State Government Insurance Office (Qld) v Crittenden
117 CLR 412(Judgment by: Windeyer J)
State Government Insurance Office (Qld)
vCrittenden
Judges:
McTiernan ACJ
Taylor J
Menzies J
Windeyer J
Judgment date: 9 September 1966
Sydney
Judgment by:
Windeyer J
I agree that this appeal should be dismissed. The Act (which must govern the meaning of the insurance policy) speaks of a legal liability "by way of damages ... for accidental bodily injury (fatal or non-fatal) to any person". It is not expressed to relate only to a legal liability to a person who himself suffers bodily injury.
A plaintiff who has himself suffered a bodily injury by the fault of another recovers damages measured by the consequences of the hurt to him - expenses to which he has been or will be put, loss of wages, loss of amenities, pain and suffering and so forth. But the damage that is of the essence of his cause of action is not the measured consequences of the hurt but the fact of hurt. It is this that gives rise to the right to damages.
On the other hand the damage that is of the essence of a cause of action for loss of the consortium of a plaintiff's wife or of the services of his servant is that loss itself. That it may be the result of a bodily injury of the wife or servant is only incidental. It is not the fact of bodily injury but its consequence that gives rise to the right to damages.
I do not overlook the distinction. I agree with the appellant's submission that it is fundamental. But saying that does not I think answer the question we have to decide. The words "damages for accidental bodily injury" seem to me, in the context of the Act, apt to cover both kinds of claim. That they can in this context be given a wide application without doing violence to meaning or grammar is, I think, shewn by the judgment of my brother Taylor, which I have had the advantage of reading. The Act is not a model of drafting. But I do not think that its apparent remedial purpose should be defeated by a meticulous construction.