W & A McArthur Ltd
v Queensland

Judges: Knox CJ
Isaacs J
Higgins J
Gavan Duffy J

Rich JStarke J

Sydney.

Decision by:
Rich J

RICH J. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of my learned brothers the Chief Justice and Isaacs and Starke, and, agreeing with that judgment on all points, I should, but for one circumstance, have contended myself with simply stating my concurrence; but the circumstance that I am departing from my judgment in Duncan's Case ^[F33] makes it proper for me to say why I do so. In Duncan's Case the judgment in which I took part was founded substantially, so far as I am concerned, on what I considered the "real object" of the Act. But for that, my judgment would have been the other way, in accordance with the view I had already expressed in Foggitt, Jones & Co v New South Wales ^[F34] . In McCawley v The King ^[F35] I had to reconsider what was meant by the "object" of an Act. At p. 65 I stated, in conjunction with my brother Isaacs, the conclusion I then came to on that subject by the light of the opinions of Sir Roundell Palmer and Sir Robert Collier, and of judicial opinions referred to on the page mentioned. That conclusion was that "the object" of an Act is to be gathered from its necessary effect, and not from some purpose or motive which the Legislature may be supposed to have had. That conclusion was at the root of my judgment in McCawley's Case, and is opposed to the view which had been acted on by me previously in Duncan's Case. My later view has met with the approval of the Privy Council in McCawley's Case ^[F36] . It necessarily follows that, since I agree with the judgment of the Chief Justice and Isaacs and Starke JJ. in every other respect, my judgment in Duncan's Case presents no obstacle, and I join with them in their judgment.