Sweet v Parsley
[1969] 1 All ER 347(Judgment by: Lord Wilberforce)
Between: Sweet
And: Parsley
Judges:
Lord Reid
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest
Lord Pearce
Lord WilberforceLord Diplock
Subject References:
Drugs
Dangerous drugs
Cannabis
Tenant of house
No knowledge that cannabis being smoked on premises
Rooms in house sublet and in fact used for smoking cannabis
Mental element in statutory offence
Whether tenant concerned in the management of premises used for smoking of cannabis
Criminal Law
Mens rea
Statutory offence
Absolute liability
Concerned in management of premises used for smoking or dealing in cannabis
Examination of relevant circumstances establishing intention of Parliament to create absolute offence
Legislative References:
Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 (c 15) - s 5(b)
Case References:
A-G v Lockwood - (1842) 9 M & W 378; 152 ER 160, affd sub nom
Lockwoood v A-G - (1842) 10 M & W 464; 152 ER 552; 39 Digest (Repl) 270, 116
Bank of New South Wales v Piper - [1897] AC 383; 66 LJPC 73; 76 LT 572; 61 JP 660; 14 Digest (Repl) 32 40
Brend v Wood - (1946) 175 LT 306; 110 JP 317; 17 Digest (Repl) 460, 194
Derbyshire v Houliston - [1897] 1 QB 772; 66 LJQB 569; 76 LT 624; 61 JP 374; 14 Digest (Repl) 36, 60
Dyke v Elliott, The Gauntlet - (1872) LR 4 PC 184; 26 LT 45; 17 ER 373
sub nom R v Elliott - 41 LJAdm 65; 15 Digest (Repl) 877, 8445
Lim Chin Aik v Reginam - [1963] 1 All ER 223; [1963] AC 160; [1963] 2 WLR 42; Digest (Cont Vol A) 23, *166a
M'Naghten's Case - (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200; [1843-60] All ER Rep 229; 8 ER 718; 14 Digest (Repl) 60, 246
Maher v Musson - (1934) 52 CLR 100
Pearks, Gunston & Tee Ltd v Ward, Hennen v Southern Counties Dairies Co Ltd - [1902] 2 KB 1; [1900-03] All ER Rep 228; 71 LJKB 656; 87 LT 51; 66 JP 774; 14 Digest (Repl) 43, 115
Proudman v Dayman - (1941) 67 CLR 536; 14 Digest (Repl) 33, *24
R v Gould - [1968] 1 All ER 849; [1968] 2 QB 65; [1968] 2 WLR 643
R v Tolson - (1889) 23 QBD 168; [1886-90] All ER Rep 26; 58 LJMC 97; 60 LT 899; 54 JP 4, 20; 20, 15 Digest (Repl) 890, 8578
R v Wheat, R v Stocks - [1921] 2 KB 119; [1921] All ER Rep 602; 90 LJKB 583; 124 LT 830; 85 JP 203; 15 Digest (Repl) 891, 8591
Sherras v De Rutzen - [1895] 1 QB 918; [1895-99] All ER Rep 1167; 64 LJMC 218; 72 LT 839; 59 JP 440; 14 Digest (Repl) 39, 90
Thomas v Regem - (1937) 59 CLR 279
Warner v Metropolitan Police Comr - [1968] 2 All ER 356; [1968] 2 WLR 1303
Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions - [1935] AC 462; [1935] All ER Rep 1; 104 LJKB 433; 153 LT 232; 14 Digest (Repl) 493, 4768
Yeandel v Fisher - [1965] 3 All ER 158; [1966] 1 QB 440; [1965] 3 WLR 1002; 129 JP 546; Digest (Cont Vol B) 151, 57a
Judgment date: 23 January 1969
Judgment by:
Lord Wilberforce
My Lords, in my opinion, the appellant, who was found to have "no knowledge whatever that [her] house was being used for the purpose of smoking cannabis" ought not to have been convicted. Her conviction was based on s 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965, and on an interpretation of the words "concerned in the management of any premises used for [the purpose of smoking cannabis or cannabis resin or of dealing in cannabis or cannabis resin]" which makes a person liable to prosecution who lets, or licenses the occupation of premises, on which cannabis or cannabis resin is smoked or dealt in. It requires no amplification to show how wide a category of persons would thus be brought into the category of potential offenders. So, for this appeal, the essential question is to determine whether this interpretation is correct.
The words "concerned in the management" are not, on the face of them, very clear, but at least they suggest some technical or acquired meaning, some meaning other than one which refers merely to such common transactions as letting or licensing the occupation of premises. For if it had been intended to penalise anyone who lets or licenses premises on which cannabis comes to be smoked, it would have been easy to do so in simple language. This impression is strengthened when the following words of the paragraph are read. They reflect what I would think to be logically correct, namely, that one does not "manage" premises, the inert subject of a conveyance or a lease, but rather some human activity on the premises which the manager has an interest in directing. And so, when the paragraph speaks of management of premises, and for a purpose, I would expect the purpose for which the premises are used to be that of the manager, otherwise, what would be the nature and object of the management?
A consideration of previous and analogous legislation removes any doubt that these words are intended to refer to such a special and limited class as I have described, one which quite clearly excludes such persons as the appellant. This legislation deals with other "anti-social" activities such as the keeping of brothels, opium "dens" and gaming houses.
- 1.
- The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, s 13, dealt with the keeping of brothels. It penalised a person who "keeps or manages or acts or assists in the management of a brothel". It dealt also with persons, other than managers, tenants, occupiers, lessors and (by an amendment in the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1912) persons in charge, but in relation to them it stated explicitly the requirement of knowledge-"knowingly permits", "lets ... with ... knowledge", "is wilfully a party to the continued use". These fit in with and emphasise the conception of purposeful management. Substantially similar language is taken into the modern Sexual Offences Act 1956, which refers to managing or acting or assisting in management. It is perhaps worth observation that this Act refers both to "used as a brothel" and "used for the purposes of habitual prostitution", showing that when a convenient noun exists which includes the concept of a prohibited purpose, it is adopted, and that "used for the purposes" is employed to denote a similar type of situation as to which no convenient noun can be found or coined.
- 2.
- The Dangerous Drugs Act 1920, dealt with opium. The relevant sections are reproduced in the Act of 1965 (s 8), and it is obvious that the provisions regarding cannabis are based on them. In dealing with management of premises it seems clear enough that what is in mind is not the lessor of premises on which opium may come to be smoked, but a manager of what, if a noun is required, might be called "opium dens". No doubt opium smoking is a more elaborate and prolonged process than smoking of cannabis, so that the transference of legislation from one activity to the other is not completely appropriate, but the difference (perhaps not understood by the draftsman) is not sufficient to impel us to a fresh conception of management.
- 3.
- The use of the word "management" in relation to gaming houses goes back at least to the Gaming Act 1845 (s 4). The experession "concerned in the management" is used in s 5. The Betting Act 1853 (s 3) combines prohibition of "permitting" by occupiers with prohibition of management of a house or place used for the purposes of betting, a comparable structure to that of s 5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965. I need not trace this wording through the mountains of later enactments.
I am left with no doubt after examination of this legislation that, when the Dangerous Drugs Act 1964 (the predecessor of that of 1965) adopted, in relation to cannabis, language which penalised on the one hand "permits ... to be used" and on the other hand being "concerned in the management of any premises used for any such purpose ... ", it must, in the latter provision, have had in mind the same kind of purposeful management activity as was referred to, in analogous connections, in previous legislation. One can describe what is penalised as being concerned in the management of a cannabis shop, or a cannabis smoking den or parlour, a type of activity which no doubt includes not only one where this was the direct or main purpose of the manager, or person concerned in the management, but also cases where, by extension or infiltration and acquiescence, this purpose had come to be included in the purposes for which the premises are being managed or, one might say, run. If this is the correct meaning to extract from the language, when one considers that there is also a wide area of penalisation elsewhere of possession and of permitting by occupiers, there is a rational statutory scheme of considerable scope. I see no reason to strain the language of s 5(b) so as to convert it into, in effect, an instrument of amateur law enforcement which may catch many innocent persons, whether the section, as so interpreted, is too severe or not severe enough, is something for Parliament to consider.
On this admittedly prosaic interpretation of the paragraph, I do not embark on a wider examination of the problem of absolute offences, or of guilty intention. As in Warner v Metropolitan Police Comr , the word "possession" carried its own content of mental intention so. perhaps a fortiori , do the words "concerned in the management of any premises used for any such purpose ... ", and there is no occasion to look beyond them for some separate ingredient which might, in fact, be difficult to define. I would allow the appeal.