Grain Elevators Board (Vic) v Dunmunkle Shire
[1946] HCA 13(Judgment by: Rich J)
Grain Elevators Board (Vic)
vDunmunkle Shire
Judges:
Latham CJ
Rich JStarke J
Dixon J
McTiernan J
Williams J
Judgment date: 31 May 1946
Judgment by:
Rich J
The question involved in the present appeal is whether land vested in the Grain Elevators Board of the State of Victoria for the purposes of its functions is exempt from liability to rates under the Local Government Act 1928 Vict. which, by s. 249 (1), excepts from ratability "land the property of His Majesty which is unoccupied or used for public purposes." Two questions are involved, (1) Is the land vested in the Board land the property of His Majesty?, and (2) Is it used for public purposes?
I feel no doubt that land vested in the Board is land the property of His Majesty. The Board, by reason of s. 10 of the Grain Elevators Act 1934 Vict., is so much under the control of the Minister that it is, in my opinion, a branch or department of the Government (and therefore "the Crown") rather than a body independent of the Government having, as its primary function, the exercise of independent powers and discretions free of governmental control. In Mersey Docks v. Cameron [ [18] ], the criterion of taxability imposed by a statute was occupancy of land. Hence, since the Act did not bind the Crown, the criterion of exemption was whether it was the Crown which occupied the land, not whether the occupant was using it for a public purpose or for the general good of the realm: to be exempt, the land had to be occupied by the Crown or by a servant of the Crown for the purposes of the Crown, as distinguished from merely public purposes. In the case now before us, it is property in land which is one of the criteria of exemption. To be capable of being exempt, the land must be the property of the Crown. It is clear that the Board, which is an agency of the Crown, has no beneficial interest in any land which it may acquire for the purposes of its functions; for example, with the permission of the Minister under s. 10 (1) (a), or by agreement or compulsory purchase under s. 17 (1) (a), of the Grain Elevators Act , any title to land so acquired it holds as trustee for the Crown.
The next question is whether the land is used for public purposes. In my opinion, it is. It is used, not by a private concern, but by a Crown agency for the purpose of supplying the public at large with facilities for the storing and delivery of grain, and ancillary purposes. No doubt, charges are made for the services so supplied; but these do not enure, in whole or in part, for the benefit of private individuals, but wholly for the benefit of the Crown. There is nothing in the case of Essendon Corporation v. Blackwood [ [19] ] inconsistent with this: Cf. Municipal Council of Mosman v. Spain [ [20] ]; and, as was pointed out by Latham , C.J., in South Australia v. The Commonwealth [ [21] ], "any activity may become a function of government if parliament so determines."
The appeal should be allowed.