Stevens v. Brodribb Sawmilling Company Pty Ltd
160 CLR 1663 ALR 513
(Judgment by: BRENNAN J)
Between: STEVENS
And: BRODRIBB SAWMILLING COMPANY PTY LTD
Judges:
Mason J.
Wilson J.
Brennan J.Deane J.
Dawson J.
Subject References:
Negligence
Judgment date: 13 February 1986
Canberra
Judgment by:
BRENNAN J
I am in general agreement with the reasons prepared by Mason J. for dismissing these appeals, but I should state my own reasons for agreeing that Brodribb did not breach any personal duty of care owed to Stevens.
Brodribb organized the felling, snigging, loading and trucking operations which brought the forest logs to the mill. All of those operations involve some risk of injury to those engaged in them. We are concerned with the loading operation. The movement of bulldozers as they manoeuvre heavy logs on loading ramps involves some risk of injury to those engaged in the loading operations. An entrepreneur who organizes an activity involving a risk of injury to those engaged in it is under a duty to use reasonable care in organizing the activity to avoid or minimize that risk, and that duty is imposed whether or not the entrepreneur is under a further duty of care to servants employed by him to carry out that activity. The entrepreneur's duty arises simply because he is creating the risk (Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 59 ALJR 564, at p 587; 60 ALR 1 , at p 42) and his duty is more limited than the duty owed by an employer to an employee. The duty to use reasonable care in organizing an activity does not import a duty to avoid any risk of injury; it imports a duty to use reasonable care to avoid unnecessary risks of injury and to minimize other risks of injury. It does not import a duty to retain control of working systems if it is reasonable to engage the services of independent contractors who are competent themselves to control their system of work without supervision by the entrepreneur. The circumstances may make it necessary for the entrepreneur to retain and exercise a supervisory power or to prescribe the respective areas of responsibility of independent contractors if confusion about those areas involves a risk of injury. But once the activity has been organized and its operation is in the hands of independent contractors, liability for negligence by them within the area of their responsibility is not borne vicariously by the entrepreneur. If there is no failure to take reasonable care in the employment of independent contractors competent to control their own systems of work, or in not retaining a supervisory power or in leaving undefined the contractors' respective areas of responsibility, the entrepreneur is not liable for damage caused merely by a negligent failure of an independent contractor to adopt or follow a safe system of work either within his area of responsibility or in an area of shared responsibility.
In the present case, Brodribb prescribed the location of loading ramps. Brodribb also retained (though it did not actively exercise) a right to prescribe the manner of their construction and, if it be a matter of additional prescription, the means by which logs were to be loaded. Logs were to be loaded by pushing them by bulldozer blade up and over the edge of the ramp on to a waiting trailer. The bulldozer would move up and down between the skids of the ramp. Perhaps forklifts could have been used, but any improvement in safety would have been speculative, and did not warrant the cost and inconvenience involved. Brodribb did not employ servants to snig, load or carry logs; it employed independent contractors who were experienced in those activities. That seems to be the extent of the organization by Brodribb of the activity of loading logs. Was it negligent in prescribing that organization? Further supervision by a Brodribb employee of the independent contractors while they were working could have been prescribed but it might have been an irritating distraction to those engaged in loading. At all events, it would have been unreasonable to prescribe supervisors of experienced contractors. Brodribb did not prohibit truck drivers from helping in the loading of logs, nor did Brodribb prohibit those engaged to load logs from helping truck drivers. Was it bound to do so? In my opinion, no such prohibition was called for; to prohibit one from helping the other might increase the risk of injury in some situations. It would have prevented the injury suffered by Stevens if truck drivers had been absolutely prohibited from getting up on the loading ramp, but that would have been an unnecessary and unreasonable prohibition to prescribe. The problem of manoeuvring logs too short to straddle the gap between the skids of a loading ramp was well known. But Brodribb was not negligent in leaving the problem of manoeuvring short logs to competent independent contractors to deal with. In my opinion, the evidence did not show that Brodribb failed to exercise reasonable care in organizing the loading of logs. Apart from its responsibility in the organizing of the loading of logs, did Brodribb have any relevant continuing responsibility in the conduct of the loading operations? I think not. If the persons working in the vicinity of the loading ramps had been employees, Brodribb would have remained under a continuing duty to prescribe and enforce a safe system for dealing with the problem of logs jammed on or near the ramp (see Kondis v. State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672 ), but Brodribb was not under such a duty to persons who were not employees. The way in which the independent contractors chose to deal with the problem of jammed logs was a matter for them. The cause of Stevens' injury was Gray's movement of the bulldozer while Stevens was still within the danger area. That was negligence on the part of an independent contractor within an area of his responsibility. Brodribb is not vicariously liable to Stevens for Gray's negligence in moving the bulldozer when and in the manner he did.
I need not address the question whether there is some special category of non-delegable duty of care other than the personal duty of care arising from particular relationships (for example, master and servant, parent and child, school authority and pupil). I agree with Mason J. that no such duty arises from the circumstances of this case.
The appeals should be dismissed.