-
The impact of this case on ATO policy is discussed in Decision Impact Statement: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citylink Melbourne Ltd (Published 4 October 2006).
FC of T v CITYLINK MELBOURNE LIMITED
Judges: Gleeson CJGummow J
Kirby J
Callinan J
Heydon J
Crennan J
Court:
Full High Court of Australia
MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION:
[2006] HCA 35
Kirby J
4. This appeal comes from a judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia
[1]
5. The answer to these questions is to be found, ultimately, in the operation of s 51(1) of the
Income Tax Assessment Act
1936 (Cth) (
"
the 1936 Act
"
)
[2]
The facts
6. For the most part, the facts relevant to my reasons sufficiently appear in the reasons of Crennan J
[5]
ATC 4408
The proceedings in the Federal Court
7. Before the primary judge
: The primary judge
[11]
8. Despite the foregoing findings, the primary judge held that the concession fees were not deductible because they were akin to a promised share of profits or payment of a dividend to the State in return for the advantage flowing to capital which the State had contributed to the Project
[17]
9. It was on this basis that the primary judge rejected Transurban ' s " appeal " to the Federal Court against what it claimed was the erroneous decision of the Commissioner of Taxation ( " the Commissioner " ) disallowing Transurban ' s objection to the Commissioner ' s disallowance of deductions claimed by Transurban in respect of concession fees for the income years.
10. In the Full Court
: In allowing Transurban
'
s appeal, the Full Court found that Transurban had incurred the concession fees in the income years although they were years during which the tollway was still under construction and therefore not generating (as it later did) substantial revenues from vehicular tolls. Moreover, the Full Court found that the concession fees were referable to the income years and that the State and Transurban were not joint venturers and did not, in any legal sense, share profits
[20]
11. By special leave, this appeal is now brought to this Court to permit the Commissioner to propound his arguments defensive of the orders made by the primary judge.
The applicable legislation
12. Primacy of the legislation
: Problems of income tax law, such as the present, cannot be resolved by generalities. In each case, it is the duty of the decision-maker to apply the relevant legislation to the facts as found. Income tax law is not a mystery unto itself, to be preserved separate from other parliamentary law as a legal canon reserved to a specialised priestly caste
[22]
13. In deriving the meaning and application of income tax law, as in other areas of the written law, wisdom lies in maintaining fidelity to the statutory text and the purpose of the legislation as found in its language and elucidated by authority and admissible material
[23]
14. The legislation
: The applicable legislation, in its successive forms in the 1936 Act and the 1997 Act, is set out in Crennan J
'
s reasons
[25]
ATC 4409
(relevantly) it is a loss or outgoing of capital, or of a capital nature [26]15. From the remarks of successive judges, explaining the application of the legislation to particular facts, have come observations that have sometimes hardened into supposedly fixed rules
[28]
The issues
16. The issues arising in this appeal are foreshadowed in the foregoing observations. Logically, the first question is whether Transurban ' s liability for the concession fees constituted outgoings on capital, rather than revenue, account. If this is so, that is the end of Transurban ' s entitlement to claim a deduction in respect of those fees. Further issues do not then arise. If, however, the fees are judged to be on revenue account, other, subsidiary questions arise.
17. The issues presented for decision are thus:
- (1) The capital characterisation issue : Are the concession fees outgoings incurred in the performance of a promise given by Transurban as consideration for the acquisition of a capital asset, namely, the grant of the concession for the Project ( " the Concession " )? Are there circumstances where such payments are not of a capital nature, given the object and purpose for which the payments are made?
- (2) The incurring of the obligation issue : If the first issue is determined against the Commissioner and the concession fees are characterised as being on revenue account, where the contract provides that an obligation may be satisfied by the issue of Concession Notes which are subject to identical conditions for presentation as the conditions which allow the deferral of payment, does the issue of such Notes mean that the obligation was " incurred " in the relevant income years or at some other time?
- (3) The proper referability issue : If the first issue is determined adversely to the Commissioner and the second issue in favour of Transurban, where the outgoing is " incurred " in the income years but will not fall due for payment until some uncertain time in the future, can the full amount of the outgoing nevertheless be said to be " properly referable " to the income years, and thus deductible in respect of those years?
18. Other issues were presented at various stages in these proceedings
[29]
The propounded deduction was an outgoing on capital account
19. The applicable principles : The primary question on the first issue is whether the concession fees are outgoings on capital account. What is the principle that distinguishes payments on capital account from payments on revenue account? The statutes alone do not answer this question.
20. Judges and commentators have been complaining about the income and capital dichotomy for more than a century. In
Inland Revenue Commissioners
v
British Salmson Aero Engines Ltd
[30]
" There have been many cases which fall on the border-line. Indeed, in many cases it is almost true to say that the spin of a coin would decide the matter almost as
ATC 4410
satisfactorily as an attempt to find reasons. But that class of question is a notorious one, and has been so for many years. "
The comments of Starke J in
Hallstroms Pty Ltd
v
Federal Commissioner of Taxation
[31]
21. The distinction between capital and revenue was examined in
BP Australia Ltd
v
Federal Commissioner of Taxation
[32]
" The solution to the problem is not to be found by any rigid test or description. It has to be derived from many aspects of the whole set of circumstances some of which may point in one direction, some in the other. One consideration may point so clearly that it dominates other and vaguer indications in the contrary direction. It is a commonsense appreciation of all the guiding features which must provide the ultimate answer. Although the categories of capital and income expenditure are distinct and easily ascertainable in obvious cases that lie far from the boundary, the line of distinction is often hard to draw in border line cases; and conflicting considerations may produce a situation where the answer turns on questions of emphasis and degree. That answer ' depends on what the expenditure is calculated to effect from a practical and business point of view, rather than upon the juristic classification of the legal rights, if any, secured, employed or exhausted in the process ' (per Dixon J in Hallstrom ' s Case [33]
(1946) 72 CLR 634 at 648. ). As each new case comes to be argued felicitous phrases from earlier judgments are used in argument by one side and the other. But those phrases are not the deciding factor, nor are they of unlimited application. They merely crystallize particular factors which may incline the scale in a particular case after a balance of all the considerations has been taken. "
22. In this Court, this analysis was taken a step further in
Federal Commissioner of Taxation
v
Energy Resources of Australia Ltd
[34]
" Where a taxpayer incurs loss or expense in raising funds by issuing promissory notes at a discount to their face value, its entitlement to a s 51 deduction for that loss or expense depends on the use to which the funds are to be put. If the funds are to be used as working capital, the cost of the discounts will be deductible as a revenue expense. If the funds are to be used to strengthen ' the business entity, structure, or organisation set up or established for the earning of profit ' , the cost of the discounts will generally not be deductible because they will be a capital, and not a revenue, expense. But sometimes the raising of capital may be such a recurrent event in the business life of a taxpayer that the cost of raising the capital will qualify as a revenue expense. "
23. Yet these were not new thoughts. In
Sun Newspapers Ltd and Associated Newspapers Ltd
v
Federal Commissioner of Taxation
[35]
" The distinction between expenditure and outgoings on revenue account and on capital account corresponds with the distinction between the business entity, structure, or organization set up or established for the earning of profit and the process by which such an organization operates to obtain regular returns by means of regular outlay, the difference between the outlay and returns representing profit or loss. "
24. Later in the same reasons, Dixon J made reference to what some would now call
"
guidelines
"
to which courts might refer in order to sharpen the foregoing distinction and to apply it to the facts of a particular case
[36]
" There are, I think, three matters to be considered, (a) the character of the advantage sought, and in this its lasting qualities may play a part, (b) the manner in which it is to be used, relied upon or enjoyed, and in this and under the former head recurrence may play its part, and (c) the means adopted to obtain it; that is, by providing a periodical reward or outlay to cover its use or enjoyment for periods commensurate with the payment or by making a final provision or payment so as to secure future use or enjoyment. "
25. Nearly a decade later, Dixon J returned to this issue. In the passage cited by the Privy Council in BP Australia , he explained that the tests for distinguishing revenue and capital
ATC 4411
expenditures invoke a commercial rather than a strictly legal or jurisprudential approach. In Hallstroms [37]" What is an outgoing of capital and what is an outgoing on account of revenue depends on what the expenditure is calculated to effect from a practical and business point of view, rather than upon the juristic classification of the legal rights, if any, secured, employed or exhausted in the process. "
26. Application to the facts
: The bundle of rights appearing in cl 2.8 of the Concession Deed were granted to Transurban once and for all. Such rights were a condition of Transurban
'
s being able to establish and operate the Project. The promise to pay the concession fees was made in return for the grant of that bundle of rights. The defining feature of the Project (and an essential commercial condition of its viability) was its connection, at both ends, with the existing, publicly owned freeway infrastructure
[38]
27. Transurban, in this way, acquired the right to establish a profit-yielding venture. To perfect the grant of rights to Transurban, the State gave Transurban essential access to those portions of Crown land over which the tollway was to be constructed
[39]
28. For my approach, I would adopt the comprehensive analysis of the facts expressed by the primary judge, his application of the foregoing statements of authority as to the applicable
discrimen
for distinguishing payments on revenue from those on capital account and his consequent conclusion that the concession fees, by these criteria, were outgoings of a capital nature. This is what the primary judge concluded
[41]
" [ W ] hen the matters stated by Dixon J in Sun Newspapers [42]
(1938) 61 CLR 337 at 363. are considered, the concession fees are of a capital nature. The advantages sought by the payment of the concession fees are to be characterised by reference to the services, facilities and entitlements contributed by the State. Those contributions … have lasting qualities, are of enduring benefit, are of a ' once and for all ' nature and form part of the profit yielding structure of City Link. The services, facilities and entitlements contributed by the State, when considered cumulatively, are not contributed, and are not used, relied upon or enjoyed, on a periodic or recurrent basis. Rather they, and the advantages derived from them, are to be used, relied upon, enjoyed and not derogated from throughout the term of the Concession. Finally, the means adopted to obtain the services, facilities and entitlements (ie, payment of concession fees) is not a periodic reward or outlay for the use and enjoyment of City Link for periods commensurate with the payment. Rather, payment of the fees is in fixed amounts payable at the end of the Concession Period with provision for earlier payment if certain financial conditions are satisfied. In summary, the concession fees are outgoings expended ' on the structure within which the profits were to be earned ' and were not ' part of the money earning process ' [43]. Accordingly, it must also follow that the concession fees are outgoings on capital, rather than revenue, account [44] BP Australia (1965) 112 CLR 386 at 398, 403-404; [ 1966 ] AC 224 at 266, 271.cf . "at 182 per Lockhart J. United Energy Ltd vCommissioner of Taxation (1997) 78 FCR 169
29. The evidence shows that the advantages for which the concession fees were payable were clearly of a permanent and enduring character. Those advantages, secured by the obligation to pay the concession fees, comprised the grant of the Concession for a period of approximately 38 years. Clearly, that was a capital asset because it was the indispensable part of the profit-yielding structure of Transurban. The Concession was relied upon and enjoyed by Transurban in the building of the infrastructure and then in operating it, as intended, over the concession period. Transurban obtained the Concession by undertaking the obligations provided in the Concession Deed and in the other Project documents. Those obligations included the performance of Transurban ' s promise to build and operate the tollway and to collect tolls and other revenue and to make payments to the State, including (relevantly) the concession fees.
30. Self-evidently, Transurban acquired the Concession in order to generate profits for its
ATC 4412
business through the operation of the tollway. This was an important capital asset so long as the Concession operated. With respect, the Full Court erred in concluding that the concession fees were " ultimately payable " [45]31. Unsurprisingly, the Full Court felt obliged to express the extent to which the concession fees were paid for the rights to design, construct and commission the tollway. The judges in the Full Court acknowledged that such rights
"
may be seen to confer an advantage of an enduring kind and therefore be capital
"
[46]
32. Without any supporting reasoning, the Full Court proceeded to conclude that
"
[
t
]
he concession fee can
thus
be seen to be paid for the right to operate the ring road system to be constructed by Transurban and to impose and collect tolls for the use of the system by motorists in accordance with the toll schedule
"
[47]
33. This conclusion is still further reinforced by the nature of the Concession that Transurban secured under its agreements with the State. It is impossible to disaggregate those rights and to divide them up. Clearly, in composite, they were undifferentiated, both in their operation and in their character. The concession fees which Transurban was bound to pay to the State were paid
"
in consideration of the State granting the concession rights set out in clause 2.8
"
[48]
34. The recurrent concession fees payable by Transurban are thus no more than the method agreed upon by Transurban and the State for payment by Transurban for a significant capital asset indispensable to the Project. It follows that the fees constitute an outgoing of capital or of a capital nature.
35. Expenditure necessary to the Project
: It is true that in
Cliffs International Inc
v
Federal Commissioner of Taxation
[49]
" the fact that payments are made or received in performance of a promise given as part of the consideration for the acquisition of a capital asset does not necessarily mean that the payments are themselves of a capital nature " .
36. However, Barwick CJ was dealing there with a case where the taxpayer, by its recurrent payments,
"
acquired nothing which it did not already have
"
[50]
37. The better view on this issue in
Cliffs International
was that stated by Gibbs J and Stephen J. In his reasons, Gibbs J
[51]
" the … payments should properly be regarded as expenditure necessary for the acquisition of property or of rights of a permanent character, the possession of which was a condition of carrying on the business … at all " .
Later, Gibbs J stated
[52]
" In my opinion, if the expenditure can be truly characterized as the payment of consideration for a capital asset or advantage, it will be of a capital nature notwithstanding that the payments are recurrent and are continued for an indefinite period. "
38.
ATC 4413
This approach is also consonant with that taken by Fullagar J inColonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [53]
" It does not matter how they are calculated, or how they are payable, or when they are payable, or whether they may for a period cease to be payable. If they are paid as parts of the purchase price of an asset forming part of the fixed capital of the company, they are outgoings of capital or of a capital nature. "
39. As in those cases, so in this. The payments of the concession fees formed part of the purchase price to secure an asset forming part of Transurban ' s fixed capital essential to the conduct on Crown land of the Project. As such, they were outgoings of capital or of a capital nature. The primary judge was correct to so hold.
40. No analogy to rent
: The Full Court came to its conclusion that the concession fees represented outgoings on revenue account by suggesting that those fees were akin to rental payments, to be treated separately from the other elements in the Concession giving rise to Transurban
'
s investment in the Project
[54]
41. In my respectful view, the Full Court
'
s rental analogy is unpersuasive. Transurban uses the tollway, designed, constructed, commissioned, operated, tolled, maintained and repaired by it, to raise revenue. It was also authorised by the Concession Deed to
"
raise revenues from other lawful uses of the Link approved by the State
…
until the end of the Concession Period, subject to and upon the terms of this Deed
"
[56]
42. Nor were the concession fees expressly payable only to allow Transurban possession of the land from time to time or to obtain an income flow from the use of the land. Clause 2.8 of the Concession Deed not only granted rights with commensurate obligations. It also ensured the support of the State for a project that included the many identified governmental acts necessary for its successful implementation. The State ' s control over the infrastructure denied to Transurban any right to use the asset constituting the Project in the same way as a lessee usually enjoys the use of property under a lease. Unlike in a lease, there was no pre-existing distinct property right held by the State that was made the subject of use or enjoyment by Transurban. The consideration given for the Concession was given for the conveyance of new rights and not merely for their use and enjoyment. Accordingly, on the facts, the analogy between the concession fees and rent is not sustained.
43. Additionally, an inherent feature of rent is that it typically involves a (generally regular) periodical payment. It is not a deferred payment payable over time. By way of contrast, the concession fees in the present case are, effectively, the deferred consideration payable by Transurban to secure the grant of the Concession essential to constituting the Project. The concession fees are not a series of periodic payments payable for the periodic use or enjoyment of the asset. It is true that periodic accrual, accounted for semi-annually and secured by the issue of Concession Notes, comprised the mechanism adopted for the quantification of the consideration given for the rights conferred. However, what Transurban acquired was a capital asset and an advantage of a capital nature. The concession fees were thus to be classified as the instalment payments for securing that asset and advantage.
44. The Commissioner submitted that, if any analogy to an outgoing on revenue account was needed for the concession fees, a more accurate one was a promise by a lessee to pay a premium in instalments on entering into the lease. Such a payment has been described as
"
a cash payment made to the lessor, and representing, or supposed to represent, the capital value of the difference between the actual rent and the best rent that might otherwise be obtained
"
[57]
ATC 4414
view, the promise to pay concession fees fits comfortably with the concept of a premium.45. I do not find it necessary to decide whether the payment of concession fees was analogous to some other form of payment incidental to a lease. It is enough to conclude that rent is fundamentally the consideration for the right to use property. The concession fees in this case were never payable simply for Transurban
'
s right to use land. The integrated benefits acquired and the inter-related obligations assumed future payments by Transurban for the acquisition of the Concession, which was incontestably a capital asset. They themselves therefore displayed the character of capital. The analogy to rent generally, or to rent specifically payable for a parking station lease (as the Full Court thought
[58]
46. Conclusion: on capital account : It follows that a correct application of the statutory provisions, explained in this Court ' s past authority, produces the conclusion that the characterisation adopted by the primary judge was the correct one.
47. I acknowledge that dicta can be found in the cases that appear to support Transurban ' s argument. On this issue, there have been so many judicial remarks that one feels embarrassed to add to them. Usually they are peppered with invocations as to how the expenditure can be " truly characterised " . Characterisation, in every branch of the law, is problematic and usually disputable. Different minds categorise payments on different sides of the income and capital divide. That is why, in new and unusual circumstances such as the present case, it is necessary to return to the statutory text and to the novel means adopted to acquire the Concession and thereby to secure, fund, establish, maintain and ultimately operate this major project of capital infrastructure.
48. To be accepted as the Project controller, Transurban had, at the one moment, to accept a series of interlocking agreements that represented an integrated payment for the capital asset it acquired for the designated period. Each part of the interlocking agreements was integral to, and dependent on, the others. The capital asset would not have been provided without the carrying out of each part. The concession fees are thus to be viewed, together, as the payment of consideration for this capital asset. This conclusion makes practical and business sense. And that is the approach proper to such questions, as this Court has repeatedly affirmed
[59]
49. Therefore, whilst accepting that on such issues different minds may reach different conclusions, a return to the statutory language, and the differentiation it accepts, persuades me that the primary judge ' s conclusion was the better one. It disclosed no error on this point. The Full Court ' s analysis was faulty and unpersuasive. The primary judge ' s conclusion should be restored.
Concession fees were not incurred in the income years
50. The remaining questions : Having reached the foregoing conclusion, it is strictly unnecessary for me to consider the remaining issues in this appeal. They arise only if the concession fees are properly to be characterised as outgoings on revenue account. Nevertheless, out of respect for the parties ' arguments, and in case I am wrong in the foregoing conclusion, I will offer my opinion on the chief remaining issues.
51. If one returns to the statutory language and the division it postulates between the income and capital accounts, there are serious factual oddities that militate against a conclusion that the concession fees, for which Transurban seeks deduction from its income tax obligations, were
"
incurred
"
in the income years. Transurban claimed a deduction for each year of income for which it incurred a liability to pay concession fees although no amount was actually paid to the State in respect of those fees in the relevant taxation years. During those years, the tollway was still being constructed. No tolls were collected. It was this feature of the evidence that led McHugh J, in the special leave hearing in relation to this appeal, to observe
[60]
" [ Y ] ou have been allowed a deduction of $ 95 million which you do not pay until [ 2013 on the base case ] …
[ T ] he words of section 51 … talk [ ] about an outgoing …
ATC 4415
[ A ] rguably, this is a case of form triumphing over substance.…
[ W ] hen you talk about ' present liability ' you are putting a gloss on the words of the section. … [ H ] ere you have a situation where you pay rent, $ 95 million, you discharge the liability by issuing a note, and the concession note, on one theoretical view, may never be payable at all. "
52. These remarks were stated tentatively. They did not represent considered judicial conclusions and doubtless they reflect various imperfections. However, they highlight the intuitive oddity of the outcome upheld by the decision of the Full Court. They require this Court to scrutinise that outcome closely, to ensure that it accords with the text and purposes of the legislation. On the face of things, that seems unlikely. But have we, by judicial glossing of the legislation, reached such an outcome?
53. The Commissioner ' s submissions : On the assumption that liability for the concession fees was " incurred " , the Commissioner submitted that nonetheless such fees were not outgoings incurred in the years of income, within the applicable provisions. He submitted, first, that the payments were not due until the conditions stated in cl 1.9 of the Master Security Deed and the conditions in Pt 3 of the Concession Notes were satisfied. He argued that these conditions had not been satisfied in the income years. He further submitted that the payments were not " properly referable " to the years of income. He also argued that for the concession fees to be deductible in full in the income years, long before they would fall due for payment, was truly an anomalous outcome. This was particularly so given the large discrepancy between the face value and the net present value of the concession fees in the respective years of income.
54. The Commissioner argued that this Court should hold that, where a contract provides that a contractual obligation to make a payment in the year of income is subject to conditions which defer payment indefinitely, or for a very long time in the future, at nil or negligible present cost, the obligation is not " incurred " in the relevant sense. He urged that the applicable statutory provisions contemplated that only the actual expenses of carrying on an income-earning activity in the year of income would be deductible in that year. This submission was made on the footing that the words " loss or outgoing " include debts but only if they have " come home " as a loss or outgoing and are " properly referable " to the income year. The concession fees, he suggested, did not answer to these descriptions.
55. Looking afresh at the language of the legislation and its apparent purpose and assuming, contrary to my primary conclusion, that the concession fees are to be characterised as payable on revenue account, I would accept these submissions and uphold the Commissioner ' s arguments.
56. Concession fees were not incurred
: The trial judge, with apparent reluctance
[61]
57. The practical effect of these conditions was that the State ' s entitlement to demand payment was dependent upon the traffic levels, revenue and available cash flows arising from the operation of the tollway.
58. Transurban elected to issue Concession Notes with respect to the amounts of concession fees in the income years. However, the State can demand payment only when the conditions for presentation in Pt 3 of the Concession Notes are satisfied. In the absence of satisfaction of the conditions in Pt 3(b) or (c) of the Concession Notes, the State is entitled, under Pt 3(a), to present the Concession Notes within one year of the Expiry Date for payment on the Expiry Date. Like any claim for payment under Pt 3(b) and Pt 3(c)(ii), if the relevant conditions are satisfied, it is subject to cl 1.9 of the Master
ATC 4416
Security Deed. It is uncertain whether these conditions will be satisfied either by this time or before the end of the Concession (be that at the Expiry Date or another time).59. In
New Zealand Flax Investments Ltd
v
Federal Commissioner of Taxation
[63]
60. In
Nilsen Development Laboratories Pty Ltd
v
Federal Commissioner of Taxation
[64]
61. In his reasons in
Nilsen Development
, Gibbs J explained that an actual entitlement to payment was necessary to sustain the conclusion that an obligation was
"
incurred
"
[65]
" The employees were entitled to leave, but they were not entitled to payment. The entitlement to payment would not arise until the employees took leave (or died or left the employment). The event on which the entitlement … to payment depended had not occurred. There was a certainty that a liability to make payments in respect of leave would arise in the future, but it had not arisen. The present is not a case in which there was an immediate obligation to make payment in the future, or a defeasible obligation to pay, or a present obligation which as a matter of law was unenforceable - there was no accrued obligation to make any payment at all. There was no loss or outgoing ' incurred ' within s 51(1). "
Similarly, Barwick CJ in
Nilsen Development
said
[66]
" [ T ] here can be no warrant for treating a liability which has not ' come home ' in the year of income, in the sense of a pecuniary obligation which has become due, as having been incurred in that year. Sir John Latham ' s language in
Emu Bay Railway Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [67](1944) 71 CLR 596 at 606. clearly enough indicates that to satisfy the word ' incurred ' in s 51(1) the liability must be ' presently incurred and due though not yet discharged ' . The ' liability ' of which Sir John speaks is of necessity a pecuniary liability and the word ' presently ' refers to the year of income in respect of which a deduction is claimed. It may not disqualify the liability as a deduction that, though due, it may be paid in a later year. That part of Sir Owen Dixon ' s statement in New Zealand Flax Investments [68](1938) 61 CLR 179 at 207. which presently needs emphasis is that the word ' incurred ' … ' does not include a loss or expenditure which is no more than pending, threatened or expected ' : and I would for myself add ' no matter how certain it is in the year of income that that loss or expenditure will occur in the future ' . "
62. Conclusion: liability not incurred
: A deduction need not be referable to income actually derived in a specific tax year
[69]
Steele
v
Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation
[71]
" The words ' to the extent to which ' contradict a complete divorce between [ the assessable income and the incurring of ' losses and outgoings ' ] . The word ' in ' also suggests the necessity of a connection between the ' losses and outgoings ' in question and the real possibility of ' assessable income ' . Further, the very notion of ' allowable deductions ' , so described, suggests a relationship of some kind between the ' losses and outgoings ' in question and ' the assessable income ' . "
63. It follows in the case of such a loss or outgoing, due in the year of income but payable
ATC 4417
in the future, that the liability must have " come home " [72]64. In the present case, Transurban ' s obligation had not " come home " . The concession fees were " owing " in a notional sense. However, they were not " due for payment " . This was because of the payment conditions. Transurban did not, therefore, " incur " an obligation to pay the concession fees until those conditions were satisfied. Until then, the obligation in respect of the concession fees remained " impending, threatened or expected " . Accordingly, Transurban had only a " hope " or " expectation " of a loss or outgoing. No such loss or outgoing had actually been " incurred " . The Commissioner was therefore correct, on this ground, to reject the deduction claimed by Transurban.
The fees were not referable to the income years
65. Concession fees: a future expense
: In
Coles Myer Finance Ltd
v
Federal Commissioner of Taxation
[73]
66. Upon the present hypothesis, in the present case, the concession fees in issue are a future expense of Transurban
'
s business operations. They actually fall to be met out of future assessable income
[75]
67. Before the primary judge, in reliance upon that authority, the Commissioner argued that the concession fees were
"
referable
"
to the years of income during which they would actually fall due for payment. In my opinion, that submission was correct. It postulates an approach which appears consistent with the language and purpose of the legislation. It is reinforced by the following observations of Dixon J in
Commissioner of Taxation (NSW)
v
Ash
[76]
" Where the reason for allowing a deduction is that it is a normal or recurrent expenditure or an expenditure which is fairly incident to the carrying on of the business, it is evident that it can seldom be associated with any particular item on the revenue side against which to set it, and, as the ground of its allowance is that it is an incident or accident, something concomitant to the conduct of the business, it follows that to deduct it in the year when it falls to be met is consistent with the reason for deducting it and conforms with business principles. "
68. The primary judge rejected the Commissioner
'
s submission in this respect. He did so because he considered that to allow deductions for concession fees in the year that they fall due for payment could potentially distort Transurban
'
s operations on revenue account
[77]
69. Such distortions may be readily avoided by adopting the
"
reflex principle
"
which this Court explained in
Carden
'
s Case
[78]
" In the present case we are concerned with rival methods of accounting directed to the
ATC 4418
same purpose, namely, the purpose of ascertaining the true income. Unless in the statute itself some definite direction is discoverable, I think that the admissibility of the method which in fact has been pursued must depend upon its actual appropriateness. In other words, the inquiry should be whether in the circumstances of the case it is calculated to give a substantially correct reflex of the taxpayer ' s true income … Speaking generally, in the assessment of income the object is to discover what gains have during the period of account come home to the taxpayer in a realized or immediately realizable form. "
70. Conclusion: no correct reflex : A correct reflex of Transurban ' s income was obliged to take into account the following facts:
- (1) No amount would be derived through the operation of the Project until some time after the income years;
- (2) The Concession Notes were not interest-bearing. The true cost to Transurban was thus far less than the face value of the Concession Notes. In fact, that cost decreased the longer the period of time for which they were to be held before being presented for payment. The Project documents forecast that the payment of Concession Notes would not be a demand on revenues in the income years because it would be many years before the preconditions for presentation of the Concession Notes would probably be satisfied;
- (3) By contrast, the value of the benefits enjoyed by Transurban, from the grant of the Concession, was projected to increase in later years; and
- (4) The expected source of funds for payment of the concession fees was the returns enjoyed by Transurban in the later years of the Project.
71. The anomaly of this result was recognised, and called to attention, by the primary judge. Obviously, it is a result having a considerable potential for tax avoidance. The primary judge was right to perceive the anomaly. He should have given effect to his intuition. As I have shown, it is supported by the authority of this Court.
72. A straight line apportionment was the approach taken by this Court in
Coles Myer
for allocating the discount on the accommodation bills and notes in issue there in each income year. If this approach is followed, no deductions would be allowable to Transurban in any of the income years because the trial judge held that the net present value of the concession fees, in those years, was nil, or negligible. In the trial, the Finance Director of Transurban, Mr Phillips, gave evidence that, if the concession fees were only deductible when payable (that is, when the Concession Notes were redeemed), their net present value was
"
nil
"
[80]
Outcome and orders
73. My conclusion is that the concession fees, on the assumption that they were incurred in the income years and were properly referable to those years, were not deductible because they were capital in nature. If, however, the concession fees were to be classified as an outgoing on revenue account they were not deductible because, on the evidence, they were not outgoings " incurred " in the income years. Any future obligation was neither satisfied in, nor properly referable to, those years.
74. On this basis, the conditions for deductibility stated in the applicable income tax legislation for the income years were not established. The Commissioner was therefore right to disallow the claims. The Full Court erred in upholding Transurban ' s objections to the Commissioner ' s assessments.
75. To give effect to these conclusions the following orders should be made. The appeal should be allowed with costs. The judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia should be set aside. In place of that judgment, this Court should order that the appeal to the Full Court be dismissed with costs.
Footnotes
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