Hill J

Federal Court


Judgment date: Judgment delivered 13 December 1995

Hill J

At all times during the year of income ended 30 June 1990, Mrs Mansfield was a flight attendant employed by what was then known as Australian Airlines. In her tax return for that year she claimed to be entitled to a deduction in the sum of $1,215, made up of $469 claimed under the rubric ``cosmetics'', $434 for hairdressing, $132 for stockings and $180 for shoes. In respect of these items, she received an allowance from her employer in the sum of $1,019.

The Commissioner included the sum of $1,019 in her assessable income. He disallowed to her the whole of her claim for a deduction of $1,215. Mrs Mansfield objected to the assessment and that objection was disallowed. There were other items at issue between Mrs Mansfield and the Commissioner but those items no longer are in dispute. Mrs Mansfield appealed to this Court against the decision of the Commissioner disallowing her objection.

In her tax return Mrs Mansfield gave fuller details of the deduction which she claimed. In particular, she said, of her claim for a grooming allowance, that it was ``substantiated by invoices, receipts or other documentation of the expense being incurred''. She further elaborated the claim to deduct expenses for grooming in the following terms:

``To achieve and maintain the Skin and Facial Care standards as set out in the Employer's Manual considerable expenditure is incurred during the year in purchasing skin care conditioners, hand lotions, lipsticks, blush and eye make-up and other body creams. The continual working in pressurised aircrafts dries the skin and requires the use of moisturisers. Claim $469.''

Under the heading ``Hairdressing'', Mrs Mansfield said:

``The taxpayer must have clean hair and hair style [sic] that conforms to Airline regulations. This is essential with the continual handling of food. Claim $434.''

Under the heading ``Stockings'', Mrs Mansfield claimed:

``The wearing of panty hose that conforms to the colour as set down by the Airline must be worn. They must be unladdered. However, due to both the confined space of an aircraft (Galleys etc) and passengers [sic] negligence frequent laddering occurs. Claim $132.''

Under the heading ``Shoes'', there appeared the following:

``The Airline stipulates a particular coloured style of shoe to be worn as part of a Uniform Standard. It will be appreciated that due to continual walking and standing a good standard of shoe is purchased for foot comfort. On long flights a cabin shoe (flat heel) is often worn. Claim $180.''

For the taxpayer from the outset, the case was treated as if it were a test case applicable to all flight attendants in respect of claims for the costs of grooming, hairstyling, stockings and shoes. It seems clear enough that those who supported Mrs Mansfield's appeal to this Court saw themselves as fighting a case for the benefit of the industry. The Commissioner on the other hand made it clear right from the time of filing a statement of facts, issues and contentions, that one of the issues in question was whether Mrs Mansfield had, in fact, incurred any of the amount of $1,215 which she claimed. That statement of facts, issues and contentions, which to some extent was in formal terms, sought to put in issue as well as the matter of

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principle, that is to say whether outgoings of these particular kinds were deductible, the rather more confined issue whether in fact any amount at all had been incurred by Mrs Mansfield on these items.

The fact that there was a threshold issue appears rather to have escaped the attention of those who advised Mrs Mansfield. The evidence as filed was largely directed at the wider issue of deductibility to a hypothetical flight attendant of amounts of this kind, rather than to the specific issue of whether an amount of $1,215, or some part of that amount, was allowable as a deduction to Mrs Mansfield. Indeed, counsel for Mrs Mansfield appeared to have been taken by surprise when it became clear during the course of the hearing that the Commissioner, at any event, preferred to argue the question of whether Mrs Mansfield had satisfied the onus of proof under s 190(b) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (``the Act''), in showing that she had incurred the amount of $1,215, rather than to embark upon the issue of principle which counsel for Mrs Mansfield desired to litigate.

This Court has an obligation to consider with care any issue which is properly brought before it and, within reason, a litigant may argue any ground which he or she chooses. However, it is to be hoped that the parties do not believe that the time of this Court should be spent considering the question of whether an amount of something less than $500 in tax was payable by a particular taxpayer. The cost to the community of the Commissioner employing senior and junior counsel to argue that proposition can hardly be justified by reference to the amount of tax payable. It can only be justified by reference to the wider issue which counsel for Mrs Mansfield sought to agitate.

In the result, leave was given to counsel for Mrs Mansfield to adduce further evidence to overcome the deficiencies of evidence manifest at the time the hearing commenced. It is now necessary to canvass that evidence.

By the time Mrs Mansfield came to work with Australian Airlines she had been employed in the industry for some five years. She was employed by Australian Airlines in May 1981 and since that date had been a flight attendant working only on domestic routes. In the year of income this entailed flights on the eastern seaboard of Australia, as well as flights to and from Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth. Mrs Mansfield had some choice in the allocation of the routes she flew and, to the extent that she was able, chose routes that would not require her to be away from home for long periods. She had three young children for whom she cared as a single mother.

Prior to being employed with Australian Airlines, Mrs Mansfield had been employed by Airlines of New South Wales and Ansett Airlines, as that company was then known. At the time of her initial employment with the Ansett Group she had attended a flight attendants' training school in 1975. She had been instructed, at that time, by a beautician teaching at the school concerning techniques of applying makeup and the proper choice of colour for cosmetics. She was well aware, by the time of the year of income, that the combination of pressurisation and lack of humidity during a flight served to dehydrate skin and, in the result, that there was a special need to apply a moisturising agent to the skin to counter this problem.

Australian Airlines, like the Ansett Group with which Mrs Mansfield had previously been employed, conducted induction training programmes. Mrs Mansfield attended such a programme on moving to Australian Airlines. It included advice on grooming and the need for moisturisers. Not unsurprisingly, Australian Airlines placed considerable significance on the appearance and grooming standards of its flight attendants. There was on issue to flight attendants, around the year of income, a publication entitled ``Dressing for Success'' which referred to the minimum standards required by the airline to be maintained by a flight attendant throughout his or her flying career. It said, inter alia:

``... acceptable appearance in uniform is your responsibility. Failure to maintain standards may result in termination of your employment.''

The booklet set out in some detail what was acceptable and what was not acceptable in matters of grooming. It was, for example, not acceptable for a flight attendant to fly with blemishes and cold sores that could not be concealed. Shoes to be worn by a flight attendant, other than in the cabin, had to be plain navy leather court shoes with navy heels or stacked leather heels and discrete stitching. Certain types of shoes were indicated as being not acceptable. In-cabin shoes could be worn in

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flight only and had to be of a plain navy leather court style. Hosiery had to be sheer with allowable colours of tones of navy or grey. Certain colours of hosiery were deemed unacceptable. Hair was to be clean, well-cut, in good condition, styled and regularly maintained. Unstyled, untidy wash-and-wear perms were not acceptable and there were regulations as to the wearing of hair beyond a certain length.

Flight attendants, when signing on for a shift, are checked for grooming. Each year a flight attendant employed by Australian Airlines is required to undertake an annual performance review. This entails, inter alia, a monthly assessment of the state of uniform and grooming of the flight attendant. A flight attendant not presenting well-groomed or not complying with the requirements is counselled. Poor grooming could curtail promotion prospects or ultimately perhaps lead to dismissal.

Cabin pressurisation and dehydration, coupled with the requirement that the flight attendant stand for long periods of time, had the consequence that the feet of flight attendants would swell. For this reason it became necessary for them to purchase shoes at least one half size larger than those normally used by them in civilian occupations for use in the cabin. Thus in the relevant year of income Mrs Mansfield purchased shoes of the relevant colour for use in the cabin which were half a size larger than those she normally wore. There was another problem with shoes which plagued flight attendants. Working with the large trolleys that are pushed up and down the aisle for inflight service, shoes would regularly become scuffed and needed to be replaced more frequently than would have been the case in other occupations.

Evidence as to the incurring of the expenditure

Notwithstanding the statement in her tax return that she had receipts evidencing the expenditure claimed by her, Mrs Mansfield no longer had those receipts. She said that she had taken receipts to her accountant, that he had sent them back to her after preparation of the return but that she had since moved house and no longer had the receipts.

She gave evidence on oath in respect of each of the various categories of expenditure. There was no suggestion that her evidence should not be accepted, so far as it went at least, and accordingly I would make the following findings with respect to it.


In the year of income Mrs Mansfield purchased four pairs of shoes, costing between $80 and $120 on average. When she went to her accountant she had receipts only for the amount she had claimed, although she had spent approximately twice as much. In the year of income she purchased a couple of pairs of cabin shoes which would have accounted for half of the claim. This is so notwithstanding that at one point in her evidence she indicated that the claim related to one pair of high heeled shoes and one pair of cabin shoes. There was no real difference in price between cabin shoes and those that were used outside the cabin, so that I would find overall that Mrs Mansfield purchased, in the year of income, four pairs of shoes, two pairs of cabin shoes and two pairs of shoes with high heels and that the amount claimed represented the amount either for two pairs of in-cabin shoes, two pairs of shoes with high heels or one pair of each variety. The cabin shoes were worn solely inside the cabin and never outside. The shoes were purchased in shoe shops or department stores. Neither the cabin shoes nor the shoes with high heels were ever used by Mrs Mansfield, other than when she was in uniform. This was largely because she played a lot of squash so that, when out of uniform, she wore either flat sandals, shoes suitable for squash or, when dressed up, ordinary high heeled shoes.


It will be recalled that the only requirement imposed by Australian Airlines in the year of income as to stockings was colour and weight. Mrs Mansfield generally wore support hose while working because of the added support provided. She was required by her employer always to carry a spare pair of pantyhose, in addition to passport, bar change and bar tools. The pantyhose used by Mrs Mansfield were of a kind available in department stores. There was a particular brand of pantyhose said to be sheer, specifically marketed for flight attendants with the Qantas logo displayed on the packet which was advertised to outlast other pairs of stockings and to provide the sort of comfort that a Qantas flight attendant would need. However, apart from the colour there was really nothing to distinguish the pantyhose which Mrs

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Mansfield might wear from that which other women might wear in other occupations.

I accept Mrs Mansfield's evidence that, when not working as a flight attendant, she did not wear support hosiery. I accept too that stockings worn by a flight attendant continually become snagged on seats, on passengers' items such as briefcases, and on galley equipment. I accept also Mrs Mansfield's evidence that she did not wear hosiery of the same colour (ie blue or grey) when out of uniform and that she spent, as she deposed, $132 on purchasing hosiery of the kind that she was required to wear by Australian Airlines as part of her uniform.


Mrs Mansfield claimed to be entitled to a deduction in the sum of $469, being the amount spent for moisturisers. She said, and I accept, that in the year of income she expended approximately twice the amount that she claimed. About one quarter of the total amount expended by her was for makeup, the remaining three quarters being for moisturisers, creams, cleansers and body lotion. Essentially, there were two kinds of moisturising products which Mrs Mansfield purchased in the time. Sixty percent of her total expenditure was for moisturisers to combat dehydration. The remaining fifteen percent was expenditure on oil based products.

From this evidence it can be concluded that at least $469, that is to say the amount claimed, related to moisturisers used by Mrs Mansfield to combat the dehydration effects of pressurisation and lack of humidity in the cabin.

Hairdressing Expenditure

Mrs Mansfield claimed the sum of $434 as expenditure during the year for hairdressing. She said that the amount she had claimed was considerably less than the amount she had expended. Particularly, she said, that she attended a hairdresser approximately every two weeks to have a good quality conditioner applied to her hair. Further, she said she needed to wash her hair and apply moisturising substances to it every night preceding the day on which she would work as a flight attendant and needed to apply hairspray approximately four times a day because of the flattening effect upon her hair which resulted from the hat she was required to wear as part of her uniform.

The amount of $434 claimed, and I accept that she spent at least that amount on these items, covered hairspray, styling, cutting, conditioner applied by the hairdresser, conditioner applied at home, shampooing at the hairdresser and shampoo purchased for use at home. Mrs Mansfield was asked to attempt an apportionment of how much was spent on conditioning. She said that at the hairdresser she had to pay $10 extra for conditioning. As she went to the hairdresser every two weeks it can be accepted that over the year an amount of at least $100 could be attributed to the extra cost to her of conditioning. I have arrived at this figure allowing for the fact that Mrs Mansfield did not fly fifty-two weeks in a year so that some of the hairdressing expenditure could on no view be related to her employment. She said that she had to buy a revitalising creme which she used after showering every second or third day and always after flying, because she had to wear her hair pulled up and this stretched the perm she had and made it frizzy.

On the evidence I am unable to dissect the amount spent by Mrs Mansfield on hairdressing expenditure, other than to say that at least $100 of the amount claimed related to conditioning. Other amounts included in the claim related to hairdressing, styling and the like and could not properly be said to be work related.

The Flight Attendants' Award

Reference should here be made to the Flight Attendant's (Domestic Airlines) Award 1985 which, as amended, was in force at the relevant time. That Award provided for the payment to flight attendants of a cosmetic and hairdressing allowance of a weekly amount being, at the relevant time, $11.00; a hose allowance of $5.90 per week; a shoe allowance of $7.70 per week, unless shoes are issued to a flight attendant at the airline's expense. The Award also conferred an entitlement to sick leave if an employee was unable to work because of cosmetic problems.

The significance of the Award is that it recognises the requirement of a flight attendant to expend moneys on hose and shoes as well as grooming and provides for an allowance to compensate for that, in addition to ordinary salary. Although a formal submission was put that, if I should find that no deduction was available to Mrs Mansfield for the expenditure incurred by her, then the allowance should in some way or other not form part of assessable income, that submission can not be accepted. The fact that an amount paid by an employer to

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an employee for services rendered constitutes an allowance in respect of expenditure which the employee is required to undertake does not permit the conclusion that the allowance is not income in ordinary concepts. But even if it were not income within ordinary concepts, it would clearly be an allowance falling with s 26(e) and thus made assessable income:
Smith v FC of T 87 ATC 4883; (1987) 164 CLR 513 and cf
Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v FC of T 93 ATC 4508.

The relevant legal principles

Mrs Mansfield's claim arises under the provisions of s 51(1) of the Act. That section is in familiar terms and provides relevantly for a deduction of:

``... outgoings to the extent to which they are incurred in gaining or producing the assessable income... except to the extent to which they are... outgoings of... a private or domestic nature.''

To satisfy the positive requirement of s 51(1), Mrs Mansfield must show that each of the categories of expenditure to which reference has been made was incurred by her in, that is to say in the course of, gaining or producing her assessable income, that is to say, her salary. It is not necessary that she show a connection between the outgoing and salary of a particular year. What is significant is that she show a real connection between the expenditure and her activities as an employee, which activities are directed at her obtaining wages: cf
FC of T v Smith 81 ATC 4114 at 4117; (1980-1981) 147 CLR 578 at 585. As I said in
FC of T v Cooper 91 ATC 4396 at 4412; (1991) 29 FCR 177 at 197:

``... the concept enshrined in the first limb of the sub-section, is one of the deductibility of working expenses.''

To fall outside the exclusory limb of the section, Mrs Mansfield must demonstrate that the expenditure which she has incurred does not have the character of a private or domestic expense. As indeed for the purpose of deciding whether the positive limb of the sub-section is satisfied, it is necessary to look at the essential character of the expenditure: Cooper at ATC 4402; FCR 184 per Lockhart J and at ATC 4412; FCR 197 per Hill J.

The relevant authorities are discussed in the judgments in Cooper and need not be extensively repeated here. Cooper, it will be recalled, was a case where a professional footballer sought a deduction for expenditure on what he said was additional food which he consumed to combat weight loss during the football season. The Court, by majority, disallowed the deduction. The case is important in emphasising that the fact that expenditure is required to be incurred by an employee will not necessarily bring about deductibility. In Cooper the taxpayer was said to have been required by his coach to eat various amounts of steak, potato, bread and beer, ``in addition'' to his normal meal. That factual finding, somewhat at odds with the concession made by Mr Cooper's brother in the Board of Review that the so- called letter of instruction was written at the request of an accountant, did not secure the deductibility of the expenditure to Mr Cooper. This is not to say, as the Court indicated, that the terms and conditions of a taxpayer's employment are irrelevant (see per Lockhart J at ATC 4400; FCR 182, per Hill J at ATC 4414; FCR 200). At the latter page I said:

``Assuming that that letter was a direction lawfully given under Mr Cooper's contract, it does not follow that the expenditure must be deductible. An employer may require an employee to travel to and from work by a particular mode of transport, but the fact that the employee is required, as a term of his employment, to incur a particular expenditure does not convert expenditure that is not incurred in the course of the income-producing operations into a deductible outgoing. If it did, then, no doubt, employers would be besieged by employees with requests that the employer should require the particular expenditure to be incurred. There may be cases where the fact that expenditure is required to be made assists an employee to show the relevant connection between the outgoing and the activities which produce assessable income, but the decision of the High Court in FC of T v Finn (1961) 12 ATD 348; (1961) 106 CLR 60, shows that there was no difference in the availability of a deduction for overseas travel expenditure, between those expenses which the taxpayer there incurred in travelling to South America at the request of his employer, and those which he incurred in travelling to Great Britain and Europe in his own vacation time. There was, in each case, the necessary connection

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between the expenditure and the taxpayer's income- earning activities as an architect.''

Ultimately, the reason Mr Cooper failed to obtain a deduction was that there was not the necessary nexus between the increased consumption of the relevant items and Mr Cooper's activity of playing professional football. The character of the expenditure was thus neither relevant nor incidental to the actual activities which gained him the assessable income, namely, the training for and the playing of football matches. As Lockhart J observed (at ATC 4403; FCR 185):

``The taxpayer was paid money to train for and play football, not to consume food and drink. His income producing activities did not include the consumption of food and drink.''

See, too, per Hill J at ATC 4414; FCR 199-200.

Additionally, upon the facts of that case, I took the view that the expenditure in question was private expenditure and thus excluded from deductibility.

In the present case reliance was placed upon the decision at first instance of Gummow J in
FC of T v Edwards 93 ATC 5162 and of the Full Court on appeal (1994) 49 FCR 318. In that case the taxpayer, who was personal secretary to the wife of the Governor of the State of Queensland, sought a deduction for expenditure which she had incurred in purchasing hats, gloves, and formal full length evening dresses which she was required, by virtue of the duties she undertook, to purchase. Particularly, the taxpayer was expected to dress in a manner compatible with that of Lady Campbell, upon whom she attended. It was not an express condition of her employment that she wear or purchase any particular outfit, but it was certainly well understood that she was required to dress in accordance with an appropriate standard. Her personal standard of clothing was quite different from that in respect of which the claim for deduction was made. It was casual. She had, however, little private time and an allowance was made by her of one third which she said was a private use component. In dismissing the Commissioner's appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which had found in favour of Mrs Edwards, Gummow J looked at the essential character of the expenditure indicating that s 51(1) must be applied in a ``practical and commonsense fashion''. Particularly, his Honour rejected a submission that because the items of clothing were conventional and suitable or appropriate for use in circumstances when Mrs Edwards was not on duty the clothing was not ``exclusively adapted'' to use in her occupation.

On appeal, the judgment of Gummow J was unanimously upheld. In so doing the Full Court pointed to the significance of the fact that the amount claimed for expenditure was for ``additional clothing'', over and above Mrs Edwards personal requirements of modesty, decency and warmth which were dealt with by her first set of clothing on the day which was presumably private.

Counsel for the Commissioner in the present case seized upon the reference to ``additional'' changes of clothes and to clothing ``necessary for modesty, decency and warmth'' to argue that, so far as the claimed expenditure was for shoes and stockings, such items were necessary for Mrs Mansfield's modesty, decency or warmth and so ought not to be seen as deductible. With respect, that is to elevate a proposition of fact to be found in Edward's case into a proposition of law.

I turn now to look at the particular items of expenditure in the light of these cases and the principles of law which are discussed in them and in the cases to which they refer.

In my view, expenditure for moisturiser, the necessity for which was brought about by the harsh conditions of employment which Mrs Mansfield was called upon to endure, is incidental and relevant to her occupation as a flight attendant. It has the necessary connection with her activities in the cabin itself. It is these activities which are directly relevant to her gaining and producing assessable income by way of salary.

It is particularly critical for a flight attendant that he or she be well groomed and presented at all times. This is a requirement of the airline itself and there are obviously good reasons for it. The need for grooming is recognised in the Award under which Mrs Mansfield worked by the provision to her of an allowance. It is recognised in the training courses which she undertook, in the daily and monthly assessments of grooming and in the annual performance review.

As the cases indicate, the mere fact that a particular expenditure may be required to be made by the employer, while relevant will not

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be determinative of deductibility. The additional feature present in the present case is the fact that the occasion of the expenditure is to be found in Mrs Mansfield's working in the cabin, that is to say, in the dehydration brought about by pressurisation of the cabin at altitude.

In these circumstances I would hold that the expenditure claimed in respect of moisturisers for hydration is an allowable deduction under s 51(1). Because only the amount of $469 was claimed and because all of this has been shown to have been expended on moisturising for hydration, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether that part of the amount which Mrs Mansfield expended on makeup would be deductible. However, as presently advised I do not think that it would. Even if makeup as such is required by the airline as an incident of the employment, I am presently of the view that makeup retains an essential personal characteristic which excludes it from deductibility.


It must be conceded that it is difficult to express as a general principle the circumstances when expenditure on clothing may be deductible and those circumstances when it will not be. The mere fact that a particular form of clothing is required to be used in an occupation or profession will not necessarily lead to the conclusion that expenditure on that form of clothing was deductible.

It can be said that generally expenditure on ordinary articles of apparel will not be deductible, notwithstanding that such expenditure is necessary to ensure a suitable appearance in a particular job or profession. An employed solicitor may be required to dress in an appropriate way by his or her employer, but that fact alone would not bring about the result that the expenditure was deductible. On the other hand the expenditure in Edwards was expenditure upon clothing which might be said to be ``ordinary'' in the sense that it was capable of being worn by Mrs Edwards on occasions outside her employment, albeit that it was such that she would be most unlikely so to do for private purposes. Yet the clothing was deductible, after an allowance had been made for personal use. In Edwards, however, some weight was given to the fact that the expenditure was on clothing additional to that necessary in Mrs Edwards ordinary life. Some weight was, no doubt, also given to the fact that the clothing was qualitatively different from that which Mrs Edwards wore in ordinary life.

At the other end of the spectrum, the expenditure upon a distinctive uniform by an employee would ordinarily qualify for a deduction. A uniform is not merely a set of clothes reserved for the occasion of work. Rather it is the fact that the uniform has a distinctive characteristic which provides the nexus between the expenditure on the uniform and the work activity, notwithstanding that the uniform may be worn travelling to work and in circumstances where clearly modesty, if not necessarily warmth in a country such as Australia, requires the clothing be worn: cf
Mallollieu v Drummond [1983] 2 AC 861 at 875. As that case indicates, there are matters of fact and degree involved. That is so notwithstanding the differences that exist in the wording of the United Kingdom legislation and that contained in s 51(1).

The shoes in the present case were required to be worn as part of the uniform. It is true that there was nothing to distinguish the shoes from shoes which a flight attendant might purchase for domestic purposes other than, on the evidence of the present case, colour. But there are other features besides the requirement that the shoes match the remaining parts of a flight attendant's uniform which assist the taxpayer here. There is the additional feature that the cabin pressure requires the shoes to be a half size too large for ordinary use. Further, of course, there is the fact that the taxpayer's employment brings about regular scuffing of the shoes. It is these features that lead, in my view, to the conclusion that the occasion of the outgoing on shoes, that is to say cabin shoes, should be seen as being found in the duties which Mrs Mansfield performed as a flight attendant in the year of income. It is unnecessary, therefore, for me to decide what the result may have been if her claim had been not merely to deduct expenditure on cabin shoes but also expenditure on blue high heeled shoes which could be worn to and from work as well as in the cabin and which, presumably, were not a half size too large for normal usage.


The question of deductibility of the cost of support hose is more difficult. In favour of a deduction is the fact that the hosiery has to be of a particular colour (although there is at least a choice of blue and grey) so as to conform with

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the rest of the uniform which Mrs Mansfield was required to wear. Otherwise, there is nothing which distinguishes Mrs Mansfield's expenditure on pantyhose, be it support hose or otherwise, from the expenditure of any woman engaged in employment who wears support hose, either by inclination or by virtue of the additional support which a support hose might give in a non-sedentary occupation.

Not without some doubt I take the view that the connection with employment is to be found in the fact that the pantyhose is part of the uniform which Mrs Mansfield is required to wear. It does not cease to be part of the uniform merely because a choice is given of two colours. As part of the uniform, so important to the image of an airline, it finds a differentiation from ordinary clothing, so that the necessary relationship is to be found between the expenditure on the pantyhose and Mrs Mansfield's occupation as a flight attendant, and likewise the essential character of the expenditure is not to be seen as private. In other words, the expenditure can be properly seen as work-related expenditure.


Mrs Mansfield has shown only that the sum of $100 has been outlaid on conditioner necessitated by the lack of humidity and pressurisation of the cabin. This amount falls in the same category as the moisturiser to which reference has already been made. The remaining expenditure on hairdressing, in my view, could not be deductible. The fact that Mrs Mansfield was required by her employer to be well groomed and presentable does not of itself operate to confer deductibility. Expenditure on hairdressing is of a private nature. There is no additional feature which shows any relationship between the expenditure on the one hand and Mrs Mansfield's employment as a flight attendant. The expenditure does not have the character of employment-related expenditure and in my view is not deductible. Her selection of a perm, which requires somewhat regular maintenance, is her choice. It is not occasioned by her employment.

As Mrs Mansfield has been substantially successful, I would order that the objection decision of the Commissioner be set aside and the objection remitted to the Commissioner for reconsideration in accordance with the reasons. The Commissioner must pay Mrs Mansfield's costs of the appeal.


1. The objection decision of the Commissioner be set aside.

2. The objection be remitted to the Commissioner for reconsideration in accordance with these reasons.

3. The respondent to pay the applicant's costs.

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