ESSO AUSTRALIA RESOURCES LTD v FC of T

Judges: Gleeson CJ
Gaudron J
McHugh J
Gummow J
Kirby J

Callinan J

Court:
High Court

MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION: [1999] HCA 67

Judgment date: 21 December 1999

Callinan J

115. In this case the appellant asks the Court to re-open Grant v Downs [161] (1976) 135 CLR 674. and to hold, contrary to the decision of the majority in that case, that the test for legal professional privilege, or as the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (``the Act'') calls it, client legal privilege, should be a test of dominant purpose rather than sole purpose. A number of subsidiary questions are raised, including whether ss 118 and 119 of the Act which expressly enact a dominant purpose test in respect of the adducing of evidence, and make no reference to the production, discovery and inspection of documents in other situations, operate in such a way as to modify the common law to make it conform to the Act in those other situations.

Facts

116. This is an appeal from interlocutory orders. The substantive proceedings, yet to be heard, involve six related applications to the Federal Court, challenging assessments made by the respondent under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) in respect of a transaction between the appellant, the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited (CSR) and other parties. By the agreement giving effect to the transaction, the appellant acquired all of the issued units in a trust, Delhi Australia Fund from CSR. Interest was payable to both CSR and to the Exxon Overseas Investment Corporation on the unpaid balance of the purchase price. The appellant claims that the interest paid to those two corporations is allowable as a tax deduction.

117. General orders for discovery were made in each of the six related applications on 18 October 1996. The appellant, by affidavit, claimed client legal privilege for a number of documents on the basis that they had been prepared for the dominant purpose of giving or receiving legal advice. By notices of motion dated 22 October 1997 the respondent sought orders that the appellant produce for inspection, all relevant documents except those prepared for the sole purpose of giving or receiving legal advice.

118. The Notices of Motion came on for hearing before Foster J who framed questions of law as follows: [162] Esso Australia Resources Ltd v FC of T (1997) 150 ALR 117 at 126.

``(a) Whether the correct test for claiming legal professional privilege in relation to the production of discovered documents is the `sole purpose' test as formulated by the High Court in Grant v Downs [163] (1976) 135 CLR 674. or the `dominant purpose' test as set out in s 118 and s 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).

(b) Whether the court has power pursuant to O 15, r 15 of the Federal Court Rules to make an order excluding from production


ATC 4065

discovered documents on the basis that such documents meet the `dominant purpose' test as set out in s 118 and s 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).''

119. Section 118 provides as follows:

``Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of:

  • (a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer; or
  • (b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for the client; or
  • (c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by the client or a lawyer;

for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal advice to the client.''

120. Section 119 is in these terms:

``Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of:

  • (a) a confidential communication between the client and another person, or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made; or
  • (b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared;

for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party.''

The decision at first instance

121. Foster J referred to the reasoning of the majority (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ) in Grant v Downs who said: [164] (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 688.

``that unless the law confines legal professional privilege to those documents which are brought into existence for the sole purpose of submission to legal advisers for advice or for use in legal proceedings the privilege will travel beyond the underlying rationale to which it is intended to give expression and will confer an advantage and immunity on a corporation which is not enjoyed by the ordinary individual.''

122. His Honour also referred to the judgment of Barwick CJ who held that a test of dominant purpose was the appropriate test.

123. Since Grant v Downs , and after an extensive period of research and consultation, and a report by the Australian Law Reform Commission, [165] Evidence , Report No 38 (1987). two jurisdictions only (the Commonwealth and New South Wales) have enacted the Act. [166] The Act also applies to courts in the Australian Capital Territory: s 4.

124. Foster J gave consideration to a number of cases in which it was held that ss 118 and 119 of the Act have a derivative, indirect, or ``flow-on'' effect on the common law, that in some way the former exert a gravitational influence on the latter so as to make the common law conform to the statute.

125. In Telstra Corporation v Australis Media Holdings [ No 1] [167] (1997) 41 NSWLR 277 at 279. McLelland CJ in Eq accepted that although the Act does not apply of its own force to ancillary processes it does have:

``an indirect or flow-on effect, in the application of equivalent principles to all ancillary processes.''

126. McLelland CJ in Eq was impressed by the reasoning in Trade Practices Commission v Port Adelaide Wool Co Pty Ltd , [168] (1995) 60 FCR 366 at 369. in which Branson J concluded that it was arguable that the Act applied derivatively to privilege claims in respect of ancillary processes.

127. In Towney v Minister for Land and Water Conservation (NSW) , [169] (1997) 76 FCR 401 at 412. Sackville J adopted and applied these two decisions, saying, in doing so, that the reasoning of McLelland CJ in Eq was ``convincing''.

128. But there is a category of cases in which a different conclusion has been reached. Akins v Abigroup Ltd [170] (1998) 43 NSWLR 539. and Zemanek v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [171] Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 2 October 1997. are instances.

129. In the present case, Foster J decided not to follow Telstra and Towney . His Honour's view was that in terms, the Act applied only in respect of the adducing of evidence, and that the common law, as settled by this Court in Grant v Downs applied in other circumstances, including the present.

130. There is a third category of cases in which consideration has been given to an argument that O 15 r 15 of the Federal Court


ATC 4066

Rules authorises a Court, in effect, to circumvent Grant v Downs by refusing to make orders for discovery on the basis of a sole purpose test.

131. The rule provides:

``The Court shall not make an order under this Order for the filing or service of any list of documents or affidavit or other document or for the production of any document unless satisfied that the order is necessary at the time when the order is made.''

132. In BT Australasia Pty Ltd v New South Wales , [172] (1996) 140 ALR 268. Sackville J (following the reasoning of Branson J in Trade Practices Commission v Port Adelaide Wool Co Pty Ltd [173] (1995) 60 FCR 366. ) was of the view that the Court could, and would ordinarily, exclude from production, documents which do not meet the dominant purpose test, on the basis that the fact that neither the documents nor evidence of them might be adduced on trial was relevant to the issue of ``necessity'' with which the rule is concerned. [174] (1996) 140 ALR 268 at 271.

133. Branson J thought it anomalous that a party might have access to a wider class of documents at an early stage of the proceedings than would be admissible at trial. Foster J pointed out however that the scope of discovery is not limited to documents which would be admissible in evidence. [175] See Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v The Peruvian Guano Co (1882) 11 QBD 55 at 62-63 ; Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341 at 345 ; Trade Practices Commission v CC (New South Wales) Pty Ltd & Ors (1995) ATPR ¶ 41-425 at 40,797; (1995) 58 FCR 426 at 436 .

134. Foster J, in disposing of the premise upon which the expansive view of the Federal Court Rules was said to be justified, held that the taking of a procedural step to widen privilege would be to accord a privilege expressly denied by the High Court in Grant v Downs . [176] (1997) 150 ALR 117 at 125.

135. The questions of law were answered by Foster J in this way: [177] Esso Australia Resources v FC of T (1997) 150 ALR 117 at 126.

``In respect of question (a), that the correct test for claiming legal professional privilege in relation to the production of discovered documents is the `sole purpose' test as formulated by the High Court in Grant v Downs .

In respect of question (b), that the question be answered in the negative.''

136. The appellants appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court, comprised of a bench of five judges (Black CJ, Beaumont, Sundberg, Merkel and Finkelstein JJ). [178] Esso Australia Resources v FC of T (1998) 83 FCR 511. By a majority (Black CJ and Sundberg J; Finkelstein J) the appeal was allowed in part, but only in respect of the answer given to question 1(b) which was amended as follows: [179] (1998) 83 FCR 511 at 527.

``Yes, but to exclude from production discovered documents for the sole reason that they meet the `dominant purpose' test in ss 118 and 119 would not be a proper exercise of the power.''

Construction of the Act

137. Black CJ and Sundberg J were of the view that the Act did not apply either directly or indirectly to the production of documents in pre-trial settings. Their Honours rejected the argument that the Act had a derivative effect on the common law; that the common law must adapt itself to include the Act as part of its fabric; or that the common law was indirectly modified by the Act. They held that Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins [180] (1998) 81 FCR 360. was incorrectly decided. They said that the modification view, although it had received approval in the United States, has not been embraced in this country. In any event, their Honours thought this case would be an inappropriate one in which to apply such a principle (even if it were available), because so few jurisdictions in this country have enacted the Act: the United States cases which applied the modification principle were all cases in which there had been all but overwhelming adoption, by valid legislation of the provisions exerting the influence. [181] See Moragne v States Marine Lines Inc 398 US 375 (1970) ; cf Mobil Oil Corporation v Higginbotham 436 US 618 (1978) . Finkelstein J was of a similar mind. There were only two bases in his Honour's view upon which ss 118 and 119 could be construed to produce any derivative effect upon the common law: first if to do so would promote the purpose and object of the Act, and, secondly, if the failure to adopt that construction would lead to unfair or absurd consequences.

138. In answer to the first proposition, Finkelstein J concluded that a literal reading of the sections (118 and 119) was appropriate, and that they have no application to pre-trial processes. In relation to the second, his Honour rejected the view that prevailed in many of the cases: that apparent asymmetry or inconsistency in the tests applicable at pre-trial and trial stages was sufficient to justify a reading of the sections contrary to their express and literal meaning. Then his Honour made two observations: [182] (1998) 83 FCR 511 at 566.

``Only one object of discovery, and in many cases not the principal object, is to obtain evidence. Often the principal object is to obtain information that will throw light on


ATC 4067

the case... including information that would, directly or by train of enquiry, advance a party's own case or disadvantage that of his or her adversary.''

139. And he concluded the point by saying: [183] (1998) 83 FCR 511 at 567.

``Further, in the preparation of a case for trial it is commonplace, and it has been for over 150 years, for a party to obtain possession of a large quantity of documents many of which are not capable of being tendered in evidence for one reason or another... Thus, rather than creating confusion and disorder, the ascertainment of facts and information from documents not themselves admissible is often likely to lead to a just determination of a cause.''

140. The minority (Merkel J, with whom Beaumont J, in brief reasons, agreed) held that there had been no modification of the common law other than that part of the common law directly altered by the Act. Merkel J also referred to what was said by Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd : that it is for the High Court and not other courts in this country to depart from, or overrule its own decisions. [184] (1998) 194 CLR 395 at 403.

141. Their Honours differed from the majority on the construction of ss 118 and 119 of the Act: they thought that on its proper construction it did apply to ancillary processes. Otherwise, they said, the Act would frustrate and defeat the object attributed to the Statute: to protect client legal privilege in proceedings in the federal courts.

142. On the other point, that of the use to which O 15 r 15 of the Federal Court Rules could be put, there was unanimity. Their Honours concluded that to use the rule as a basis to accord privilege to a party when, on the authority of Grant v Downs , none existed, would not be a proper exercise of power.

The appeal to this Court

143. On some of the matters raised I can state my conclusions shortly.

144. I would reject the theory that the Act operates to alter the common law, so as in some way to make its provisions applicable to circumstances other than the adducing of evidence. The United States ``modification'' theory has not received any acceptance so far in this Court. [185] Lamb v Cotogno (1987) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 80-124 at 68,961; (1987) 164 CLR 1 at 11-12. Abstinence from legislation on a matter can on occasions be, as telling as legislation on it, or, as here, upon a closely related matter.

145. I would also reject the argument that it may, and ordinarily would not be ``necessary'' within the meaning of O 15 r 15 to order discovery of documents before a hearing if they, or their contents could not be adduced in evidence, over an objection on the ground of client legal privilege during a hearing. The purpose of the rule is to control oppressive and unnecessary obligations of discovery, and more particularly perhaps, to prevent obfuscation by excessive discovery. Its purpose is not to permit modification of the law of privilege.

146. A third argument of the appellant was that on its proper construction the Act did not confine the dominant purpose test to the adducing of evidence: indeed, that as a matter of statutory construction, ss 118 and 119 apply to ancillary processes. The appellant submits that a proper, purposive construction of the Act compels that conclusion. [186] Parramore v Duggan (1995) 183 CLR 633 at 644, 651; Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214 at 233, 242-243; Saraswati v R (1991) 172 CLR 1 at 21-23; Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill & Ors (1991) 9 ACLC 843 at 860; (1991) 172 CLR 319 at 345-348; Pyramid Building Society (In Liq) v Terry (1997) 189 CLR 176 at 195; Newcastle City Council v GIO General Limited (1997) 9 ANZ Insurance Cases ¶ 61-380; (1997) 191 CLR 85. In support of this submission the appellant pointed to a quantity of extraneous material, the reports of the Australian Law Reform Commission and the deliberations and reports of the relevant Committee of the Senate. [187] Evidence Bill 1993, Interim Report by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, June 1994; Evidence Bill 1993, Final Report by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, December 1994. The submission was that par 199 of the Final Report of the Australian Law Reform Commission could not be imputed to Parliament itself. Paragraph 199 was in these terms:

``The Terms of Reference limit the Commission to considering the application of the privilege in the courtroom where evidence is sought to be given. Situations may arise where a party obtains access to documents outside the courtroom which are protected in the courtroom by the proposed privilege. Under the proposal, the privilege will still apply in the courtroom unless the client voluntarily disclosed the document. Having wider access on discovery or under a search warrant is usual. Access is not determined by the rules of admissibility such as relevance and hearsay. It is not unreasonable to have wider access in the investigative stage.''

(footnotes omitted)

147. The Evidence Bill 1993 in its original form contained cll 118 and 119 which did not adopt the Law Reform Commission Proposal and were in quite different terms from the Commission's draft Bill. It provided for a ``sole purpose'' test. The Bill was referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and


ATC 4068

Constitutional Affairs on 9 February 1994. It was the Report of the Committee, which, it may be inferred, the appellant argues, influenced the Senate initially and ultimately the Parliament to adopt the dominant purpose test.

148. The recommendation of the Committee was as follows: [188] Evidence Bill 1993, Final Report by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, December 1994 at 13.

``The Committee recommends that clients should be able to claim legal privilege for confidential communications made and confidential documents prepared by or for a lawyer acting for the client, for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to the client, or where the dominant purpose is to provide the client with professional legal services in connection with litigation, or anticipated litigation involving, or possibly involving, the client. A dominant purpose test should also apply to confidential communications between, or confidential documents prepared by or for, unrepresented parties and their advisers.''

149. I do not propose to deal any further with this argument. Recourse to the extraneous material is not warranted. The language of ss 118 and 119 is clear. The Act is silent as to any situation other than the adducing of evidence. There is no reason to suppose that that silence on the part of the Parliament was other than deliberate. The intention of the Parliament must be taken to have been that the common law would govern the discovery, production and inspection of documents in situations other than the adducing of evidence.

150. There was a related, fourth argument which may also be shortly disposed of. It was that the discovery, production and inspection of documents were in truth a way of adducing evidence. It was pointed out that historically discovery was not available at common law. Access to documents could only be ordered by Courts of Equity in suits in equity, seeking, as final relief, a Bill of Discovery, which, if granted would enable a party to gain access to documents (and information in the possession of another party), for use in common law proceedings. [189] Bray, The Principles and Practice of Discovery (1885) at 4, 5. Notwithstanding the origins of the process of discovery, production and inspection, the rules in relation to them have long since outgrown those origins, and are now the subject of other detailed rules and many decisions intended to adapt them to the efficient conduct of modern litigation. All courts in this country today recognise the distinction between the adducing of evidence at a hearing, and the discovery, production and inspection of material otherwise.

151. The appellant's major argument is that the decision in Grant v Downs should be re- opened, and a test of dominant purpose substituted by this Court.

152. It has been held that this Court does have ``power to review and depart from its previous decisions''. This must, with respect, be so. Although ``such a course is not [ to be] lightly undertaken'' [190] John v FC of T 89 ATC 4101 at 4112; (1989) 166 CLR 417 at 438. there is ``no very definite rule as to the circumstances in which [ the Court] will reconsider an earlier decision''. [191] Attorney-General for NSW v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1952) 85 CLR 237 at 243-244. Dixon J made the observation that the rigid (different) rule adopted by the Court of Appeal in England in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [192] [ 1944] KB 718. was ``incompatible with the practice of the [ High] Court and is inappropriate''. [193] Attorney-General for NSW v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1952) 85 CLR 237 at 244.

153. In John v FC of T [194] 89 ATC 4101 at 4112; (1989) 166 CLR 417 at 438. the Court had regard to four matters or conditions which Gibbs CJ thought relevant in The Commonwealth v Hospital Contribution Fund [195] (1982) 150 CLR 49 at 56-58. to justify a departure from an earlier decision. The appellant submits that each of those conditions is satisfied in this case.

154. The appellant first submits that the decision in Grant v Downs did not rest upon a principle carefully worked out in a significant succession of cases. As Barwick CJ said: [196] (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 676. See also Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co Ltd v London and North Western Railway Co [ 1913] 3 KB 850 (produced for the solicitor in relation to proceedings pending, threatened or anticipated); Woolley v North London Railway Co (1869) LR 4 CP 602 (obtained with a view to litigation); Fenner v London and South Eastern Railway Co (1872) LR 7 QB 767 (obtained for the purpose of litigation); Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co v Quick (1878) 3 QBD 315 (per Cotton LJ, for the purpose of being communicated to the solicitor with the object of obtaining his advice); City of Baroda (1926) 134 LT 576 (for the purpose of being communicated to the solicitor); Seabrook v British Transport Commission [ 1959] 1 WLR 509; [ 1959] 2 All ER 15 (wholly or mainly for obtaining for and furnishing to the solicitor evidence and information where there is litigation contemplated); Longthorn v British Transport Commission [ 1959] 1 WLR 530; [ 1959] 2 All ER 32 (substantial purpose).

``There is no such statement of authority binding the courts in Australia. The matter has been discussed in cases decided in England and in articles in legal journals. But no authoritatively accepted statement of principle has emerged.''

155. The submission is correct. That this is so appears also from the reasons for decision of the majority in Grant v Downs who dwelt at length upon policy considerations (particularly in relation to corporations) [197] (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 686-688. as a justification for the rule which they proposed to adopt.

156. In Grant v Downs Jacobs J did not adopt the sole purpose test. His Honour preferred a test which looked to the reason for the existence of the material and posed the question in the following, perhaps, deceptively simple terms: [198] (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 692.

``does the purpose of supplying the material to the legal adviser account for the existence of the material?''

157. Later, in Waterford v The Commonwealth [199] (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 85. Deane J used this language


ATC 4069

in stating the test his Honour then thought appropriate:

``For the document to be protected, the cause of its existence, in the sense of both causans and sine qua non, must be the seeking or provision of professional legal advice.''

158. The second matter upon which the appellant relies in seeking a review of Grant v Downs is that the stating of a sole purpose test by the majority was not necessary for the decision. All Justices allowed the appeal and ordered production and inspection: although the joint judgment considered in general terms documents brought into existence for several purposes they did not weigh up and consider the competing advantages and disadvantages of a dominant purpose test, as opposed to a sole purpose test. As the distinction between the two tests had no relevance to the outcome of the case it is likely, it was put, that there was little by way of submission which would have assisted the Court in striking the correct balance. In substance this submission also is correct.

159. The third matter to which the appellant points is the inconvenience which, it contends, has flowed from the application of a sole purpose test. Although it may have been no understatement for Dennis Pearce in an article ``Legal Professional Privilege - Sole or Dominant Purpose'' [200] [ 1979] Australian Current Law 281. to say that the decision in Grant v Downs was ``greeted with disbelief by some practitioners'' and that the adoption of the sole purpose test may have confined the privilege too narrowly, it is certainly true to say that it is the experience of practitioners and courts that the sole purpose test has proved no less fertile a ground of controversy and uncertainty as any that it replaced.

160. The authors of Cross on Evidence in 1979 [201] 2nd Aust ed, par 11.27. made the following comments and criticisms:

``It is apparent that the majority decision will expose to production a great number of documents which have been traditionally supposed to be immune, such as routine reports following accidents or even loss assessors' reports to insurance companies which have among their purposes that of informing the underwriters of the justice of a claim by the insured. It is submitted that a too rigid application of the principle in Grant v Downs will lead to an undesirable reluctance on the part of such persons to express opinions which might subsequently be used against their principals. Moreover, in practice, it is likely to lead to unnecessary refinements in the concept of `purpose', as it is used in the rule, with a consequent loss of certainty among litigants as to the precise status of documents in their possession.''

161. I agree with those observations.

162. Just as it is important to be alive to, and to avoid, so far as can be, the placing of corporations in favoured positions, there is no reason why they should be placed in a disadvantageous position by comparison with natural persons. The application of a ``sole purpose'' test may in practice discriminate unfairly against corporations. The employees of natural persons, partners, officials in bureaucracies and employees and directors of corporations may, and often must, out of practical necessity communicate internally by written report. A corporation ``cannot... think or write or act except by certain machinery, which is, so to speak, extraneous of itself''. [202] Mayor & Corporation of Bristol v Cox (1884) 26 Ch D 678 at 682 .

163. The fourth matter referred to by Gibbs CJ in Hospital Contribution Fund was whether the earlier decision had been independently acted on ``in a manner which militated against reconsideration''. [203] See John v FC of T 89 ATC 4101 at 4112; (1989) 166 CLR 417 at 438-439. It is not entirely clear what acting independently on an earlier decision in a manner which militated against reconsideration would involve in every case. One matter which could clearly militate against reconsideration is the extent to which people may have arranged their affairs on the basis of a well settled understanding of the law. There is no doubt that Grant v Downs has been applied extensively throughout the Commonwealth including by this Court since it was decided. [204] Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; National Employers' Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind (1979) 1 ANZ Insurance Cases ¶ 60-010; (1979) 141 CLR 648. Application may however be one thing, the organisation of affairs in a certain way, another.

164. The presence of any one or more of the matters to which Gibbs CJ referred does not mean that this Court must review an earlier decision even if the Court is persuaded that the earlier decision is one with which the later Court does not agree. Nor should it be assumed that the category of criteria identified by Gibbs CJ should be regarded as necessarily closed. Should this Court take the view, for example, that a decision reached by a majority of three to two should command the same weight and respect as a decision reached by a majority of all the Justices of the Court? Another question


ATC 4070

which may arise is whether the decision of a bench which itself may have overturned what had for a long time been regarded as settled legal orthodoxy should have a monopoly on the thinking on the topic in question for all time? If the answer to this last question is an affirmative one it would mean that those who support change of this kind would be able to entrench their changes by capitalizing on the caution of those who favour an incrementalist approach. These questions do not need to be answered in this case because there is other, good reason to overrule Grant v Downs . In Astley v Austrust Ltd , I referred to the disadvantage to people, particularly litigants, who have acted on a perceived, settled state of the law, when the law is restated in a quite different way. [205] (1999) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 81-501 at 65,726; (1999) 73 ALJR 403 at 434; 161 ALR 155 at 197. Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council also recently pointed to the anomalous position of a party who had acted on the basis that the law precluded reliance on mistake of law to ground a claim, when the House of Lords decided to change the law to make such a claim then, and in those proceedings maintainable. [206] [ 1998] 3 WLR 1095 at 1100-1101; [ 1998] 4 All ER 513 at 518. Legislators can, and usually do enact transitional provisions when they change the law. The courts have so far found and provided no like means of cushioning the impact of decisions which effect significant changes. It may ultimately turn out to be an inescapable concomitant of any role that a final court may arrogate to itself to change the common law markedly, that it do so only in a way which is sensitive to the affairs and expectations of those who have acted upon the basis of what they reasonably took to be the legal status quo. If the proposition that judges do not change the law is to be acknowledged as a fiction, then something may have to be done to displace the effect of the other legal fiction, that the law as found by the Court has always been so, and those who may have acted upon a different understanding in the past are nonetheless bound by the Court's most recent exposition of the law. Merely to state the problems is to expose the difference between the legislative and curial roles. Certainty, predictability, the desirability of a gradual and incremental development of the common law only, and respect for the knowledge, wisdom and experience of those who made the earlier decision are very important considerations. The last of these matters will always however invite the question whether those who made the decision under challenge themselves paid due deference to those who in the past held a different opinion.

165. A change in the present circumstances is unlikely to cause any serious inconvenience to anyone. A change in the rules relating to discovery is quite different from the creation of a new or different cause of action, the creation of a new defence, or the abolition of a pre- existing one. Those who satisfy a test of sole purpose should certainly be able to satisfy any lesser test. People are unlikely to have arranged their affairs on the basis that they or others may have brought into existence documents with an eye to a sole purpose test. The only likely inconvenience is in the case of pending actions in which discovery and inspection have already been given. In relation to those situations I think that there may be a great deal to be said for the view that Lord Browne-Wilkinson took in Kleinwort, effectively that the decision (in this case the decision of this Court) should in all respects be taken to operate prospectively only. [207] cf Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1 at 22-23 .

166. I do not think that I would have decided Grant v Downs in the way in which the majority did. I do not, with respect, regard it as stating a convenient test, or a wholly fair one in accordance with the underlying rationale for legal professional privilege, of candour by clients in communications with legal advisers, or one which necessarily emerged as a result of full and considered argument by the parties. I think that it may have a tendency to discriminate against corporations and other large organisations. It was based to some extent on policy considerations upon which minds have much differed.

167. In my opinion therefore Grant v Downs should be overruled. When it was decided it did represent a departure from the generally prevailing, if not universal view of the obligation of discovery as expressed by Buckley LJ in Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co Ltd v London and North Western Railway Co : [208] [ 1913] 3 KB 850 at 856.

``It is not I think necessary that the affidavit should state that the information was obtained solely or merely or primarily for the solicitor, if it was obtained for the solicitor, in the sense of being procured as materials upon which professional advice should be taken in proceedings pending, or threatened, or anticipated. If it was obtained for the solicitor, as above stated, it is none


ATC 4071

the less protected because the party who has obtained it intended if he could to settle the matter without resort to a solicitor at all.''

168. The policy considerations which weighed with the majority in Grant v Downs are capable of pulling two ways. The sole purpose test has not proved more convenient, less productive of controversy or productive of some higher order of justice. It is also of some relevance that other common law countries have not adopted a sole purpose test. [209] In the United Kingdom, see Waugh v British Railways Board [ 1980] AC 521. For Canadian authority, see Levin v Boyce [ 1985] 4 WWR 702; Werner v Warner Auto-Marine Inc (1990) 44 CPC (2d) 175 (HC). In Ireland see Silver Hill Duckling Ltd v Minister for Agriculture [ 1987] IR 289 and in New Zealand, Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of NZ Ltd v Stuart (1985) 3 ANZ Insurance Cases ¶ 60-671; [ 1985] 1 NZLR 596. In the United States the matter is one for each of the States and otherwise is likely to be affected by the Fifth Amendment. The decision in Grant v Downs was not unanimous, and one of the judges, Jacobs J, who rejected a dominant purpose test, stated a test, that did not use the word ``sole'' and which could operate differently from the sole purpose test of the majority.

169. I did give consideration to the possibility that a different test from either dominant or sole purpose might be formulated. For example, a test of ``a substantial purpose'' has its attractions. Dominant purpose is, however, by now a well understood test by reason of its adoption elsewhere. And in any event, as the parties presented their arguments, there were effectively only two contenders, ``sole'' or ``dominant''.

170. In Waugh v British Railways Board [210] [ 1980] AC 521. the House of Lords was asked to adopt a sole purpose test for the United Kingdom as stated by the majority in Grant v Downs . Their Lordships declined the invitation. Their reasoning is compelling. Lord Simon of Glaisdale referred in pragmatic language to the competing considerations: [211] [ 1980] AC 521 at 535.

``The issue exemplifies a situation which frequently causes difficulties - where the forensic situation is covered by two valid legal principles which point each to a different forensic conclusion. Here, indeed, both principles subserve the same legal end - the administration of justice. The first principle is that the relevant rules of law should be applied to the whole body of relevant evidence - in other words, in principle all relevant evidence should be adduced to the court. The report in question in this appeal undoubtedly contains information relevant to the matters in issue in the litigation here. The first principle thus indicates that it should be disclosed, so that the appellant may make use of it if she wishes.

The second general principle arises out of the adversary (in contradiction to the inquisitorial) system of administration of justice. Society provides an objective code of law and courts where civil contentions can be decided. But it contents itself with so providing a forum and a code (and nowadays some finance for those who could not otherwise get justice). Having done so much, society considers that it can safely leave each party to bring forward the evidence and argument to establish his/her case, detaching the judge from the hurly- burly of contestation and so enabling him to view the rival contentions dispassionately.''

171. Later his Lordship stated his conclusion in terms with which I respectfully agree: [212] [ 1980] AC 521 at 537.

``Your Lordships will therefore, I apprehend, be seeking some intermediate line which will allow each of the two general principles scope in its proper sphere. Various intermediate formulae as a basis for the privilege have been canvassed in argument before your Lordships, most based on some authority - the obtaining of legal advice was `an appreciable purpose'; `a substantial purpose'; ` the substantial purpose'; it was `wholly or mainly' for that purpose; that was its `dominant' purpose; that was its `primary' purpose.

Some of these are in my view too vague. Some give little or no scope to the principle of open litigation with the minimum exclusion of relevant evidence. The one that appeals to me is `dominant' purpose, as it did to Barwick CJ in Grant v Downs [213] (1976) 135 CLR 674. . It allows scope to each of the governing principles. It seems to me less quantitative than `mainly'; and I think it would be easier to apply - the law is already cognisant of the concept of a dominant purpose - in the law of conspiracy, for example (see Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch ) [214] [ 1942] AC 435 esp at 445 per Viscount Simon LC, 452 per Viscount Maugham. and in the law as to fraudulent preference in bankruptcy [215] See Halsbury's Laws of England , 4th ed, vol 3, at 496, 499, pars 908, 913. .''

172. Whether a purpose is a dominant purpose, is, in my view, a matter to be objectively determined [216] Guinness Peat Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson [ 1987] 1 WLR 1027 ; [ 1987] 2 All ER 716 . but the subjective purpose will always be relevant and often decisive.

173. I would answer the first stated question as follows:


ATC 4072

``The appropriate test is the dominant purpose test at common law.''

174. The second question perhaps should have incorporated a reference to O 15 r 15 of the Federal Court Rules as the matter originally arose on a directions hearing pursuant to it. But because of the conclusion I have reached on the first question there is no need to consider the implications, if any, of this. It is therefore unnecessary to answer the second stated question.

175. The matter should be remitted to the Federal Court to deal with the applications in accordance with the judgments of this Court. The Solicitor-General offers no serious resistance to an order that costs should follow the event in this Court. Accordingly the appeal is allowed with costs. The respondent should pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings before Foster J and of the appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court.

ORDER

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 22 December 1998, and in place thereof, order that:

  • (i) the appeal to that Court be allowed with costs; and
  • (ii) the respondents pay the costs of the proceedings before Foster J.

3. Questions of law raised for decision for Foster J answered:

  • (a) The correct test is the dominant purpose test, which is the common law test for claiming legal professional privilege.
  • (b) Does not arise.


Footnotes

[161] (1976) 135 CLR 674.
[162] Esso Australia Resources Ltd v FC of T (1997) 150 ALR 117 at 126.
[163] (1976) 135 CLR 674.
[164] (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 688.
[165] Evidence , Report No 38 (1987).
[166] The Act also applies to courts in the Australian Capital Territory: s 4.
[167] (1997) 41 NSWLR 277 at 279.
[168] (1995) 60 FCR 366 at 369.
[169] (1997) 76 FCR 401 at 412.
[170] (1998) 43 NSWLR 539.
[171] Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 2 October 1997.
[172] (1996) 140 ALR 268.
[173] (1995) 60 FCR 366.
[174] (1996) 140 ALR 268 at 271.
[175] See Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v The Peruvian Guano Co (1882) 11 QBD 55 at 62-63 ; Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341 at 345 ; Trade Practices Commission v CC (New South Wales) Pty Ltd & Ors (1995) ATPR ¶ 41-425 at 40,797; (1995) 58 FCR 426 at 436 .
[176] (1997) 150 ALR 117 at 125.
[177] Esso Australia Resources v FC of T (1997) 150 ALR 117 at 126.
[178] Esso Australia Resources v FC of T (1998) 83 FCR 511.
[179] (1998) 83 FCR 511 at 527.
[180] (1998) 81 FCR 360.
[181] See Moragne v States Marine Lines Inc 398 US 375 (1970) ; cf Mobil Oil Corporation v Higginbotham 436 US 618 (1978) .
[182] (1998) 83 FCR 511 at 566.
[183] (1998) 83 FCR 511 at 567.
[184] (1998) 194 CLR 395 at 403.
[185] Lamb v Cotogno (1987) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 80-124 at 68,961; (1987) 164 CLR 1 at 11-12.
[186] Parramore v Duggan (1995) 183 CLR 633 at 644, 651; Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214 at 233, 242-243; Saraswati v R (1991) 172 CLR 1 at 21-23; Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill & Ors (1991) 9 ACLC 843 at 860; (1991) 172 CLR 319 at 345-348; Pyramid Building Society (In Liq) v Terry (1997) 189 CLR 176 at 195; Newcastle City Council v GIO General Limited (1997) 9 ANZ Insurance Cases ¶ 61-380; (1997) 191 CLR 85.
[187] Evidence Bill 1993, Interim Report by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, June 1994; Evidence Bill 1993, Final Report by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, December 1994.
[188] Evidence Bill 1993, Final Report by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, December 1994 at 13.
[189] Bray, The Principles and Practice of Discovery (1885) at 4, 5.
[190] John v FC of T 89 ATC 4101 at 4112; (1989) 166 CLR 417 at 438.
[191] Attorney-General for NSW v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1952) 85 CLR 237 at 243-244.
[192] [ 1944] KB 718.
[193] Attorney-General for NSW v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1952) 85 CLR 237 at 244.
[194] 89 ATC 4101 at 4112; (1989) 166 CLR 417 at 438.
[195] (1982) 150 CLR 49 at 56-58.
[196] (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 676. See also Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co Ltd v London and North Western Railway Co [ 1913] 3 KB 850 (produced for the solicitor in relation to proceedings pending, threatened or anticipated); Woolley v North London Railway Co (1869) LR 4 CP 602 (obtained with a view to litigation); Fenner v London and South Eastern Railway Co (1872) LR 7 QB 767 (obtained for the purpose of litigation); Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co v Quick (1878) 3 QBD 315 (per Cotton LJ, for the purpose of being communicated to the solicitor with the object of obtaining his advice); City of Baroda (1926) 134 LT 576 (for the purpose of being communicated to the solicitor); Seabrook v British Transport Commission [ 1959] 1 WLR 509; [ 1959] 2 All ER 15 (wholly or mainly for obtaining for and furnishing to the solicitor evidence and information where there is litigation contemplated); Longthorn v British Transport Commission [ 1959] 1 WLR 530; [ 1959] 2 All ER 32 (substantial purpose).
[197] (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 686-688.
[198] (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 692.
[199] (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 85.
[200] [ 1979] Australian Current Law 281.
[201] 2nd Aust ed, par 11.27.
[202] Mayor & Corporation of Bristol v Cox (1884) 26 Ch D 678 at 682 .
[203] See John v FC of T 89 ATC 4101 at 4112; (1989) 166 CLR 417 at 438-439.
[204] Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; National Employers' Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind (1979) 1 ANZ Insurance Cases ¶ 60-010; (1979) 141 CLR 648.
[205] (1999) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 81-501 at 65,726; (1999) 73 ALJR 403 at 434; 161 ALR 155 at 197.
[206] [ 1998] 3 WLR 1095 at 1100-1101; [ 1998] 4 All ER 513 at 518.
[207] cf Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1 at 22-23 .
[208] [ 1913] 3 KB 850 at 856.
[209] In the United Kingdom, see Waugh v British Railways Board [ 1980] AC 521. For Canadian authority, see Levin v Boyce [ 1985] 4 WWR 702; Werner v Warner Auto-Marine Inc (1990) 44 CPC (2d) 175 (HC). In Ireland see Silver Hill Duckling Ltd v Minister for Agriculture [ 1987] IR 289 and in New Zealand, Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of NZ Ltd v Stuart (1985) 3 ANZ Insurance Cases ¶ 60-671; [ 1985] 1 NZLR 596. In the United States the matter is one for each of the States and otherwise is likely to be affected by the Fifth Amendment.
[210] [ 1980] AC 521.
[211] [ 1980] AC 521 at 535.
[212] [ 1980] AC 521 at 537.
[213] (1976) 135 CLR 674.
[214] [ 1942] AC 435 esp at 445 per Viscount Simon LC, 452 per Viscount Maugham.
[215] See Halsbury's Laws of England , 4th ed, vol 3, at 496, 499, pars 908, 913.
[216] Guinness Peat Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson [ 1987] 1 WLR 1027 ; [ 1987] 2 All ER 716 .

This information is provided by CCH Australia Limited Link opens in new window. View the disclaimer and notice of copyright.