State Government Insurance Office (Qld) v Crittenden
117 CLR 412(Judgment by: Menzies J)
State Government Insurance Office (Qld)
vCrittenden
Judges:
McTiernan ACJ
Taylor J
Menzies JWindeyer J
Judgment date: 9 September 1966
Sydney
Judgment by:
Menzies J
This appeal is against a judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland overruling a demurrer by the State Government Insurance Office (Queensland) as third party to a statement of claim delivered by the defendant Crittenden. The ground of the demurrer was that, if the defendant be liable in the action to the plaintiff Purkess, that liability is not covered by the third party insurance granted by the State Government Insurance Office to Crittenden. The plaintiff's claim is for the loss of consortium and the point at issue between the parties is whether such damages brought about by injury to the plaintiff's wife caused by the defendant's alleged negligent use of an insured motor vehicle would be "damages in respect of such motor vehicle for accidental bodily injury ... to any person".
There is little doubt that compulsory third party insurance is intended broadly to afford protection to users of motor vehicles who become subject to liability because of bodily injury caused to others by the use of their motor vehicles, and to persons who become entitled to damages by reason of the bodily injury so caused. The appellant contends, however, that in Queensland, by reason of the wording of s. 3 of The Motor Vehicles Insurance Acts, 1936 to 1961, this protection is limited to persons who actually suffer bodily injury-and, in the case of fatal bodily injury, to the dependants of the deceased-and to those liable in damages to persons so injured. The contention, put in the language of statutory construction, is that it is only liability to a person or the estate of a person who himself suffers "accidental bodily injury" from the use of a motor vehicle which is correctly described as liability for damages "in respect of such motor vehicle for accidental bodily injury ... to any person".
I do not think the section, which is intended to meet a well-recognized social and economic problem, should be construed so narrowly as to reduce it to but a partial solution of that problem and I do not accept the appellant's narrow construction of such a beneficial provision. I am prepared to uphold the judgment appealed against on the ground that where a husband is entitled to damages for the loss of the consortium of his wife owing to injury caused to her by the use of a motor vehicle, the person liable is a person legally liable "by way of damages in respect of such motor vehicle for accidental bodily injury ... to any person". In such circumstances, the "any person" who suffers "accidental bodily injury" is the wife, and the liability in damages of the person responsible for the injury to the wife is a liability in respect of such motor vehicle for accidental bodily injury to the wife. It is true that in establishing such liability the plaintiff must prove more than the negligent use of the defendant's motor vehicle and his wife's injury caused thereby; he will also have to prove his own damages due to his wife's injury. This further element, however, does not, in my opinion, take the liability outside the description of a liability for damages "in respect of such motor vehicle". The plaintiff's action, to use the language of Kitto J. in Curran v. Young [16] , is "an action for the damage caused to the husband by the injury of the wife" by reason of the use of the motor car. Such damages seem to me to fall within the conception of "damages in respect of" a motor vehicle.
The appellant had, of course, to concede that s. 3 (1) applies to indemnify a person liable to damages at the suit of the dependants of a person killed by a motor car. The significance of this for present purposes, regardless of how it comes about, is that the section does unquestionably provide an indemnity against a liability which depends not only upon proof of death caused by the negligent use of a motor vehicle, but depends in addition upon proof of dependancy, and yet is a liability for damages "in respect of such motor vehicle for accidental bodily injury ... to any person". In an action for loss of consortium, the proof of the husband's loss corresponds, in my opinion, to the proof of loss by members of the deceased's family-that is, dependancy-in a Lord Campbell's Act claim.
In his careful and comprehensive judgment in the Full Court, Gibbs J. analyses (a) other provisions of the Act to support construing the words "for accidental bodily injury" in s. 3 (1) as broadly equivalent to "in respect of accidental bodily injury" and (b) authorities bearing upon the present problem decided in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and New Zealand. I would regard it as supererogatory to do more than to express my agreement with what his Honour has said about these sections and decisions.
In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed.