Between: State of South Australia and Anor - Plaintiffs
And: Commonwealth of Australia and Anor - Defendants
Between: State of Victoria and Anor - Plaintiffs
And: Commonwealth of Australia and Anor - Defendants
Between: State of Queensland and Anor - Plaintiffs
And: Commonwealth of Australia and Anor - Defendants
Between: State of Western Australia and Anor - Plaintiffs
And: Commonwealth of Australia and Anor - Defendants

Judges: Latham CJ
Rich J
Starke J
McTiernan J

Williams J

Judgment date: 23 July 1942

Judgment by:
Williams J

In these actions four States, South Australia, Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia, and their respective Attorney-Generals, have each sued the Commonwealth of Australia and its Treasurer claiming a declaration that the whole or some one or more of the following Acts, the States Grants (Income Tax Reimbursement) Act, No. 20 of 1942 , the Income Tax (War-time Arrangements) Act, No. 21 of 1942 , the Income Tax Assessment Act, No. 22 of 1942 , and the Income Tax Act, No. 23 of 1942 , or some part or parts thereof, are or is ultra vires the Parliament of the Commonwealth and are or is unconstitutional and invalid and the scheme of uniform taxation embodied in these Acts is unconstitutional and invalid.

The surrounding circumstances under which the four Acts were passed can be shortly stated as follows:-

Since 1915 the Commonwealth and the States have each been levying income taxes, with the result that, during the financial year commencing on 1st July 1941, there were in the Commonwealth and the several States some twenty-three taxes on income, many of them differing not only in the rate but also in the basis of assessment. Since the outbreak of war, the Commonwealth Parliament has been increasing the rates of Federal income tax, particularly on the higher incomes, to an unprecedented extent. Most taxpayers who have to pay Commonwealth income tax have also to pay income tax in at least one of the States. As the incidence of taxation varies considerably in the States, the Commonwealth Government has not been able to use for its own purposes what it considers to be the full taxable capacity of many taxpayers in a less highly taxed State without imposing an unsupportable burden on a taxpayer at the same income-tax level in a more highly taxed State, by reason of the aggregate of Commonwealth and State taxes. In some cases the combined rates of these taxes for the above financial year exceeded twenty shillings in the pound. The taxable capacity of the community has been rising, largely from the defence expenditure of the Commonwealth. The States, in addition to increased receipts from their railways, have been relieved from expenditure on unemployment, which has greatly decreased, and the Commonwealth has assumed responsibility for child endowment and widows' pensions.

The Commonwealth Government considers that, as the financial responsibilities of the States have diminished, whilst its own expenditure has increased enormously, the only amount of revenue previously derived from income tax which can be made available to the States during the further continuance of the war, without prejudice to its own growing requirements, will be an amount in the case of each State approximately equal to the average of the amounts raised by that State by means of income tax in the financial years commencing 1st July 1939 and 1st July 1940. The amounts payable to each State on this basis are those which appear in the schedule to the Grants Act. The Commonwealth Government also considers there is a serious waste of manpower involved in the administration of twenty-three different taxes by the taxation departments, and in taxpayers having to comply with several Acts, many of which require the payment of the tax in instalments by deductions from wages and dividends. In these circumstances the four Acts were passed, all being assented to on 7th June 1942 .

The Grants Act came into operation on 1st July 1942 , while the other three Acts came into operation on the day they received the Royal Assent. The Grants Act and the War-time Arrangements Act each contain a concluding section that they shall continue in operation until the last day of the first financial year to commence after the date on which His Majesty ceases to be engaged in the present war, and no longer. The preamble to the War-time Arrangements Act states that it is necessary or convenient to provide for the matters set out in the Act with a view to the public safety and defence of the Commonwealth and the several States and for the more effectual prosecution of the war in which His Majesty is engaged.

By sec. 4 of the Grants Act it is provided that, in every financial year during which the Act is in operation in respect of which the Commonwealth Treasurer is satisfied that a State has not imposed a tax upon incomes, there shall be payable by way of financial assistance to that State the amount set forth in the schedule to the Act against the name of that State, less an amount equal to any arrears of tax collected by or on behalf of that State during that financial year.

Sec. 31 of the Assessment Act provides (so far as material) that, for the better securing to the Commonwealth of the revenue required for the efficient prosecution of the present war, a taxpayer shall not pay any tax imposed by or under any State Act on the income of any year of income in respect of which tax is imposed by or under any Act with which this Act is incorporated until he has paid that last-mentioned tax or has received from the Commissioner a certificate notifying him that the tax is no longer payable. Sec. 32 provides that the amendments effected by the Act, other than that effected by sec. 31, shall apply to all assessments for the financial year beginning on 1st July 1942 and all subsequent years.

The Tax Act, sec. 7, provides that the tax imposed by the Act shall be levied and paid for the financial year beginning on 1st July 1942 , and that, until the commencement of the Act for the levying and payment of income tax for the financial year beginning on 1st July 1943, the Act shall also apply for all financial years subsequent to that beginning on 1st July 1942 .

Several decisions of the Privy Council, including Attorney-General for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers ^[F183] , In re Insurance Act of Canada ^[F184] , Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada ^[F185] , W. R. Moran Pty. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (N.S.W.) ^[F186] , and the decision of this Court in R. v. Barger ^[F187] , establish that, when the question for determination is whether an Act of Parliament infringes some overriding constitutional provision, the Court must examine the substance and purpose of the Act in order to discover what it is the legislature is really doing. Where there are several Acts having, as in the present case, a clear interaction, the Court is entitled to investigate the substance and purpose of each Act in the light of the knowledge disclosed by them all.

The Tax Act is an Act which levies an income tax estimated to produce £145,000,000. The rates rise steeply, reaching 18s. in the pound at £2,100 on income from property, and 16s. 6d. in the pound at £2,500 and 18s. in the pound at £4,000 on income from personal exertion. As the Act imposes the same rates of tax on all incomes which it taxes, it does not discriminate between States or parts of States considered as geographical entities, and therefore complies with sec. 51 (ii.) of the Constitution (Cameron v. Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Tas.) ^[F188] ). It deals with one subject of taxation only, and so conforms to sec. 55 of the Constitution. The States admit that if the Commonwealth Parliament had passed the Tax Act alone, this would have had the practical economic effect of driving the States out of this field of taxation at least in the case of the higher incomes, if they do not desire to bankrupt many of their citizens, leaving them at most with a limited field amongst the lower incomes capable of actual exploitation. They contend, however, that but for the Grants Act, by which the Commonwealth proposes to reimburse the States for the loss of income tax to the extent of £33,489,000, the Parliament could have imposed lower rates sufficient to raise a total amount reduced by this sum, in which event a taxable margin would have been left out of which the States could raise a sufficient sum by way of income tax for their own purposes without exceeding the financial capacity of their citizens. But to draw such a conclusion would be pure surmise. If the Grants Act is valid, such assistance would be a Federal purpose under sec. 96 of the Constitution. None of the Acts provide for any rebates, if the States refuse the grants. The whole £145,000,000 is called up finally in any event. It is all payable, like other revenue of the Commonwealth, into the Consolidated Revenue Fund. No part of it is earmarked to pay the grants. At a time when the Commonwealth is floating frequent loans to enable it to meet its commitments, it is idle to suggest that the whole of the tax is not required for Federal purposes. The Tax Act is, in my opinion, an unexceptionable, if to many people a somewhat painful, exercise of the power to tax.

It was strongly urged that the condition in sec. 4 of the Grants Act is unlawful because it requires a State to surrender its sovereign rights to levy income tax in order to qualify for a grant. Sec. 96 of the Constitution authorizes the Commonwealth Parliament to grant financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit. The grants to each State are not made conditional upon acceptance by all the States. A separate offer is made to each State. The offer is made upon an annual basis, so that if a State which accepts a grant the first year finds it an insufficient reimbursement it will be able to refuse the grant in subsequent years. There is no illegal interference with the sovereignty of the States, because the matter of levying or not levying their own income tax is left entirely to the discretion of their own Parliaments. An analogous case would be where the Commonwealth Parliament offered a State assistance on condition it ceased to carry on the mining of a profitable ore, which the Commonwealth thought it was inadvisable to exhaust in the national interest, the Commonwealth offering the State assistance under sec. 96 to offset the loss of revenue it would suffer by doing so. The present case may be summed up as follows. The Parliament, when the Commonwealth is in imminent danger, considers that it is not in the national interest for the States to levy income tax. But it recognizes that, if they co-operate by agreeing not to do so, they will require financial assistance to reimburse them for their loss of revenue. So it makes its offer of assistance dependent on their co-operation. The condition is one which is capable of aiding in the defence of the realm. Sec. 5 offers an inducement to the States to collect their arrears of tax in respect of the financial years up to and including that of 1st July 1941. It is a fair and equitable provision, as it gives to all States ultimately the benefit of all the taxes they levied prior to the Tax Act coming into force. Faint objection was taken to sec. 6 of the Act on the ground that Parliament and not the Treasurer must fix the amount of a grant; but, as Latham C.J. pointed out in Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (N.S.W.) v. W. R. Moran Pty. Ltd. ^[F189] , where several authorities are cited: "It is too late now to argue that terms and conditions determined by a Minister under such legislation are not determined by the Parliament." The allotments to the State are not made on any ratable basis, but sec. 96 does not prohibit discrimination, and grants may be made to one State and not to others and between the States on an unequal basis. Under the circumstances the Grants Act is, in my opinion, a valid exercise by the Parliament of its powers under sec. 96.

Although the language of sec. 31 of the Assessment Act is not as clear as it might be, I agree with Mr. Ham that it means Commonwealth income tax on the income of any year of income must be paid in priority to the State tax for that year of income, so that, once the Commonwealth tax for any financial year has been paid, the section does not prevent a taxpayer from then paying his State tax for that financial year. Counsel for the States contended that, as both the Commonwealth and State Parliaments are entitled by the exercise of their sovereign rights to impose income tax, there can be no inconsistency between the two impositions, each of which operates concurrently but independently of the other, so that it is not an exercise of the taxing power or incidental thereto for the Commonwealth to provide that its tax shall be paid in priority to that of a State. But the Privy Council in In re Silver Bros. Ltd. ^[F190] , and the majority of the Justices of this Court in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Official Liquidator of E. O. Farley Ltd. ^[F191] , appear to me to have considered, I would respectfully say correctly, that it is possible for the Canadian and Australian national Parliaments respectively, by aptly framed legislation, to give priority to their taxation statutes over those of the Provinces in the case of Canada and of the States in the case of Australia, where they come into conflict in the same field in the sense that a taxpayer who has to pay the two exactions is unlikely to be able to meet them both in full. In In re Silver Bros. Ltd. ^[F192] Viscount Dunedin said: "The two taxations, Dominion and Provincial, can stand side by side without interfering with each other, but as soon as you come to the concomitant privileges of absolute priority they cannot stand side by side and must clash; consequently the Dominion must prevail." After pointing out, quite rightly, that each of these decisions relates to the liquidation of a company, counsel for the States contended in the alternative that, even if the Commonwealth can make its tax a prior charge upon a taxpayer's assets, it would still not be incidental to the taxation power to prevent a taxpayer from paying his debts, including a State assessment, as they become due. It would be impossible to make an income tax a fixed charge on a taxpayer's assets generally, some of which he is acquiring and disposing of from day to day, while many taxpayers would not possess particular assets of an appropriate nature to be charged specifically. Grave difficulties would be encountered in evolving and heavy expense incurred in administering a system of fixed charges. The only practical way, therefore, to prefer the Commonwealth debt would be to provide that it should be paid in priority to the State debt. To do this would not be to manufacture inconsistency between Federal and State laws. It would be a means of aiding the effective operation of the power comparable to the right of the Commonwealth under the borrowing power, sec. 51 (iv.), to make its loans attractive to investors by freeing them from State taxation (The Commonwealth v. Queensland ^[F193] ). It would be strange if the Commonwealth could protect interest on its loans from State taxes, but could not take effective measures against the States to ensure the getting in of revenue required to pay the interest. The section is, in my opinion, a valid exercise of power.

Under arrangements made with the States pursuant to the Income Tax Collection Act 1923 the Commonwealth in Western Australia is at present collecting its own income tax and the income tax of that State through its own income tax department, while, in the other States, the State income tax departments are collecting their own income tax and that of the Commonwealth. The affidavits filed on behalf of the States show that they each maintain a department for the collection of State income taxes, in which a large staff is employed consisting of officers the senior members of whom have spent many years in the department and thereby acquired a specialized knowledge of the administration of the State's income tax Acts. Each department uses for the purposes of its work large numbers of typewriters, adding machines and other mechanical equipment. They are housed in extensive offices in their respective capital cities, and, in the present conditions, it would be impossible or impracticable to replace their personnel or equipment or to find other suitable premises for their accommodation.

The Arrangements Act provides for the suspension of the existing arrangements with the States for the assessment and collection of income tax, and the assessment and collection of the tax imposed by the Tax Act in all States by the Commonwealth from a date fixed by proclamation until the Act ceases to operate; for the compulsory temporary transfer of officers employed by the States in assessing and collecting income tax to the Public Service of the Commonwealth and their subsequent retransfer to the States; for the compulsory temporary use by the Commonwealth of any office accommodation, furniture and equipment owned by a State; and for the compulsory permanent acquisition by the Commonwealth of any records in the possession of a State relating to the assessment and collection of Commonwealth income tax. The Act applies to all State servants, permanent or temporary. The transfer to the Commonwealth Public Service is effected by the Treasurer of the Commonwealth addressing a notice in writing to the Treasurer of a State. The transfer can be called for if, in the opinion of the Treasurer of the Commonwealth, it is necessary for the efficient collection of revenue required for the prosecution of the war, for the effective use of manpower, or otherwise for the defence of the Commonwealth. The rights conferred upon the Treasurer of the Commonwealth with respect to the office accommodation, furniture and equipment of the States are also very extensive. He can demand the temporary possession and exclusive use of this property for the Commonwealth when it is required for the efficient collection of revenue, for the effective use of manpower, or otherwise for the defence of the Commonwealth. The Act provides that, in default of agreement between the parties, compensation for the possession and use of such property and the obligations of the Commonwealth with respect to keeping it in good order and repair and otherwise shall be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Governor-General. No compensation is provided for the acquisition of the returns and records, but the States are given the right to have access to and inspect those which relate to the assessment or collection of any tax imposed upon income by or under any law of the State. No argument was addressed to the Court whether the entry into the possession and use of the office accommodation, furniture and equipment or the transfer of the returns and records would be an acquisition by the Commonwealth of State property within the meaning of sec. 51 (xxxi.); or whether, if it is, provision for an arbitration by an arbitrator appointed by the Federal Executive Council and therefore in effect by one of the parties is a compliance with the placitum; or whether a right given to a State, from whom the returns or records are acquired, to have access to and to inspect them is a fair equivalent for their value; so I shall not express any opinion on these points. It is obvious from the framework of the Act as a whole that it is sought to justify its constitutional validity as an exercise of the defence power. In what Mr. Ham described as the piping times of peace there could be no question, I should imagine, that the collection of taxes would be incidental to the execution of the taxation and not the defence power. The defence power does not become in time of war a paramount power (Andrews v. Howell ^[F194] , per Starke J.), but, as Dixon J. pointed out in the same case ^[F195] , though its meaning does not change, "its application depends upon facts, and as those facts change so may its actual operation as a power enabling the legislature to make a particular law." In Farey v. Burvett ^[F196] Isaacs J. said: (It is) "a power which is commensurate with the peril it is designed to encounter, or as that peril may appear to the Parliament itself; and, if need be, it is a power to command, control, organize and regulate, for the purpose of guarding against that peril the whole resources of the continent, living and inert, and the activities of every inhabitant of the territory. The problem of national defence is not confined to operations on the battlefield or the deck of a man-of-war; its factors enter into every phase of life, and embrace the co-operation of every individual with all that he possesses-his property, his energy, his life itself." The necessary steps to meet the peril depend so greatly upon the knowledge of the Parliament and the Executive it controls that the Court, in determining whether a particular Act is within the ambit of the power, is only concerned to see that its provisions are such as to be capable even incidentally of aiding the effectuation of the power. After that the Court must stay its hand, for "no authority other than the central Government is in a position to deal with the problem which is essentially one of statesmanship" (per Viscount Haldane when delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Fort Francis Pulp and Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co. ^[F197] ).

In Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. ^[F198] , Knox C.J., Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ., in their joint judgment, said:-

"It is undoubted that those who maintain the authority of the Commonwealth Parliament to pass a certain law should be able to point to some enumerated power containing the requisite authority. But we also hold that, where the affirmative terms of a stated power would justify an enactment, it rests upon those who rely on some limitation or restriction upon the power, to indicate it in the Constitution" ^[F199] .

It was there held that States and their agencies, when parties to industrial disputes in fact, are subject to Commonwealth legislation under placitum xxxv. of sec. 51 of the Constitution, if such legislation on its true construction applies to them. This is because, when States become merchants and traders and engage in industrial activities which the general public may carry on, the subject matter of the power conferred on the Parliament by this placitum is such as to embrace States acting in such a capacity as well as individuals within its scope.

Applying the principles laid down in the Engineers' Case ^[F200] , there can be no doubt, in my opinion, that States, like individuals, are within the ambit of the defence power, so that, where it is incidental to the execution of the power to take some action to meet an emergency which affects rights which in normal times are within the domain exclusively reserved to the States by the Constitution, the Commonwealth Parliament can do so. In Farey v. Burvett ^[F201] legislation under the power was held to be valid, although relating to a subject matter, i.e., the price of bread, which in times of peace would have been only within the powers of the States. Any attempt at State legislation on this subject which came into collision with the Federal Act would have been to that extent void under sec. 109 of the Constitution. But in times of peace the State legislation would have been valid and the Commonwealth legislation invalid. In mobilizing the resources of the nation under the defence power, the Parliament has the same right to call for the services of those employed by the States as of those employed by private employers, and the same power to enter into possession of property owned by the States as in the case of property privately owned. If the real substance and purpose of a statute is incidental to defence, then, however seriously its operation may hinder the carrying on of the government of a State, this would simply be the indirect result of the lawful action of the Commonwealth undertaken to meet the national emergency. It is one thing for the Commonwealth Parliament to attempt directly to prevent a State exercising its legislative, judicial, or executive functions, which would be an illegal interference with the prerogative rights of the State, and quite another thing to claim the services of a body of individuals employed by or the possession of property owned by a State where the employees and property are organized, as they are here, so as to possess some special attribute capable of advancing the total war effort. But legislation which appears to discriminate against a State by the mass transfer of its public officers in one department and the exclusive acquisition of its property must be carefully scrutinized to see that its real substance and purpose is to assist defence and not under colour of such a purpose to intermeddle in the sovereignty of a State. The affidavits filed on behalf of the States themselves show that the collection of the new tax would be gravely impeded if the Commonwealth had to organize a new department in every State except Western Australia. It was suggested that the existing arrangements, which have worked satisfactorily since 1923, should be allowed to continue. Their provisions are not before us, but it appears that they would have to be at least revised because, if the Commonwealth is to become during the war the sole income-tax authority, the expense which is now shared between the Commonwealth and the States will become the sole burden of the Commonwealth. The only reason Mr. Ham gave for the Commonwealth requiring a transfer of the officers and accommodation was that, as the tax was being collected on behalf of the Commonwealth, it ought to have control of its own affairs. It is not for us to weigh the merits of this reason. The question whether the Commonwealth should have direct control or should have to rely upon an agent to perform this important work is one of policy which must be decided by the Government and not by the Court. It is clear that an Act to enable the Treasurer to get in expeditiously the sinews of war to the extent of £145,000,000 can assist in the prosecution of the war, and is, therefore, incidental to the execution of the power of defence. If the Commonwealth could call up all officers by some form of legislation, and this must, I think, be conceded, it is a matter of convenience and not of substance that the Act provides for the Treasurer of the Commonwealth giving the notice to the Treasurer of a State instead of to each officer personally.

Secs. 5-10 of the Act contain provisions with respect to the pay of transferred officers whilst in the service of the Commonwealth and their rights on death, retirement, or at the conclusion of their service with the Commonwealth. Whilst they are employed by the Commonwealth they are to receive the same pay from the Commonwealth as, but for the transfer, they would have received from the State. Upon retirement they are retransferred to the State and become entitled to the same pension and other benefits they would have received if they had not been transferred. The sections provide for the continuation of payments to superannuation funds by the officers themselves, and the Commonwealth making the same payments as a State would have made if they had been serving the State. The Commonwealth also contributes to pensions or other payments which dependents of officers who die become entitled to receive from the State, the respective obligations of the Commonwealth and the State being adjusted on the basis of the officers' length of service with the Commonwealth and the State. A transferred officer is deemed to be an officer of the State for the purpose of promotion or transfer from a temporary to a permanent position. The purpose of the sections is to provide a scheme to prevent officers suffering from the temporary transfer, the Commonwealth taking over a fair share of the burdens of any emoluments which would have accrued from long service if their employment by the State had been continuous. In America it has been held that, under the commerce power, Congress can legislate to prevent any person engaging in unfair labour practices which affect commerce. The National Labor Relations Act 1935, after defining unfair labour practices, by sec. 10 (c) authorized a Board to require the reinstatement of employees who had been discharged for engaging in trade union activities which the Act authorized them to engage in against the wishes of their employers. The Supreme Court held the provision to be valid. It did not interfere with the contractual relationship of the parties except to the extent necessary to give effect to the policy of the Act (National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation ^[F202] ). So, under the defence power, the Commonwealth can, in my opinion, legislate with respect to the reinstatement of citizens called up for some national duty, to prevent them being prejudiced in their civil employment when their services are no longer required for this purpose. The present Act purports to do nothing more. It does not deprive the States of any rights the States would have against the officers on the basis that they had not been transferred. The States can legislate as freely as before to affect any existing rights of public servants with respect to pay, contributions to superannuation funds, amounts of pensions, and so on, and the officers transferred to the Commonwealth will be bound by all such legislation. If the Commonwealth Parliament can pass legislation making awards binding on the States under the conciliation and arbitration power, it would be a strange result if, under the defence power, it cannot legislate with respect to the reinstatement of men employed by a State and called up by the Commonwealth for national service in the same way as it can legislate for this purpose with respect to private employers. It is suggested that the powers conferred on the Treasurer are in terms wide enough to enable him to call up any officers whom a State, in order to collect arrears of or to levy its own income tax, might engage from time to time to replace those who had been transferred, and to take possession of any new office accommodation they might commence to use for this purpose; but the Treasurer can only call up officers, on the recommendation of the Public Service Board, if they are required in the Public Service of the Commonwealth for one of the three purposes mentioned; and it is preposterous to believe that the Public Service Board and the Treasurer would conspire together to call them up when they were not required, and thereby deliberately overstaff the Commonwealth Public Service at the expense of the taxpayers in order to deprive a State of their services. To do so would be to make a colourable use of the power which could be restrained by the Court. The Grants Act, sec. 4, contemplates that existing arrears of State income tax will be collected, if necessary, by the Commonwealth, and it is to the advantage of both the Commonwealth and the States that they should be got in.

The Arrangements Act is, in my opinion, a valid exercise of the defence power. As it is with considerable diffidence that I have reached a different conclusion from that arrived at by the Chief Justice and my brother Starke with respect to the validity of this Act, I desire to say that, even I considered the Act invalid, this would not affect the validity of the Tax Act, the Grants Act, or sec. 31 of the Assessment Act.

The States also allege that the effect of the Acts regarded as a single legislative scheme is to spread the burden of existing Commonwealth and State income taxes over the taxpayers of the Commonwealth as such and thereby to effect a discrimination between the States and the taxpayers of each State as such by reference to the varying rates of income tax at present in force therein. It is sufficient to say with respect to this contention that, although admittedly taxpayers in the different States previously paid income tax to a State and the Commonwealth at varying aggregate rates, this was due to the difference in the taxation laws of the States and not to the law of the Commonwealth (Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving ^[F203] ). Taxpayers in the States who paid State income tax at lower rates than those in the other States will now have to pay more to the Commonwealth in comparison, but any attempt by the Commonwealth to make rebates to adjust this position would bring about a result in conflict with the prohibition against discrimination contained in sec. 51 (ii.) of the Constitution.

In my opinion, the actions should be dismissed.

Actions dismissed.