlement of the parties financial affairs. While it is relatively simple to value an accrued interest in an accumulation plan, valuing an interest in a defined benefit plan is significantly more complicated;
limited powers of the Family Court : the Family Court does not have clear power under the Family Law Act to make orders directed against third parties (for example, to a trustee of a superannuation fund, directing them to divide a superannuation interest);
legislative restrictions : the superannuation legislation does not allow the division of all superannuation interests between spouses on marriage breakdown or at any other time;
insignificant other assets : in some cases there is no capacity to offset the value of a superannuation interest because there are no other significant assets (for example, equity in the former family home);
lack of access to information : information about a superannuation interest is often inaccessible to the non-contributing spouse and there is a real concern that people trade off superannuation interests for other assets without understanding the true value of accumulating income for retirement in a concessionally taxed environment;
impracticality : adjourning property proceedings is impractical except in cases where an interest is shortly to be paid out; and
weight : it has proved difficult for the Family Court to determine the weight to give to a party's superannuation interest when it is taken into account by the Family Court when considering what orders to make in respect of the property of the parties because of the problems of valuation.

Successive Governments have both investigated the problem and received a number of reports, from bodies such as the Australian Law Reform Commission, the Family Law Council and the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on Certain Family Law Issues. In the 1996 election campaign, the Government promised to examine the treatment of superannuation following the dissolution of marriage. On 8 March 1998, the Prime Minister announced the Government's intention to actively work to introduce reforms to bring about greater fairness and certainty into the treatment of superannuation in the event of marriage breakdown.

Specification of desired objective

The main objective is to provide a coherent framework for addressing the shortcomings of current arrangements, while taking into account the range and complexity of superannuation plans. Concurrent objectives are to:

encourage parties to take responsibility for their own affairs wherever possible;
minimise compliance costs; and
be consistent with the Government's broader retirement incomes policy goals.

There are naturally some tensions between these objectives and a result that achieves one objective may lead to an inability to fully meet another objective. For example, the parties might wish to access superannuation for current needs rather than keep it for retirement. While this would be consistent with the policy objective that parties should be able to agree on solutions, it would be inconsistent with the Government's retirement incomes policy objective that superannuation be used to maintain and improve living standards in retirement. The preferred option would, therefore, seek to offer a solution that provides reasonable balance between any conflicting aims.

Elements of the objectives against which options are to be assessed follow.

Consistent, transparent and fair value should be recognised : While noting the difference between superannuation and other assets, the fair value of a superannuation interest should, like any other asset of the marriage, be taken into account in the division of assets on breakdown of a marriage especially as superannuation is becoming an increasingly significant asset in many marriages. Considerations of fairness dictate that its full value should be recognised.

It is important that parties should be able to ascertain an accurate valuation of superannuation interests and have the ability to divide those interests with regard to their own particular circumstances. The benefit in a defined benefit scheme has two components: a vested benefit and an unvested value. The vested benefit must be at least the minimum resignation benefit. The unvested value notionally accrues to the employee but may not be realised until the member satisfies certain requirements, as determined by the rules of the fund. For example, the employee may not fully qualify for additional benefits unless he or she remains employed by the company for a certain number of years. This raises questions about transparency and consistency of the methods used to fully value superannuation benefits, which must be addressed by the various options. Guidance for parties agreeing on solutions : Parties should retain responsibility for settling their own affairs but clear guidance should be provided to assist this and for the Family Court to make decisions in the absence of agreement .

In family law, the emphasis is now for parties to agree solutions and use mechanisms other than the Court for dispute resolution (for example, mediation). Solutions relating to superannuation interests on marriage breakdown should follow this direction, especially as the vast majority of family law cases settle without the need for a hearing before the Family Court. A major consideration in designing a new scheme for dealing with superannuation on marriage breakdown is, therefore, to facilitate an outcome about which parties can agree.

It is also necessary to address the lack of certainty arising out of the present divergent approach by the Family Court and to design proposals which provide guidance for both negotiated settlements and Court decisions.

Access to information : To enable informed decisions, parties should have access to full information about superannuation interests .

Parties settling their financial matters after marriage breakdown can only make informed decisions about how to deal with superannuation if they have access to information about their spouse's superannuation interests, information about how to value and apportion superannuation interests and understanding about the benefits of accumulating assets for retirement in a concessionally-taxed environment.

A clean break : The treatment of superannuation interests on marriage breakdown should, as far as practicable and equitable, avoid further proceedings between the parties.

Property decisions made by the Family Court under the Family Law Act are guided by the clean break principle by which the Court is required to make such orders as will finally determine the financial relationships between the parties to the marriage and avoid further proceedings between them. The aim of the principle is to avoid the need for unnecessary contact between the parties following marriage breakdown and to allow them to pursue independent lives as far as possible.

In the superannuation context, a clean break may be possible where the value of the superannuation is readily ascertainable and the accrued interest can be divided immediately, such as with fully vested accumulation schemes. Defined benefit schemes, on the other hand, are more complex and it may be preferable for the division of the benefit to be deferred in some cases.

Consistency with retirement incomes policy : The treatment of superannuation on marriage breakdown should be consistent with the broader goals of retirement incomes policy.

The Government's retirement incomes policy has a number of broad objectives, including:

ensuring that superannuation savings, which have benefited from concessional tax treatment, are used to maintain and improve living standards in retirement rather than being diverted to other uses; and
effectively targeting Government assistance, in the form of age pensions and other benefits to those who have limited resources with which to fund their retirement.

Financial certainty following marriage breakdown : The financial circumstances of parties following marriage breakdown should be as certain as possible. Parties need to settle their financial affairs quickly and expeditiously so that they can re-establish themselves. Any proposals in relation to superannuation should also be designed to increase financial certainty for the parties so they are able to make informed decisions about their future financial situation.

Ease of administration for superannuation funds : Proposals for the treatment of superannuation on marriage breakdown should have regard to ease of compliance with administrative arrangements and, as far as possible, limit cost due to litigation and settlement.

The treatment of superannuation on marriage breakdown should not unduly increase the complexity and cost of the superannuation system. In order to minimise disruption and costs, the arrangements for superannuation on marriage breakdown should generally be consistent with the benefit design of the scheme.

Identification of options

In devising the options for consideration, there are a number of choices to be made. The first issue is whether a superannuation interest should be divided at all and if so whether all types of superannuation should be included or whether some should be excluded. There has been an increasing number of calls for reform to this area of the law and, as superannuation becomes more widespread, the option of not dividing will lead to increasing inequity between separated couples. Because of the preservation rules and as superannuation will become a more significant asset holding of the couple, the inequity of not dividing superannuation will be accentuated.

There are also choices for introducing reforms to valuation which intersect with the options set out below. Options for changes to valuation could be simply to introduce rules for valuation of the vested benefit only by reference to the minimum resignation benefit. Alternatively, valuation could include not only the vested benefit but also the unvested value calculated according to actuarial evidence on a case by case basis. A third valuation option is to calculate the unvested value according to prescribed tables which would apply to all superannuation interests. Division of unvested superannuation interests could create an actuarial risk for the contributing member which may in turn influence their employment decisions and therefore labour market mobility.

There are three broad options for consideration:

Option
1: maintain the status quo;
Option
2: maintain the status quo but introduce reforms to valuation; and
Option
3: introduce reforms to treat superannuation interests as a separate matrimonial asset and to allow superannuation interests to be divided on marriage breakdown as well as provide the Family Court with guidance on how to deal with superannuation interests. Superannuation interests including vested and unvested benefits would be valued at their actuarially determined expected value.

Option 1 - Maintain status quo

This would involve no change to the current arrangements.

Option 2 - Maintain the status quo but introduce reforms to valuation

This option would provide a greater degree of certainty because of improvements in the valuation of superannuation interests. However, under this option superannuation would remain outside the jurisdiction of the court, which would continue to rely on its present array of approaches to dealing with superannuation interests in the context of parties settling their financial affairs.

Option 3 - Introduce reforms to treat superannuation interests as a separate matrimonial asset and to allow superannuation interests to be divided on marriage breakdown as well as provide the Family Court with guidance on how to deal with superannuation interests. Superannuation interests including vested and unvested benefits would be valued at their actuarially determined expected value.

This option would include measures to enable spouses and the Family Court to readily determine the value of a superannuation interest, including by reference to actuarially determined valuation factors for a defined benefit interest. The Family Court would be given guidance on how to deal with superannuation interests for couples seeking court assistance in the settlement of the parties financial affairs. Parties would also be encouraged to agree their own solutions. Separating couples and the Family Court would be able to direct the trustees of their superannuation plans to divide payments made pursuant to a member's superannuation interest.

Valuation : One of the most difficult problems that has been faced by separating parties when deciding whether to trade a superannuation interest for other property is gaining an appreciation of the current value of that interest. This will be just as important once parties have the ability to divide a superannuation interest. The division of a superannuation interest could be confined to the vested benefit only, which could be valued by reference to the minimum resignation benefit. However, this ignores benefits that accrue to members, but which may not become payable until certain conditions of release are satisfied, and will not lead to a fair outcome especially for the non-contributing spouse.

Valuing interests in accumulation plans : Valuing interests in accumulation plans does not generally present problems as the value can readily be ascertained at any point in time.

Where there are unvested contributions in a fund that is primarily an accumulation plan, member statements should indicate that fact so that additional information can be obtained from the superannuation fund when needed.

Valuing interests in defined benefit plans Unlike accumulation plans, valuing an interest in a defined benefit plan is problematic.

Interests in defined benefit plans are typically based upon years of service with an employer and salary levels prior to retirement, as well as contributions and investment earnings. As the final benefit is dependent on future events, the full value of the retirement benefit cannot be known with certainty at the time of marriage breakdown. It is not possible, therefore, to place a definite figure on the value of an interest in a defined benefit plan at any point in time except when the benefit becomes payable. Valuing such interests normally requires actuarial expertise to identify the vested amount and the value of the benefit that has not yet vested.

This option, therefore, proposes to prescribe, in the Family Law Regulations a set of factors, developed by the Australian Government Actuary, that take these considerations into account. Parties and their advisers will be required to use these factors. The factors will also be used by the Family Court in determining the value of a superannuation interest when the parties approach the Court for assistance.

People would use the factors, in conjunction with additional information provided by the trustees, and their personal details, to calculate the present-day value of an interest in a defined benefit plan. The Family Law Regulations will also prescribe the method of calculation to be used.

If a particular superannuation fund considers that the valuation factors are not appropriate for its members, whether because of its benefit structure or the composition of its membership, it will be open to that fund to develop its own set of valuation factors and submit these to the Australian Government Actuary for approval.

If parties are unable to agree about how to value an interest in a defined benefit scheme, it will generally not be open to them to argue before the Court that there are particular characteristics (for example in terms of health, expected longevity or employment prospects) which make the relevant factors inappropriate to them. The Court will be required to use the Australian Government Actuary's valuation factors, or approved factors developed by particular funds, to assess the value of a superannuation interest.

As noted above, the value of a superannuation interest in a defined benefit plan will not be known with complete certainty until the benefit is received. The value that the parties will arrive at using the factors developed by the Australian Government Actuary will represent the present value of the various possible superannuation outcomes (that is, the receipt of a resignation, retrenchment, invalidity, death or retirement benefit), weighted according to the probability of each of those outcomes occurring. The actual benefit eventually received by the member may in fact be higher or lower than this value, depending upon the circumstances in which the member leaves his or her superannuation fund.

Information to be made available for parties will make it clear that, although they will now be able to gain a better appreciation of the value of an interest in a defined benefit scheme, the actual value may differ because of the inherent uncertainties in such schemes. The parties will still need to weigh up for themselves how they wish to deal with that information.

Assessment of impacts of each option

Impact group identification

The groups likely to be affected include separating couples and their advisers, and the Family Court, the Australian Taxation Office ('ATO'), the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority ('APRA') and superannuation plan trustees. The proposals are also likely to have implications for Government revenue and outlays. The division of superannuation would also bring about a series of indirect effects for children. On the one hand it may create a more certain financial environment for the parents, thus being of benefit to the children. On the other hand, housing needs of children should be considered and there will be occasions where it may not be appropriate to divide the superannuation. Economy wide effects are also possible, for example labour market mobility may be adversely affected, however, this cannot be assessed at this stage.

Option 1 - Maintain status quo

Separating couples

The current arrangements leave separating couples uncertain as to how to treat superannuation interests in the event of marriage breakdown. While superannuation interests are increasingly being taken into account when couples arrange their financial affairs on marriage breakdown, there is no consistent method for valuing superannuation interests, especially in defined benefit plans, or dealing with superannuation interests. Parties face an uncertain outcome.

As superannuation interests become a more significant household asset, with growth due to the superannuation guarantee legislation, the option of trading a superannuation interest for other property will become less satisfactory. The contributing spouse will increasingly be required to trade larger amounts of current assets, or borrow, to compensate the non-contributing spouse for loss of retirement income. This tends to leave one member of the couple with their current needs unmet (that is, housing) and the other with future needs unmet (that is, retirement income).

This unsatisfactory situation, combined with the significant growth in superannuation coverage, will lead to increasing community dissatisfaction with the current arrangements.

The Family Court

In the absence of reform, the Family Court would continue to apply the variety of different approaches and at the same time be unable to order a division of superannuation interest where that would be the most appropriate measure to achieve an equitable outcome in property settlement proceedings (for example, where there is no capacity to offset the value of a contributing spouse's superannuation interest because the couple has no other property). This restriction reduces the likelihood of an equitable outcome for the parties.

The absence of any clear guidance could lead to an increasing number of cases coming to the Court for determination, thus placing greater strain on the Court and its resources. It is likely that this would increase as the number of parties holding superannuation increases, due to the superannuation guarantee.

The APRA

In the absence of reform, parties may request the APRA to use its discretionary powers to direct trustees to divide their superannuation interests. Responding to such requests on a one off basis imposes an administrative burden on the APRA. While the instances of this are not great, the increased membership of superannuation is likely to mean this could increase considerably.

The ATO

The ATO currently has a role in the taxation of superannuation. This option would have no effect on the ATO.

Superannuation plan trustees

Superannuation plan trustees currently have a role in the administration of superannuation plans and this option would not increase the administrative burden but would leave trustees in a situation where they may have to deal with complaints the solution to which is outside their control. The level of dissatisfaction about the inability to divide superannuation interests may lead to an increase in the number of complaints.

Government revenue and outlays

This option has no immediate implications for Government revenue. Age pension outlays may tend to be higher in the longer term than they would otherwise be if parties were permitted to divide superannuation, as many non-contributing spouses would have no retirement income other than the age pension.

Option 2 - Maintain the status quo but introduce reforms to valuation

Separating couples

One of the shortcomings of the current arrangements is the lack of a consistent method for valuing superannuation interests especially in defined benefit schemes. Even where parties propose to deal with their superannuation in a fair manner, they need to obtain expert assistance in valuation of the interest. Valuation of a superannuation interest is a complex exercise and providing an accessible and objective means to value a superannuation interest would be of great benefit to separated couples.

However, attending to the valuation issues only would not address other important objectives in relation to superannuation in the family law context. For example. the court would not be able to equitably divide a resource that is becoming increasingly significant. Nor would the retirement income goals be addressed. The only choices for separated couples would be to trade off the resource, albeit at a fair value, or to adjourn the matter until the superannuation interest fully vests.

This unsatisfactory situation, combined with the significant growth in superannuation coverage, would lead to increasing community dissatisfaction with the current arrangements.

The Family Court

While the valuation difficulties for the Court would be resolved, it would continue to apply the variety of different approaches and at the same time be unable to order a division of superannuation interests. This restriction would reduce the likelihood of an appropriate outcome for the parties. As with option 1, it could lead to an increasing number of cases coming to the Court for determination, thus placing greater strain on the Court and its resources.

The APRA

The impact on the APRA would be similar to option 1.

The ATO

As with option 1, this option would have no effect on the ATO.

Superannuation plan trustees

Superannuation plan trustees would be required to provide information about the existing levels of superannuation accounts and would also have to provide that information to the non-contributing spouse. This would increase the administrative burden for superannuation scheme trustees, but trustees would be able to charge for the service.

These charges are expected to be modest, approximating the current costs of setting up a new superannuation account and will be borne by the separating couple.

Government revenue and outlays

As with option 1, this option would have no immediate implications for Government revenue. Age pension outlays may tend to be higher in the longer term than they would otherwise be if parties were permitted to divide superannuation as many non-contributing spouses would have no retirement income other than the age pension.

Option 3 - Introduce reforms to assist the valuation of superannuation interests, to allow superannuation interests to be divided on marriage breakdown and to provide the Family Court with more guidance on how to deal with superannuation interests

Separating couples

The focus of this option would be on the parties taking responsibility for agreeing on their own arrangements for dealing with superannuation. If they are unable to agree, however, a court would be given the jurisdiction and power to divide a superannuation interest. A superannuation interest in the name of one spouse is usually built up during a marriage through the joint efforts of both spouses. Superannuation contributions made by one party generally mean that the household has foregone current use of money so as to save for future retirement. If the parties had not separated they would have had a reasonable expectation that they would equally share in the superannuation interest at retirement.

How the division of superannuation interests can be achieved, however, would depend on the type of plan under consideration. Accumulation plans would be able to be divided relatively easily as the amount in the fund can readily be identified at any given time.

Defined benefit plans are more complex and dividing only the vested benefit would not fully recognise the value of the superannuation leading to unfairness in many cases. Although the full value of the benefit may not be realised until a later point in time, part of that benefit would often have accrued earlier.

In the case of defined benefit plans, therefore, this option proposes that an interest might be divided in different ways depending on the requirements in the particular case and based on the principle of a fair division. This option would allow the present day value of the superannuation accrued to the time of marriage breakdown to be recognised.

The Family Court

This option would give the Family Court greater choice in dealing with superannuation interests in contested settlements, which would increase the likelihood of an appropriate outcome for the parties. Providing more guidance for the Family Court on how to deal with superannuation interest would increase certainty and reduce the criticism of Court decisions.

The APRA

Following amendment of the superannuation legislation, the APRA would no longer be required to exercise its discretion to split superannuation interests.

The ATO

Because separating parties would have access to a new low rate Eligible Termination Payment ('ETP') threshold and a new Reasonable Benefit Limit, some may seek to take advantage of these taxation concessions without a bona fide separation. It may be a sham contrived to avoid taxation and depending on the extent of such sham arrangements, the ATO may be involved in investigations to ensure such arrangements are not entered into to gain the tax advantages by dividing superannuation interests.

Superannuation plan trustees

The Government recognises that enabling superannuation interests to be divided on marriage breakdown will have costs. The costs to trustees include overhead costs of implementing the reforms and the administrative costs of dividing a particular interest in the event of a request or order to do so.

The administrative costs will be borne by the parties to the marriage and the Regulations will prescribe the fees that the superannuation funds will be able to charge.

These costs are expected to be modest, particularly in the case of accumulation funds which are fully vested. It is expected that the cost would not be significantly more than the cost of establishing an account for a new member or making an ETP from a member's account. It is expected, therefore, that the prescribed fees will be similarly modest.

However there are overhead costs involved in implementing new administrative systems and information technology. Superannuation funds will not be permitted to charge fees in relation to the development of new systems. These costs would be indirectly passed on to all the members of the scheme.

Government revenue and outlays

Allowing division of superannuation interests will have a cost to revenue. Generally, the first prescribed amount (currently $96,637) of a lump sum benefit is subject to tax at a lower rate than amounts in excess of this threshold. As many non-contributing spouses may not otherwise have superannuation, allowing a division of superannuation interests would result in more people having access to this low rate ETP threshold.

Where the final benefit is taken as an income stream, the couple together may face a lower tax liability as a result of dividing the superannuation interest than if the superannuation interest had not been divided, but this would depend on other assets in retirement.

Any arrangements that increase the retirement income of a non-contributing spouse may also reduce age pension outlays. Arrangements that reduce the retirement income of the contributing spouse may increase age pension outlays.

Changes to the administrative and information technology systems for income security payments will also be required.

Consultation

Consultations have been undertaken with representatives of the superannuation industry including with the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia ('ASFA') and representatives from the State superannuation and pension schemes. The Family Court of Australia, the Family Law section of the Law Council of Australia and National Legal Aid have also been consulted.

Those consulted recognised the need for reform in this area and were generally supportive of the proposed reform.

Conclusion and recommended option

The preferred option is option 3, which involves measures to assist in the valuation of superannuation interests, the division of superannuation interests and guidance for the Family Court. This would result in a significant improvement on the current arrangements.

Any potential costs arising from this option are likely to be outweighed by benefits associated with greater choice and certainty for separating parties. The costs to Government are one off costs and the administration costs to superannuation plan trustees, in dividing superannuation interests, can largely be allocated on a user pay basis to ensure the costs are borne by those who receive the benefits of the proposed reforms.

Implementation and review

Implementation of the preferred option will occur through the Family Law Legislation Amendment (Superannuation) Bill 2000 with superannuation amendments to commence on the anniversary of the day on which the resultant Act receives the Royal Assent. The development of valuation factors by the Government Actuary and the preparation of amendments to the Family Law Regulations is expected to occur in the middle of 2000, after which further consultation with the superannuation industry would take place. It is proposed that the operation of the Superannuation Bill will be reviewed after an initial period of three years from commencement to determine what, if any, improvements to the arrangements are necessary or desirable.

CONSULTATION STATEMENT

The Family Court of Australia, the legal profession and the superannuation industry have been consulted on the draft Superannuation Bill.


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